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Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in Technical Cooperation

An Overview of the National and International Debate

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Foreword

Since the early 90s, an intensive international and national debate has been under way concerning the role and impact of development cooperation in the context of violent conflicts. The shock of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 heightened the debate, revolving around two main questions: How and through which instruments can programmes and projects of development cooperation make a contribution to conflict management and crisis prevention? How can development organisations prevent their activities from themselves exacerbating the conflicts concerned?

Multi- and bilateral, governmental and non-governmental organisations currently attach high priority to answering these difficult questions. Presently in many institutions attempts are being made to develop strategies and possible solutions. This statement also applies to GTZ and Technical Cooperation as a whole. It is, however, becoming increasingly difficult to keep pace with the new developments and innovations, as well as to integrate positive results and experiences. Nevertheless, considering the future professional requirements for personnel working in TC, it is absolutely essential that they take part in the international and national expert debate, to foster their conceptual development and positioning.

Through the present study, GTZ aims to help provide theoreticians and practitioners with an overview of the current status of that debate. Given the speed of developments, the publication can provide only a snapshot of the state-of-the-art. Further monitoring and exploration of the subjects discussed are a must.

Our thanks are due to the two authors of the publication, Dr. Andreas Mehler and Claude Ribaux. In a relatively short space of time, they have succeeded in conducting numerous interviews, and in collecting and collating a wealth of information. The text is enriched by the authors' own reflections and thoughtful remarks. We hope the publication will provide all readers with food for thought when shaping their own views.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGEH	Association for Development Aid (Germany)
AGKED	Association of Church Development Services (Germany)
ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BMVg	German Federal Ministry of Defence
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIAS	Conflict Impact Assessment
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CPR	Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network
CPS	Civil Peace Service
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of OECD
DEA	Development-oriented Emergency Aid
DED	German Development Service
DEZA	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG	Directorate-General (EU Commission))
EAWARN	The Network for the Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict (Russia)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EU	European Union
EZE	Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid (Germany)
FAST	Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding (Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
FC	Financial Cooperation
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany)
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH (Germany)
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System (UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs)

IA	International Alert
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Germany)
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany)
LPI	Life and Peace Institute (Sweden)
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
NOVIB	Nederlands Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRA	Participatory Rapid Appraisal
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRC	Swiss Red Cross
TC	Technical Cooperation
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN DPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WSP	War-torn Societies Project

Authors' Preliminary Remarks

The following findings, reflections, experiences and comments from the domain of crisis prevention and conflict management in Technical Cooperation are the combined result of our study of documents, of interviews we held, of the analysis of our own experiences, and of our active discussions with a considerable number of persons. Staff members, managers and desk officers from over 25 bilateral, multilateral and private organisations in over ten countries invested their valuable time in answering our questions, giving us tips and tracking down documents. We owe them our sincere thanks. Without their assistance, and the energetic support of the staff of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, it would not have been possible in the time available to gain a virtually complete picture of the situation in this rapidly evolving field of discussion.

The methods applied in preparing the study comprised informal talks, structured interviews, and study of the literature, brochures and websites. In a first phase we contacted possible interviewees, and informed them in writing about GTZ's project, the context of the study and the anticipated product. Informal talks were held wherever possible. The structured interviews were held on the basis of a questionnaire, developed in consultation with GTZ. We asked questions concerning the activities of the interviewee's organisation in the fields of crisis prevention and conflict management, the principles of action, and the planning of projects. We wanted to know how conflict analysis was enacted in crisis and pre-crisis situations, how crisis prevention and conflict management structures became integral parts of institutions, and what funds were being made available. Since capacity building is key to later results in any area of work, we also focused some of our attention on this important issue, a line of enquiry which led us directly to the challenge of staff training. It was of course also important to learn how the various organisations assess the importance of crisis prevention and conflict management now and in the future, and to find out where Technical Cooperation (TC) can have recourse to comparative advantages. We supplemented the information thus obtained by studying written materials such as annual reports, brochures on the organisations, studies and

evaluations on specific themes, general literature, and presentations on the internet.

We had to complete the interviews, the reading, and the writing of the report within a few weeks. This meant that for practical reasons we were unable to make a planned journey to North America, which would have included visits to Canada and the USA, as well as further interviews that had been envisaged for Europe. The study thus represents a snapshot of the present status, with a focus on Europe. The analysis of the state-of-the-art of the North American institutions was conducted through correspondence, and by studying the existing documentation. Unfortunately it was not possible to conduct interviews with organisations outside of Europe, for instance with Japanese non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

In accordance with GTZ's wishes, the scope of the study was confined to Technical Cooperation. Clearly, in certain areas the boundaries of TC are also permeable to other forms of activity, and vice versa.

To add some colour to the analysis, we have incorporated project examples into the text. It was, however, neither our task nor our intention to evaluate or comment on the quality of these projects in any way.

To enhance the utility of the text, we have attached an annex listing the relevant websites. It includes the addresses of over 80 homepages of organisations operating in the field of crisis prevention and conflict management. We decided to include the list without comment, so that readers can form their own impression. The annex also contains references to a few key documents which we believe are particularly helpful in the context of the current debate.

Andreas Mehler/Claude Ribaux, June 2000

Summary

Crisis prevention and conflict management are comparatively new, but already prominent issues for national and international, and governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in development cooperation. The current debate revolves around two questions of more or less equal importance:

1. How and through which instruments can Technical Cooperation (TC) help prevent crises?
2. How can TC organisations prevent their own activities from also unintentionally exacerbating the crisis?

At a concrete level a further question arises: How can TC organisations better brief and prepare their staff for assignments to countries in crisis, assignments which are becoming increasingly standard?

To answer these questions, the study is broken down into five sections. The first section elucidates the current importance of the debate. It is followed by a discussion of the development-policy debate concerning crisis prevention and conflict management. The third section takes the reader from project planning to impact monitoring, introducing the range of instruments currently used or under discussion, from early warning to conflict impact assessment. The fourth section focuses on briefly describing and exemplifying innovative areas of activity. This is followed by a discussion of staff training, and a presentation of future options as well as open questions. A list of key websites and a bibliography completes the report.

The study also provides information on the current national and international professional debate, and explains the current conceptual, analytical, institutional and operational approaches related to the issues at stake.

The Current Importance of the Subjects Discussed

Since the mid-1990s, the development-policy debate has been on the move. The secular shock of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 – Rwanda was a focal country for numerous donor organisations – triggered the new debate. International bodies increasingly turned

their attention to violent conflicts. The conclusions they drew, coupled with public awareness-raising activities conducted by specialised non-governmental organisations (NGOs), influenced all actors engaged in development cooperation. A marked increase in self-critical viewpoints ensued. At the same time, something like a fiercely contested "market" emerged for crisis prevention and conflict management measures. This is indisputably linked to explicit political directives on the part of national governments and international organisations, as well as to changes in budgeting. The emergence and growth of networks of development organisations and experts bears witness to the increasing significance of the discussion of violent conflicts, and their prevention. In most organisations, the new requirement to act somewhat inconsistently with established practices, and real resistance within the institutional apparatus, have delayed an offensive treatment of conflict-related challenges.

Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate

From the international relations perspective, development cooperation is also seen as an instrument to influence (domestic) policymaking in partner countries, and this increasingly with a view to preventing violent conflicts. Technical Cooperation has both advantages and disadvantages compared to Financial Cooperation, political dialogue, the work of political foundations or even military interventions, when pursuing this objective. The reduction of structural disparities is one of its most obvious strengths.

The international debate is sometimes marred by the broad diversity of terms used in discourse. The terms crisis prevention and conflict management have become the established standard in the German-speaking countries. Increasingly, the strengthening of peace constituencies is being specified as a strategic goal.

International Positions

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD), the European Union (EU) and a number of actors of the UN family have come forward with key conceptual approaches to crisis prevention. Bilateral donors have in many cases adopted, filtered or combined those positions, and proceeded to apply them in their own work in a variety of concrete settings. Among the most important, internationally acknowledged conceptual contributions are the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation of 1997, which are planned to be revised in the year 2000. The concept of a "culture of prevention" has been strongly supported by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. If applied with consistency this concept paves the way to seeing all kinds of development projects as potentially helpful to prevent crises, provided that they are designed accordingly. Having said that, a number of innovative activities may be more efficient than mainstream development programmes tuned into crisis prevention and conflict management projects. Bilateral donors have addressed the issue with various levels of intensity, with the UK, the Netherlands and Norway playing a prominent role in the European context.

Policy Frameworks in Germany

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been devoting increased attention to crisis prevention since the mid-1990s. The new German Government has devoted major prominence to this increasingly critical field. The Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, has indicated that development cooperation must become more active in two main areas:
1. To help eradicate the structural causes of violent conflicts by improving economic, social, ecological and political conditions in partner countries.
2. To help establish mechanisms of non-violent conflict management.

The national debate has been stimulated by a widely circulated evaluation of development cooperation programmes in six countries affected by crisis. Politically, new pressure is being mounted due to an intensified discussion of the instrument of the

"Civil Peace Service" (CPS). At the same time a list of crisis indicators is being tested in a pilot phase. Seen in a broad context, BMZ has positioned itself closely in line with the mainstream strategic and conceptual approaches shared by the international community.

Principles of Intervention

The strategic and conceptual approach to crisis prevention and conflict management is characterised by a number of principles, with the "do no harm" principle enjoying the greatest prominence. Consequently, a critical look needs to be taken at the unintended impacts of humanitarian and development aid. The debate is also marked by a call for a willingness to take risks, and long-term commitment. In a process of self-critical reflection by TC, codes of conduct are being discussed which are designed to reduce the negative side-effects of TC.

Instruments:
Early Warning, Reporting and Analysis in Crisis Prevention

The first requirement for crisis-sensitivity is a knowledge of the causes and risks of the conflict. Early warning is one dimension of crisis prevention that has received a comparatively large amount of attention from the academic community, without any ready-made solutions tailored to the practical requirements of TC having been promised. For an early warning system to have any prospect of being applied, it must be tailored to the needs of the end user. TC institutions, which can be both beneficiaries and providers of early warning systems, and academics will no doubt also be experimenting with various models in the future. One advantage of TC organisations with respect to information gathering is their relatively close contact with grass-roots target groups, giving them almost exclusive access to knowledge on conflict situations in certain disadvantaged regions. To date, however, the reality of development cooperation is that the flow of information has been disrupted by numerous structurally-induced obstructions.

Analytical capacities are underdeveloped in almost all TC organisations, with staff shortage usually being specified as the

main reason. Attempts are made to compensate this by calling-in external expertise. In a number of cases, help desk functions are performed externally, and country analyses are often commissioned to external third parties. In summary, country studies should display four strengths, although these are rarely likely to be achieved simultaneously:

- adequate overview of the situation on the ground;
- knowledge of the potentials for intervention, constraints and budget lines of the commissioning party;
- general overview of the entire spectrum of crisis prevention measures;
- clear recommendations on appropriate priority setting.

Planning

When cooperating with countries in crisis, a number of organisations begin by designing their activities on the basis of more crisis-sensitive planning than in "normal cases" of cooperation. This approach to project planning encounters the general obstacle of rigid financing models; more flexible procedures (for instance conflict-related budget reserves) are only gradually emerging. Explicit strategies for countries in crisis can raise awareness and promote sensitivity in this field.

Institutionalisation and Capacity Building

The institutionalisation of crisis prevention and conflict management in TC organisations and responsible ministries varies widely: entire departments on the one hand, the lone figure of the conflict advisor or loosely-structured working groups on the other. All these solutions have advantages and disadvantages, depending on the requirements as well as the financial potentials. Having said that, a "narrow gauge" solution is unlikely to be the appropriate response to the numerous new challenges.

Impact Assessment

So far there have been only few evaluations of TC in terms of crisis prevention. However, the major organisations are in the process of developing criteria and terms of reference for their consultants, in order to ensure a more systematic approach to conflict-related issues.

As with impact assessment in development cooperation in general, conflict impact assessment (CIAS) also faces the basic problem that it is very difficult to ascribe individual outcomes and developments to specific causes, given the large number of actors, projects and other factors involved. Although CIAS is still being developed, it is already seen not as an end-result-oriented instrument, but as a tool for in-process analysis, especially since the impacts in question (trajectory of violent conflicts and peace processes) are of a dynamic nature.

Areas of Activity

There is little certainty and barely any comparative studies available on what practice will most likely yield the most promising results. However, there is a common understanding that governance measures are significantly conducive to peace. At the same time, the dominant view within TC organisations is that the same effects can be achieved by applying the correct mix of measures from TC's own broad repertoire. It is thus assumed that the issue of whether project impacts reduce or exacerbate a conflict cannot be assessed simply on the basis of their sectoral focus.

Consequently, almost any traditional development project can, under certain circumstances, generate preventive impacts, or exacerbate tensions. The key approach here is to adapt measures intelligently, gearing them explicitly to reducing the causes of violent conflicts (structural disparities, poor governance, pressure of migration etc.). Some activities that are conducive primarily – and not just incidentally – to crisis prevention can be identified. This is most evidently the case with security-sector reform (the triad of the security forces, and the justice and penal systems), and community-based peace-building. The latter is proposed in the increasing number of cases of state collapse, focusing on support

for traditional leaders at the local level and district councils formed on a "bottom-up" basis. These two approaches clearly illustrate the key role played by the redefinition of the state in countries in crisis, with respect to TC. Furthermore, the promotion of local and regional initiatives for conflict management, support to the media, education and training for peace, legal assistance, democratisation, and trauma healing and reconciliation are certainly amongst the core innovations in this field. Also relevant are specific measures to promote crisis prevention and conflict management within the reconstruction process, and a keen awareness of gender issues. Joint conflict analysis by the parties involved, resulting ideally in a consensus on the causes and course of the conflict, can be a first step towards overcoming social barriers, and facilitate the formulation of alternatives to armed conflict. In asymmetrical conflicts in particular, however, it is absolutely essential that the weaker side be empowered to articulate its own objectives first, otherwise there will be no "basis for negotiation" on which conflict management can build.

Conflict management aims to bring about constructive solutions, where possible for all parties to the conflict, and therefore requires a needs analysis. Many TC organisations claim to be "apolitical". This philosophy is an obstacle to conflict management, because TC is per se of a political nature. The numerous development projects that already exist around the world offer broad scope for constructive conflict management, which could be better utilised. In a number of domains TC has strategic advantages, in that it has already gained experiences (community development, education, participatory planning, gender issues). It also often has the necessary contacts on the ground, and enjoys the trust also of the poorer sections of the population. But as in other areas, TC organisations can be perceived primarily as sources of money, and be instrumentalised by local partners for completely unsatisfactory ends. One challenge for conflict management is the fact that most promising initiatives operate locally and with a relatively small number of people. How can small, isolated activities be harnessed to create a critical mass which might prevent the outbreak of violent conflict? Only a well thought-out overall scaling-up strategy can help achieve this.

Staff Training

Work in conflict, crisis or post-war situations places high demands on personnel. It requires a broad spectrum of technical, social and personal expertise. This includes for instance an ability to analyse conflicts and accurately assess the risk, an ability to engage in intercultural communication, and stress management skills. In recent years, organisations and institutions seconding civilian personnel on peace missions have increasingly acknowledged the need to improve the briefing and preparation of those personnel (development workers, peace experts etc.) for such assignments to zones of conflict or crisis. By contrast, TC organisations as a whole still have work to do in this respect. A situation is arising in which the expertise required for specific programmes and projects of crisis prevention, and especially conflict management, is more frequently to be found outside the existing staffs of TC organisations than within them. Also, virtually no TC organisations conduct systematic debriefing of staff returning from countries in crisis.

Summary Evaluation

Crisis prevention and conflict management are still relatively recent areas of TC activity. It is evident that TC has not yet fully utilised its potential to positively influence conflicts and crises, whilst at the same time TC continues to exacerbate crises unintentionally. The recent prominence of conflict-related issues in development-policy discourse is only now beginning to result in new financial, conceptual, personnel policy and institutional priorities. A number of TC organisations are, however, making considerable efforts in all these fields. Nevertheless, at present, existing tools are not being applied, and there is a lack of training and impact assessment. There is also a lack of coherence and coordination with other policies (diplomacy, foreign trade, security policy). It is quite obvious that political dialogue, political education and crisis-sensitive TC can generate complementary effects. However, the harmonisation requirement is high, and is usually poorly served. This all the more so due to the fact that in partner countries it would be necessary to coordinate the activities not only

of one donor, but also those of a large number of international actors. A number of open questions remain. Numerous efforts still have to be undertaken if the universally manifest prominence of the new paradigm is to generate relevant impacts at the level of project implementation. The future credibility of TC and development cooperation as a whole will depend very much on the results yielded by those efforts.

1. The Current Importance of Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

Since the mid-1990s, the development-policy scene has seen dynamic conceptual changes and debates, fuelled by the secular shock of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Rwanda was a focal country for numerous donor organisations. International bodies increasingly turned their attention to violent conflicts. The conclusions they drew, coupled with public awareness-raising activities conducted by specialised non-governmental organisations (NGOs), changed the ways all the development actors were thinking. A marked increase in self-critical viewpoints ensued. At the same time, something like a fiercely contested "market" emerged for crisis prevention and conflict management measures. This is indisputably linked to explicit political directives on the part of national governments and international organisations, as well as to changes in budgeting. The emergence and growth of thematic networks of development cooperation organisations and experts bears witness to the increasing significance of the theme of violent conflicts, and how to prevent them.

In Germany the debate also gained key impetus from the strategic thinking of the new political leadership at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the results of a cross-section report on evaluations of German development cooperation in six countries affected by crises, and the establishment of a "Civil Peace Service" (cf. Section 2.4).

Development cooperation and conflicts

Development cooperation in general, and Technical Cooperation (TC) in particular, do not per se prevent crises. Development cooperation is rather also a factor triggering conflicts, and indeed must be so if it is to achieve its declared aim of promoting development in partner countries. For decades, the issue of how to manage conflicts, and of whether or not they can be resolved peacefully, was debated only peripherally by development organisations. Today, development

professionals are intensively debating the positive contributions their institutions and organisations can make, and the conditions required for that.

Questioning old certainties

Crisis prevention and conflict management are thus comparatively new cross-cutting issues for TC. Although development cooperation came to see itself also as peace work early on, it adopted a view which was not always ideology-free: It was believed that, since Technical Cooperation served the end of poverty alleviation, and since poverty was the basic cause of crises and conflicts, TC was therefore serving peace. Since the mid-1980s, new ways of thinking have become established, and some of the old certainties of development cooperation have been called into question. As the Cold War came to an end, self-imposed blinkers were cast off: Partner governments which had hitherto been unquestioningly considered development-oriented in many cases now came to be seen as key constraints to sustainable development. Shortly thereafter, donors admitted to themselves that their own instruments and behavioural patterns were often inadequately serving their proclaimed ends, and that development cooperation might also be serving to support elites hostile to reform. Whilst initially this politico-social status quo was considered as inevitable, however much it might be constraining the development process, towards the mid-1990s it became increasingly clear that some of these elites were even steering a direct political course towards civil war and disintegration of the state (Annan 1998).

Endogenous processes....

There are certainly various factors shaping international thinking on crises and conflicts. In a number of cases the regional and international dimensions are undeniable (Kosovo, Democratic Republic of the Congo). Yet we observed the recent tendency to see under-development – and the difficulties in the transition to systems of liberal democratic government – less as the result of a (sometimes poorly functioning) global political and economic system, and more as an internal problem of

national institutions and elites, or as a consequence of endogenous modernisation processes. This led to a stronger emphasis on support for human rights issues, the establishment of civil society and the promotion of democracy. These aspects became – at least verbally – essential back-up components of structural adjustment programmes.

Based on the assumption that development problems are mainly of a local nature (Carnegie Commission 1997), but cannot be solved by countries internally, over the last 15 years an increasing number of external interventions were legitimated on the grounds that they were preventing refugee flows, genocide or mass killings. TC needs to specifically address this changed constellation. Whereas relations with the poorest countries were formerly a privilege almost exclusively reserved for TC, diplomacy and the private sector, in recent years a variety of new actors have entered the arena. They somehow compete on TC's "traditional territory", thus making it necessary for TC organisations to consult the new actors and coordinate activities with them. UN emergency aid operations (implemented in part through TC agencies), peace-keeping missions, military operations, delegations of political parties and spontaneous local initiatives of concerned citizens in Europe and North America are factors and actors with which TC today has to live (or co-exist), and in some cases even extend support to. This trend, however, is creating two problems for donors and implementing organisations:

... and external interventions

1. Emergency and humanitarian aid are consuming ever-increasing shares of the budget available for development assistance.
2. In light of the events around the refugee camps in the Great Lakes region (following the genocide in Rwanda), and perhaps also earlier events, emergency aid came in for massive public criticism for its tendency to also exacerbate conflicts (Prendergast 1996, Joint Evaluation 1996, Jean 1999).

Development cooperation – a factor exacerbating conflicts?

So do traditional TC and emergency aid in their present form contribute unintentionally to exacerbating conflicts, rather than preventing them? In conflict situations, both positive and negative impacts of development cooperation can be identified.

Possible positive and negative impacts of development cooperation in conflict situations

Possible positive impacts/contributions	Possible negative impacts/contributions
Eventual removal of causes of conflicts (regional disparities, employment opportunities, defusing of conflicts over resources, etc.)	Direct support for and stabilisation of the government (through official development cooperation), which is itself a party to the conflict
Political and social stabilisation in the short and medium term due to reconstruction efforts	Wrong signals sent to the government and opposition forces through "omission" (e.g. failure to seize opportunities during the policy dialogue) and "approval"
Political openness, participation, democratisation and increase in conflict awareness of societies and political systems	Exacerbation of the conflict through the encouragement given to clientele systems and opportunities for corruption
Achievement of security and improved human rights conditions due to the presence of development cooperation personnel	Increased regional imbalances through the promotion of certain regions to the ruling elite's liking
Removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of clientele systems by means of economic reform programmes/structural adjustment	Violent countermeasures taken by the regime as a result of pressure for political reform (eventually, however, removal of potential for violence)
	Easing of the pressure exerted by development cooperation for action to deal with the causes of conflicts ("internationalisation" of government tasks)

Source: Stephan Klingebiel, Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations, Berlin 1999, p.25. The box there also includes a further column specifying "problematical" impacts.

Today, virtually all major multilateral and bilateral Technical Cooperation agencies, church-based development organisations, political foundations and NGOs are addressing these problems. The focus is on two questions of more or less equal significance:

■ How, and with which instruments, can development cooperation agencies help prevent crises?

■ And how can they prevent their inputs from themselves unintentionally exacerbating the conflict?

At a practical level, the following questions quickly emerge:

■ How do institutions prepare their personnel for assignments to countries in crisis?

■ Are they or their partners able to engage in constructive conflict management?

These questions logically imply a number of thoughts concerning the correct institutional, analytical, conceptual and operational approaches to pursue.

In crisis-affected countries as well as in donor countries a new field of activities is emerging; that activity area is engaging a whole range of actors outside of Technical Cooperation, namely diplomats, the military and experts with different backgrounds of experience. Thus TC represents but one segment of the potentials for influencing violent conflicts, and is therefore only one actor among many.

The relative contribution of TC to crisis prevention

In view of this the conviction has emerged that only a coherent approach harmonising diverse policy fields (security, foreign, trade and development policy) can help successfully prevent crises. Although TC's relative contribution to achieving that success is rated differently by different authors, nowhere in the literature is it considered crucial. (No doubt the same applies to its relative responsibility for the unintentional exacerbation of conflicts). Caution should be observed in avoiding exaggerated expectations. Nevertheless, first evaluations do indicate that measures specifically tailored to the conflict are very much more effective

Coherence is a must

than a late and reactive response by TC to a violent conflict (Klingebiel 1999, Uvin 1999).

It is therefore time to determine more precisely the place of TC within crisis prevention and conflict management. The object of the present study is to explicate the existing conceptual understanding, and the present state of the debate concerning appropriate approaches and real scope for action in this connection.

2. Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management in the Development-policy Debate

Since the mid-1990s, the issue of violent conflicts has moved sharply up the development-cooperation agenda. Inevitably, the specifics of TC have often been a secondary consideration, given the wider focus on overall engagement. Possessing the capability to take proactive action to remove causes of conflicts and to promote the non-violent settlement of conflicts is just as much in the interests of development organisations as their ensuring that they do not unintentionally exacerbate conflicts. The development community is still far from having fully discussed the issue of how to achieve these twin objectives.

Peace studies and applied theory of international relations have yielded a variety of entry points for preventive action in practical development work (Ramersbotham/Woodhouse 1999). In the wider context of international relations, development cooperation is also seen as an instrument for shaping policymaking, essentially in terms of political conditionality.

Theory and practice

"We believe it is legitimate to use development aid as a "carrot" or "stick" to get parties to accept third-party mediation and, also, to change policies that are increasing the risk of conflict. Before doing so, however, careful assessment should be made of the likely effects on the parties concerned."

Source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, Oslo 1998, p.4.

Having said that, "positive" conditionality is considered a more promising approach overall than "negative" conditionality (Uvin 1999).

Only after the genocide in Rwanda (1994) did some of the key actors in development cooperation embark on an arduous process of filtering out feasible and compatible approaches, and of coming to understand their own potentials and limits in this regard. That process is still far from complete. In most organisations, incompatibilities with established practices and real resistance within the institutional apparatus have delayed any offensive tackling of this challenge.

2.1 Distinctions

At this point those features of Technical Cooperation that distinguish it from other actors and forms of intervention within the field of crisis prevention and conflict management will be identified. In doing so it is hoped to obtain some first knowledge on comparative advantages and drawbacks.

The place of TC within crisis prevention

The most obvious approach for TC is to address structural disparities that might be considered causes of conflicts: the gap between rich and poor, regional underprivilege, urban bias etc. This is the traditional field of action of Technical and Financial Cooperation (FC), which the latter need share with barely any other actors. NGO measures often differ from official TC in that, increasingly, they are being applied in "difficult" regions (such as in "collapsed states" à la Somalia) or special fields (such as mediation) (Klingebiel 1999). In both cases, local capacity-building is a priority.

Influencing policymaking

A second group of key factors causing conflicts involves poor governance in partner countries. Such situations can be influenced through political dialogue conducted jointly by diplomats and the central administration in the ministries responsible for development cooperation. Traditionally, political foundations also operate in this domain by participating in or initiating topical political debates, and by promoting political education. Technical Cooperation

has also for a long time been playing a role in supporting good governance: it seeks to help bring good governance about by seconding government advisors to various ministries.

Compared to political dialogue proper, TC has the disadvantage of lacking political leverage, but has the advantage of a close relationship to target groups. It is possible that potentials for constructively addressing conflicts might also emerge at the local level – for instance in a natural resource management project – that are not always exhausted.

Comparison with political dialogue

Compared to the work of political foundations, TC has the drawback of being closely tied to state structures, but the advantage of a larger volume of funds being available, which is needed for sustainable structural reforms designed to secure peace (for instance decentralisation). It is quite obvious that political dialogue, political education and crisis-sensitive TC can operate on a complementary basis. Having said that, the consultation and coordination requirement is high and is usually poorly met. This is all the more so because it would be necessary in all partner countries to coordinate not only the activities of one donor, but those of a large number of international actors.

Comparison with the work of political foundations

Military peace-keeping missions, which are usually conducted under a UN mandate, are rarely applied preventively in the true sense of the word. They usually secure peace accords designed to put an end to an escalation in violence. The efficiency of these missions is itself the subject of a separate debate which cannot be dealt with here. Military interventions and TC do, however, share the experience that the will to maintain peace on the part of the parties to the conflict is crucial to the success of their own actions. In the domain of civil-military cooperation there are overlapping, joint objectives and actions. Compared to TC, military interventions are very much more costly – a sound argument for civil intervention, and especially for preventive as opposed to post-conflict involvement.

Military interventions

Comparison with Financial Cooperation

Compared to Financial Cooperation, TC has smaller budgets to help bring about medium-term structural changes in specific sectors. Yet this need not be a disadvantage. Compared to FC, TC has the advantage of having in its hands experts and its own analytical capability and, in the event of a crisis escalating, of being more readily able to re-orient projects. FC-financed large-scale projects (dams, roads) entail an unusually high risk of conflict, and can themselves even contribute to the emergence of conflicts. Material and financial assistance promote partner governments – which can mean a needed boost to legitimacy (and reduce one factor causing crises), but at the same time can also unleash means of oppression and warfare. Once money has been disbursed, FC has only limited means to exert further influence, for instance by attaching conditionalities to further disbursements, or benchmarking. However, FC too has addressed its new challenges and is seeking both ways to limit damaging secondary impacts, and to positively influence existing conflicts (KfW 1999). Partner governments often have a particularly strong interest in FC, which is why "a link to political dialogue or to conditionalities may in principle be highly effective" (Klingebiel 1999, p. VII). TC also often involves a long-term commitment and a profound understanding of partner structures, which in the eventuality of rising tensions should provide a sound data base permitting appropriate low-level intervention.

Role in reconstruction

The reconstruction of a war-torn society and its economy in particular requires a considerable deployment of funds, which can help prevent crises provided that the key design faults in the structures existing prior to the escalation can be rectified. A number of observers therefore see TC's contribution to crisis prevention as being primarily in the domain of post-conflict reconstruction. In this case, what is being prevented is a second escalation of violence. However, the need for macro-economic reforms in post-conflict situations is often just as great as the need for technical

reconstruction assistance. Yet even the World Bank, which appeared to be specialised in this kind of involvement, is now seeking ways to intervene in all phases of a conceivable conflict cycle (World Bank 1998, Moyroud 1999).

2.2 The Confusing Multitude of Terms

The multitude of terms currently employed in the field discussed is problematic. It makes it more difficult to reach a common understanding of what is actually meant: conflict resolution, conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict transformation, crisis prevention, peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy, peace-building – these and other terms are sometimes used interchangeably, even though they are intended to designate a precise segment of possible activities. Whereas conflict resolution focuses on ending the conflict, which usually cannot be brought about by external intervention, conflict prevention is a term liable to misinterpretation, as it seeks to prevent a violent escalation of conflicts, but not the conflicts themselves.

The confusing multitude of terms

Conflict resolution:

Conflict resolution understood in one sense aims to end a conflict by achieving a workable compromise or balance of opposing interests. Alternatively, the term can imply an emphasis on agreeing concrete measures to help resolve the points at issue and consequences of the conflict.

Conflict prevention:

A much used but frequently misunderstood term, since as a rule it is not the conflict itself which can be prevented, but rather its destructive escalation or the acute use of violence (= prevention of violence).

Mediation:

Various possibilities exist for third-party intervention in favour of conflict management. These range from the political intervention of a powerful outsider with its own interests, to legal proceedings for arbitration and the administration of justice, to diplomacy between the parties involved and "good services". For constructive conflict management, all these methods can be of benefit. Recently, however, the focus has been mainly on "mediation" in the strict sense, in which a neutral third party directs the process of conflict management and assists all parties involved in the declaration of their interests and the development of "inclusive solutions". At the same time it strengthens the parties and helps them achieve mutual recognition, so that they are increasingly able to regulate the conflict themselves.

Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)

There are also a range of peace-related terms covering deep-rooted collective conflicts that either are being or may be settled by means of violence. The trichotomy first presented by the Norwegian peace studies expert Johan Galtung is the one most commonly used.

a) Peace-making: The political resolution of conflicts by legitimate or *de facto* governments. Normally process oriented, peace making can however also include measures and agreements of a structural nature designed to secure the peace, for instance power-sharing arrangements. In recent times the concept has been widened to cover measures on the social level such as support to "peace constituencies".

b) Peace-building: Peace-building concerns the whole process of establishing or re-establishing the network of social relations that facilitate the peaceful resolution of a conflict. This may include measures to stimulate economic development or social justice as well as initiatives for the reconciliation of opposing parties and the strengthening of common loyalties, and projects to encourage cooperation and "inter-cultural learning".

c) Peace-keeping: As a rule, peace-keeping means the military separation of hostile parties after an armistice by blue-helmet troops, sometimes, in crisis situations, as a preventive measure. In a wider sense the term may be used occasionally for civil measures taken to secure the peace.

Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)

Remember: Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, **peace-enforcement** refers to the Security Council's right of resort to military action against individual parties to a conflict, in order to guarantee international peace and security.

In the European debate, the term peace-building has been popularised to mean measures aimed at achieving long-term development objectives. In the German debate, two terms have emerged. They provide a pragmatic distinction covering all the activities in the field: crisis prevention and conflict management.

The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) has published the following definitions for its own use:

Crisis prevention comprises early, planned, systematic and coherent action at various levels of government and society to prevent violent conflicts. Crisis-prevention measures aim to

- reduce the potential for a violent conflict
- encourage the establishment of institutions to resolve conflicts peacefully, *before*, *during* and *after* violent conflict.

Crisis prevention in Technical Cooperation comprises projects (programmes, projects and/or measures) and instruments which expressly aim to make a contribution to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Crisis prevention in Technical Cooperation also means designing projects such that they do not themselves encourage a violent escalation of existing conflicts.

Technical cooperation measures with a crisis-prevention nature target various levels of action and various phases of a conflict. Crisis-prevention measures in Technical Cooperation are particularly important *before* and *after* violent conflicts.

Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)

Conflict management is the attempt to exert influence on the way a conflict is acted out, so as to regulate it, prevent violence and put an end to any existing violence. Conflict management aims to achieve constructive solutions which benefit all participants (...).

Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English)

In practice, the distinction between the two spheres is not always that clear. Institutional development for conflict management (such as support of the formal legal system) for instance is to be considered a TC measure for crisis prevention. At the project level, a combination of measures often ultimately serves both objectives. Through this definition, the identification of general goals of TC for crisis prevention and conflict

management is largely pre-determined. In each specific case the design of measures and their objectives must be carefully tailored to the local setting, but will fall within this given framework.

People and institutions that in conflict situations emphasise the common ground rather than the dividing lines, and stand to profit from conflict resolution by reaching agreement, are the natural partners of TC for crisis prevention and conflict management. This applies especially if they are networked and possess influence. These are the "local capacities for peace" (Anderson) or "peace constituencies" which should first be identified, then selectively promoted (cf. Section 2.5 and Section 4.1).

Peace constituencies and local capacities for peace

The concept of "peace constituencies" was developed by John Paul Lederach in contrast to "war constituencies", the latter denoting a group of people who profit from the spread of violence. This group includes entrepreneurs who exploit their own ethnicity for profit, the armed forces, weapons manufacturers, and the Mafia. Peace constituencies may comprise businesspersons who are dependent on stable trading conditions, religious institutions, human rights organisations, peace initiatives, media, independent scholars, former members of the armed forces, local leaders, trade unions and representatives of the administration. Within this heterogeneous structure, NGOs (understood in the broadest sense as highly to less structured non-governmental organisations) may play an important role by mobilising and organising networks. In many places, local NGOs are perhaps still too weak to influence state policy. Yet they can act as catalysts and initiators in the emergence of peace constituencies, thus laying the foundation for lasting peace. Since local NGOs are often seen as biased on account of their leaders' allegiances or regional roots, they should not necessarily be termed neutral. Nevertheless they can alter the conflict-related behaviour of the party towards which they are biased. They are the prototypical semi-neutral actors at the middle or bottom level of society, and thus play an inestimable role in the long-term prevention of violence and civilisation of the conflict cycle. (After Lederach 1995 b)

War constituencies and capacities for war

Spoilers/dividers – or expressed in terms of the same logic capacities for war (Anderson)/war constituencies – are the converse of peace constituencies. Especially in more protracted armed conflicts, "markets" and "cultures of violence" emerge which are an obstacle to peaceful resolution. Facilitating the identification and pursuit of a way out of these structures is a further entry point for crisis prevention activities.

2.3 International Positions

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU) and a number of actors of the UN family have come forward with key conceptual approaches to crisis prevention. Bilateral donors have in many cases adopted, filtered or combined those positions, and proceeded to apply them in their own work fitting into a variety of concrete settings.

DAC Guidelines

Among the most important, internationally acknowledged conceptual contributions are the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation of 1997, which are planned to be revised in 2000. The DAC Guidelines define the role of development cooperation for specific phases of a conflict (see Box), yet also assign functions when the conflict is at its peak. Whilst a broad range of development cooperation activities are considered potentially appropriate for conflict reduction, specific precautionary measures are recommended in the event of a crisis: Development agencies must adapt their activities to unstable conditions, but should always be ready to seize opportunities to end the conflict. They should already be planning for the post-conflict phase during the hostilities. An elevated risk of error needs to be taken into account here. The Guidelines call for a firm commitment to democratic structures as a precondition for sustainable development and peace;

for a development of analytical capabilities in the donor countries to help identify the causes of conflicts; and above all they call for a more coherent approach and greater coordination among actors.

Roles of development assistance in different phases of conflict and peace

Before conflict flares: Within overall efforts by the international community to promote peace building and conflict prevention, development assistance programmes will find their most important role in promoting the democratic stability of societies. Where tensions have not escalated into violence, a great number of possible measures can be geared to help defuse the potential for violent conflict. These range from more traditional areas of assistance, such as economic growth and poverty reduction programmes, to democratisation, good governance (including justice and security systems) and respect for human rights. There is growing interest in innovative activities to strengthen mechanisms for enhancing security at lower levels of armaments and military expenditures.

In fragile transitional situations: Where organised armed violence has wound down but where it is still unclear if the situation will again deteriorate, it is important to move beyond saving lives to saving livelihoods and at the same time help transform a fragile process into a sustainable, durable peace in which the causes of conflict are diminished and incentives for peace are strengthened. Where ethnic or even genocidal violence has occurred, concerted effort will be needed to help overcome the enduring trauma, promote reconciliation, and help prevent renewed outbreaks of violent conflict.

After conflict: Post-conflict reconstruction is much more than just repairing physical infrastructure. When civil authority has broken down, the first priority is to restore a sense of security. This includes restoring legitimate government institutions that are regarded by citizens as serving all groups and that are able to ally persisting tensions, while carrying out the challenging and costly tasks of rebuilding. Efforts by developing countries and international assistance must fit within the context of a sound, even if rudimentary, macroeconomic stabilisation plan. Post-conflict situations often provide special opportunities for political, legal, economic and administrative reforms to change past systems and structures which may have contributed to economic and social inequities and conflict. Initiatives for participatory debate and assessment of the role of the military in relation to the state and civil society have been productive in post-conflict settings. In the wake of conflict, donors should seize opportunities to help promote and maintain the momentum for reconciliation and needed reforms.

**Roles of development assistance
in different phases of conflict and peace (continued)**

In open conflict: In situations of open conflict, other policy instruments such as humanitarian assistance, diplomatic initiatives and political or economic measures tend to move to the forefront of the international response. Contrary to many past assumptions, we have found that a sharp distinction between short-term emergency relief and longer-term development aid is rarely useful in planning support for countries in open conflict. Development co-operation agencies operating in conflict zones, respecting security concerns and the feasibility of operations, can continue to identify the scope for supporting development processes even in the midst of crisis, be prepared to seize upon opportunities to contribute to conflict resolution, and continue to plan and prepare for post-conflict reconstruction.

Source: DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, Paris 1998, p. 7–8.

EU positions

The EU too is at an advanced stage of policy development. As early as December 1995 a Council press release made reference to the crisis and conflict issue; in June 1996 a "common position" was adopted concerning "conflict prevention and resolution in Africa" (Landgraf 1998).

Key EU documents are:
- 1891st Council Meeting: Press Release. Extract on Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa (4 December 1995),
- Communication from the Commission to the Council: The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond (6 March 1996),
- Common Position of 2 June 1997 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, Resolution on Coherence (excerpt) adopted by the Development Council on 5 June 1997,

■ Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the member states on the role of development cooperation in strengthening peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution (30 November 1998).

The EU uses the influential but often misunderstood term "structural stability", which is seen as defining the ultimate goal of measures to secure peace, and offers implicit prospects for the place of TC in the canon of co-ordinated lines of activities.

Structural stability

"Given the fact that (i) experience shows that lack of development is not the only major source of violent conflict; that (ii) the EU policy aims concerning Africa might be summarised as helping to foster peace and stability, development, democracy and the respect of human rights; that (iii) those aims are interdependent/mutually re-enforcing; and that (iv) sustained development is often interpreted in a narrow economic sense, the ultimate policy goal could be summarised under the term structural stability.

Structural stability is to be understood as a term denoting a dynamic situation, a situation of stability able to cope with the dynamics inherent in (emerging) democratic societies. Structural stability could thus be defined as a situation involving sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures, and healthy social and environmental conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to violent conflict. Working towards structural stability would mean the targeted reinforcement of those factors that enable peaceful change."

Source: Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond, 6. 3. 1996, p. 2.

To a certain extent, the term structural stability competes with this other term from within the UN family. "Human security" has two main aspects: 1. Security against chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression; and 2. Security against sudden threats

Human security – a comprehensive concept of security

in daily life (housing situation, job opportunities, community life). UNDP lists seven components of human security, namely: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, security of the community and political security (UNDP 1994).

UN Secretary-General

Another much-quoted conceptual source is the UN Secretary-General's "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa" (Annan 1998), which followed-on from his predecessor's "Agenda for Peace" (1992). This report provided key stimulus, above all through its clear focus on the political causes of conflicts, and the unexpectedly strong emphasis of the responsibility of local political elites for the increasing disintegration of the state. In strategic terms, it also identifies relevant positions for TC. The top priorities in post-conflict situations are identified as reconciliation work and respect for human rights. As de-escalation occurs, bilateral and multilateral development institutions could then make a significant contribution by supporting activities. However, the report then goes on to mention almost all the remaining development cooperation measures which, if applied appropriately, could be conducive to peace. This was followed in the autumn of 1999 by the brochure "Facing the Humanitarian Challenge. Towards a Culture of Prevention" (Annan 1999), which places these ideas in a global context and adds the dimension of disaster prevention. Annan sees the lack of political will as the main obstacle to a "culture of prevention".

Common basic approach

This basic approach (Annan 1998) permeates most of the strategy papers: Although governance measures are seen as especially conducive to peace, a broad spectrum of TC measures would also be capable – if appropriately applied – of generating such effects. Crisis prevention is therefore being discussed – to an increasing extent in terms of a "culture of prevention" not only at the UN level (for instance: Carnegie Commission 1997). It is postulated that the conflict-

reducing or –exacerbating effects of projects cannot be inferred from their nature. There are still only few comparative studies available on this issue. It can be assumed that a number of types of project, especially those with a high volume of funding, also involve increased risks.

A glance at the basic concepts and orientations of a number of bilateral donors sheds further light on the status of the debate (for more detailed comparisons see also Walraven 1999, Smith 1999, Leonhardt 1999):

Bilateral donors

The Netherlands

Recognising the need for an integrated strategy embracing development cooperation, political mediation, emergency aid, economic sanctions and military operations, the Netherlands Foreign Ministry instituted a Conflict Management and Humanitarian Aid Department as early as 1996. This unit is sub-divided into two Divisions, one of them being the Crisis Management and Prevention Division. The goal of this Division is to realise a single, coherent policy; in practice, it is responsible for demobilisation programmes, the establishment of an independent radio station (Liberia), financial support to the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region, and support of a multi-ethnic police force in Bosnia (Foreign Ministry 1999). Seeking to promote good governance, the Netherlands opted early on for a restrictive selection of partner countries.

Norway

Norway wishes to play a lead role in developing a comprehensive, integrated approach embracing humanitarian assistance, peace and reconciliation, and development. Conflict prevention and the consolidation of fragile peace processes have high priority

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). According to an evaluation, in 1996 alone Norway implemented peace-building measures in 22 countries (Sørbø et al. 1999). Norway relies on its NGOs and policy advisors who are firmly committed to the theme, and places strong emphasis on training measures and evaluations.

Sweden

The Swedish International Development Coope-ration Agency (SIDA) draws a distinction within this thematic field between a) the promotion of dialogue processes (confidence-building, reduction of the cul-ture of violence etc.) and b) the promotion of physical security (civilian peace monitoring, demilitarisation and demobilisation, security-sector reform etc.). SIDA places strong emphasis on the ongoing review of development cooperation in both the planning and implementation phases regarding possible undesired, negative effects (conflict impact assessment). One specified focus of activity is the promotion of children's rights in armed conflicts (SIDA 1999).

Denmark

In addition to pointing out the moral dimension of helping prevent armed conflicts, the Danish Govern-ment has also expressed longer-term, pragmatic economic and security interests. A further declared aim is to prevent the destruction of development cooperation inputs. Danish inputs focus on helping build local conflict management capacities (by promoting institutions, democracy and civil society), on eradicating the structural causes of conflicts in the long term, and on strengthening crisis response capabilities both within developing countries and at the level of the international community. In 1999 Denmark set-up its

own Peace and Stability Fund (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs n.d.).

UK

The British approach to the theme is indeed highly
advanced: "…our development strategy and our conflict
prevention strategy are one and the same" (Short 1999).
Within the framework of a general development
strategy designed to reduce poverty, the Department for
International Development (DFID) published a policy
statement in early 1999 on the theme of "Conflict
Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance" (DFID 1999a).
That statement identifies violent conflict as one of the
main causes of poverty. The strategies it proposes for
addressing armed conflicts and building sustainable
peace are: a) promotion of social cohesiveness and
inclusion, b) improvement of the international
mechanisms for settling disputes and preventing
conflict, c) assistance in the limitation of the means of
waging war (weapons), d) support of security-sector
reform, e) promotion of the protection of human rights
in conflict situations f) support of post-conflict peace-
building. The planned measures in the security sector
are particularly worthy of note. Here, all actors (i.e. the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the army and the
private sector) have agreed to pursue an integrated
approach, designed to influence the partner
government such that a national security strategy
emerges which can satisfy the criteria of good
governance. It is planned to involve the army, the police
force, the customs authorities and other relevant social
actors.

Switzerland

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (DEZA) focuses its attention on the monitoring of changes relevant to development in partner countries. Whilst it has access to a range of instruments specially developed for this purpose, those instruments are not yet being applied to countries of Central Asia and Europe. To date, DEZA has continued to respond to the very broad range of conflict and crisis situations in the various countries with small-scale projects that are closely integrated into the respective social context, and which can be rapidly implemented. The Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs is also supporting the FAST early warning project of the Swiss Peace Foundation, designed to help provide better information and greater stability in situations of rising tensions.

Canada

In Canada the subject is being addressed by two governmental organisations: Since 1996 there has existed within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) a "Peace building Unit" which addresses issues of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and reconciliation. This unit focuses on the political and socio-economic contexts of conflicts, rather than on the military or humanitarian aspects. Dialogue promotion and measures which help bring the parties to the conflict closer together are strengthened through local initiatives. The Peace Building and Human Security Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) was itself created in 1995, to strengthen Canada's capability to contribute internationally to conflict prevention, peace work and democracy promotion. The Division is both an organisation for policy development, and an organisation for programme implementation. It addresses

conceptual issues of joint strategic development for conflict prevention, gender and peace-building, children in armed conflicts, and the control of light weapons and small arms. The Peace Building Division is designed to complement the activities of CIDA.

A number of bilateral donors (for instance the Netherlands, Norway) have commissioned their think tanks to design basic conceptual strategies. These think tanks usually warn against developing unreasonable expectations. In discussions with the major development institutions, it emerged that this very problem is seen as the greatest risk associated with TC's involvement in crisis prevention: an over-estimation by TC institutions of their own ability to influence events, followed by disappointed expectations and ultimately entailing a loss of legitimacy (authors' interviews 1999). Yet this position can also conceal a lack of willingness to take on additional tasks that are more sophisticated (and difficult). Because if it is the case that development cooperation (and TC) can (and sometimes must) exacerbate conflicts, then the management and prevention of the negative consequences which then result cannot simply be left to others. This leads to the following twin imperatives for development cooperation and TC:

Warnings against unreasonable expectations

- First of all, do not contribute towards the violent escalation of conflicts.
- Secondly, help prevent processes of escalation whose causes lie outside of development cooperation (and TC). A sober assessment should be made of the degree to which this objective can be achieved.

Especially where the definition of basic positions is concerned, the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors is not always characterised by competition or rejection. In some cases, clear statements on the theme by governmental organisations are held in high regard by NGOs. The latest strategy papers of DFID for instance, entitled

Non-governmental actors

"The question is not whether development aid can be apolitical in any strict sense of the term: it cannot. Rather, the question is how aid flows can be shaped and steered to provide extra political value to activities that already have their developmental value. In relation to democratisation and the promotion of human rights this idea is no longer controversial. In relation to the prevention of armed conflicts the question is new, however logical the idea. (...) Development aid is a slow-moving agent of change, and has no part to play in "fire-brigade" action. The report addresses how aid can be used to mitigate or remove the causes of an unresolved dispute which creates the risk of conflict. A distinction can be made between preventive efforts in normal times of peace and preventive measures when dangerous signs of tension emerge. The former may have a time horizon of many years or even decades, while the time frame of the latter may be a year or two at most and is more likely to be measured in months or even weeks. In the latter case, measures must be undertaken with a proper sense of urgency: in such situations, the possibilities of using development aid are limited."

Source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Development Assistance as a Means of Conflict Prevention, Oslo 1998, p. 2

"Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance" and "Poverty and the Security Sector", have been praised by British NGOs as key steps towards improved cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organisations in this sector. Having said that, NGOs often also seek a further rationale for their work which mostly is rooted in their respective world view.

2.4 Policy Frameworks in Germany

BMZ approach

The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been devoting increased attention to crisis prevention since the mid-1990s.

The new German Government has emphasised the subject on several occasions, and the term "crisis

prevention" occupies a prominent position in the coalition agreements between the ruling parties. The Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, has pressed the importance of crisis prevention in speeches and interviews. From development cooperation she expects further results in two areas:

1. Help in eradicating the structural causes of violent conflicts by improving economic, social, ecological and political conditions in partner countries;
2. Help in establishing mechanisms of non-violent conflict management.

The links between development policy and security policy

"The outlined tasks of helping eradicate the structural causes of conflicts, and promoting mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution, do not constitute new territory for development policy. Development policy is therefore especially well prepared to assume an important role within the overall strategic approach to crisis prevention. But additional steps will be needed to strengthen development policy's peace-policy orientation.
First of all, potential sites of conflict need to be identified more systematically. Work is currently under way at BMZ to develop corresponding indicators, which together with other sources such as the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) crisis atlas are to be integrated into our country concepts and country talks.
Secondly, in countries with a higher risk of conflict we must design our cooperation to help eradicate the structural causes of conflicts.
Thirdly, conflict management at the political and social levels needs to be strengthened in the medium and long term. Governmental and non-governmental Technical Cooperation are especially suited to providing additional inputs to this process. In this context, German development policy is establishing the Civil Peace Service (CPS)."

Source: German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, The Links between Development Policy and Security Policy. Speech held at the closing session of the German Federal College of Security Policy Studies core seminar on 28 May 1999

Global structural policy

BMZ sees a need for development policy to act in three fields of so-called "global structural policy" that are also relevant to crisis prevention: 1. strengthening of the UN system, establishment of regional structures for security and cooperation, and especially the strengthening of the constructive role of partner countries in the global political system; 2. elaboration and implementation of global standards and rules, covering inter alia light weapons and small arms, child soldiers, indigenous peoples and international criminal jurisdiction. Parallel to that, it is planned to help eradicate the global causes of violent conflicts (global economy and environment). 3. participation in the establishment of European and international development-policy networks for crisis prevention (Kloke-Lesch 1999).

Mainstreaming

BMZ has ambitious plans to mainstream crisis prevention within the development administration at the political level, assuming that this will take immediate effect at the operative level.

1. monitoring of the long-term trends of conflict within societies, and improved information management;
2. adjustment of BMZ's country concepts, including – where required – the preparation of key strategy papers for crisis prevention;
3. selection of key countries for targeted design of development cooperation for crisis prevention. A focus on approximately 10 countries is envisaged. To this end, a list of indicators is now being tested. This list was established by a study group commissioned by BMZ in 1998 (Spelten 1999). It has been pre-tested for 95 countries by the German Overseas Institute (cf. Section 3.1.1).
4. ongoing development of the traditional instruments, alongside the establishment of a "Civil Peace Service";
5. strengthened cooperation between institutions involved in development cooperation (Kloke-Lesch 1999).

There are plans in the medium term to issue guidelines that are binding for the regional sections of BMZ. BMZ sees a need to debate the issue of "sustainability in crisis situations", and possibly also to review other principles of development organisations (author's interview 1999).

Civil Peace Service

Ongoing conceptual work is required concerning a new BMZ instrument: the "Civil Peace Service" (CPS). Chaired by BMZ, a programme committee comprising representatives of BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office, the German Development Service (DED) and two selected members of the "Civil Peace Service Consortium" (development services seconding personnel) meets on an irregular basis to discuss basic issues and to define the scope of the instrument.

Civil Peace Service (CPS)

"The basic concept behind the CPS is the deployment of appropriately qualified experts from the recognised development services. The tasks undertaken by the CPS differ from the traditional tasks of the development services in that they involve targeted measures to promote the non-violent handling of conflicts and potential for conflict. Experts working for the CPS will – as is usual in the development services – be paid a sum sufficient to cover basic living expenses.

Tasks under the framework of the CPS involve the following areas in particular:

- strengthening the potential for peace; measures to encourage mutual trust between members of conflict parties; the development of structures and programmes for information and education to publicise and explain peace activities and to overcome prejudice and hostile images (e.g. peace education);

- mediation in conflicts between members of different interest groups, ethnic groups and religions; collaboration in the work of observing situations in terms of respect for human rights and democracy and promoting positive development in these areas;

- contributions towards reconciliation and reconstruction (including support for administrative tasks at the municipal level)".

Source: BMZ, Civil Peace Service – A new element of development co-operation (BMZ spezial; 6), Bonn 1999

The Civil Peace Service is already a reality: In a first phase in 1999, from 40 submitted proposals BMZ approved 18 projects of organisations sending personnel to crisis-prone countries. The funds thus appropriated amounted to DM 2.8/5.2 million for the fiscal years 1999/2000 respectively. A total of DM 17.5 million has been allocated for CPS for the fiscal year 2000.

Project examples of the Civil Peace Service in Guatemala:

Support for the awareness-raising, research and training work of the *Alianza Contra la Impunidad*

The contribution made by DED comprises the delivery of methodological and legal advisory services by two peace experts. The aim is to provide information, education and training to civil society organisations, enabling them to implement the recommendations of the "Historical Clarification Commission", and to provide legal support for measures against impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations and acts of violence.

Source: Author's interview, in-house DED project documents

Support for refugee resettlement in Huehuetenango

The partner organisation of Services Overseas had for many years been active in assisting refugees who had fled to Mexico to escape the civil war. Since the end of the war the organisation has been supporting the implementation of the Guatemalan peace accord and its consolidation, primarily through development and education measures within the returnee communities. Other problems involve land distribution, and reconciliation between the returnees and those who remained in Guatemala during the war. The seconded peace expert will be involved in the development and planning of integrated training and upgrading measures for staff of the partner organisation. This is a contribution to the process of rebuilding society, designed to help secure the historic peace accord.

Source: Press release of Services Overseas, 18 January 2000

BMZ draws on external expertise for planning and operative tasks inter alia within the scope of its "crisis prevention and conflict management for development" working party, the structures of which are beginning to emerge. An informal "exchange of information and ideas" with representatives of the development cooperation family and academics was held in February 2000.

BMZ working group on crisis prevention

BMZ has thus completed the first tasks required to become professional in the field. Further experiences need to be gained, and the instruments may still need some improvements. On the basis of these initiatives BMZ has positioned itself closely in line with the mainstream ideas of the international community.

2.5 Principles of Intervention

The debate concerning crisis prevention is often conducted in ritualistic fashion, using a number of buzzwords. Not all of them appear useful under all circumstances. Some of them are also mutually contradictory.

By far the most important basic rule for TC in crisis situation, and in crisis prevention and conflict management, is the one popularised by Mary B. Anderson: do no harm (1996/99). A critical look needs to be taken at the unintended consequences of humanitarian and development assistance. International assistance can also negatively influence a violent conflict, for instance through the inflow of resources then utilised to maintain troops and to purchase weapons; local markets can be distorted by aid inputs; distribution efforts of TC can affect groups in conflict, and become the cause of conflict; international assistance also mobilises local funds for the conduct of warfare; it may possibly legitimate actors pursuing war-like ends. The nature of the assistance can also implicitly send the wrong signals related to ethnicity. Anderson makes a number of proposals concerning how to

Do no harm

prevent this, always bearing in mind the particular context: limitation of inflows, creation of distribution commissions or administration committees comprised of equal numbers of representatives from all groups, cancellation of goods promised for trade, sharing of responsibility etc.. In some cases, however, a complete discontinuation of assistance may be the only solution generating less damage than benefit. A number of authors hold the "aid business" partly responsible for structural violence as a point of departure for an escalation of open violence. These authors argue that authoritarian regimes displaying contempt for human rights are directly or indirectly supported by development cooperation, or that the recruitment of project staff follows the established practice of giving preference to certain sections of the population, or that corruption is tolerated (Uvin 1998, Klingebiel 1999, Brock 1999).

Take risks

Whether in defence of the hitherto (unplanned) involvement of development organisations in highly conflictual situations, or as a consequence of initial evaluations of a conscious reorientation, numerous people we spoke to saw a willingness to take risks as prerequisite to successful crisis prevention. They were referring less to daring deeds by particular individuals, and more to the collective involvement in crisis situation where there is a fundamental risk of an escalation in violence. The development community, it is believed, must accept that the prospects for success under these circumstances are limited, and bear this fact in mind when planning and implementing projects. "...What Sierra Leone demonstrates is that many countries are happy to sign up to conflict prevention and peace-building in theory, but deeply reluctant to engage in practice. This is because conflict is by its nature risky, and development departments tend to be risk averse. But it is clear that the risks of non-engagement outweigh the risks of action. If we fail to support demobilisation and reintegration, we make it more likely, not less, that Sierra Leone will slip back into

full-scale violence and civil war. And what is true of Sierra Leone is true of many countries across the world…."(Short 1999).The Canadian Government takes a very similar view. Its strategic approach also includes a section on risk assessment. The approach is summarised as follows: "While rapid action often carries a higher risk factor, it may outweigh the high costs of inaction. Risk assessment will be undertaken in cooperation with substantive desks and posts." (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca./cida_ind.nst/).

Attention is sometimes drawn to the value of sheer presence as a way to protect human lives. However, this can hardly serve as the sole justification for costly project implementation. There are also specific forms of human rights and conflict monitoring which are deliberately labelled "human shield". TC is highly unlikely to pursue this approach. The principle of taking risks should not, however, be offset against the principle of doing no harm.

The term security first can imply two things, either high priority for involvement in the security sector or – more often – priority for the personal safety of the personnel deployed in crisis situations. This sense of responsibility to a certain extent runs counter to the principle of taking risks.

Security first

On of the key lessons learned in recent years – for instance in Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor – is that what is lacking is not information on escalating conflicts, but the political will to intervene preventively on a timely basis. This insight is often put forward to explain why early warning (cf. Section 3.1.1) is not necessary. Yet this view is not compelling: "Early warning and prevention are linked" (Eberwein/ Chojnacki 1999). Consequently, this combination of early warning and prevention should be at the heart of future efforts to improve the flow of information from countries affected by crisis (cf. Section 3.1.2). Development professionals have now extended this sequence, linking early warning to "the right early action", i.e. linking correct timing with the appropriate

Need for early action

approach to the problem, the right mix of measures, the right counterparts etc.. Harnessing what is often unique knowledge concerning the situation on the ground should lead to local information being utilised in order to identify realistic prospects for action.

Ownership of conflict

In the first instance, the (violent) conflict is a matter for the local parties to it. The EU and many national governments insist that, if it is to stand any chance of succeeding, conflict management must first be dealt with locally by the actors concerned. In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, regional organisations are next in line to be called upon to intervene (Carnegie Commission 1997, Council of the European Union 1998). Although this step is logical, it may lead to dangerous delays in the planned early action being taken.

Strengthen peace constituencies

In all societies (at least according to Anderson 1996/99), including those undergoing violent conflict, there are numerous aspects of life which bind people together rather than separating them. A common history, culture, language and experience, institutions and values, economic interdependencies, as well as mechanisms, institutions and persons of conflict management in the widest sense are often already in place. These are the "local capacities for peace" or "peace constituencies" that should first be identified, then selectively promoted (cf. Section 2.2 and Section 4.1).

Also take into account the "spoilers"

War constituencies must also be taken into account if crisis prevention is to be successfully pursued. The aim here must be to help identify alternative economic prospects for warlords and their foot soldiers. Most people we interviewed considered this eminently important, but conceded that there were risks. Material inputs might possibly be created which could be misunderstood as gratification, i.e. merely as an incentive to further violence. Entering into negotiation with warlords also helps legitimate them.

Long-term involvement pays off

Promoting peace is usually considered a dynamic process requiring long-term involvement. TC has

problems dealing with this fact, in that projects often have rigid deadlines, whilst the peace process does not respect the deadlines imposed by project cycles. A number of actors, for instance church-based organisations, draw attention to their long-term involvement alongside their local partners, and to the relationships of trust that have grown as a result. This might be an advantage over governmental TC. On the other hand, such partners can also become problematic in situations of violent conflict – the role of some church officials in the genocide in Rwanda comes to mind. Blind solidarity is therefore inappropriate; the continued delivery of assistance may send the wrong signals. The conclusion should be: adopt a long-term approach, but remain capable of rapid response and changes in the short term.

2.6 Code of Conduct

The (predominantly British and American) NGOs that have been actively involved in conflict management for years have been unable to avoid a discussion of the less conscious aspects of their activities. In some cases they have been accused of (unintentionally) feeding the war. Also, some of their ambitious goals have been seen as creating unrealistic expectations that have subsequently backfired on the organisations themselves. Some donor evaluations have been highly critical, whilst at the same time allowing room for improvement on the mistakes of the past. If TC is to scale-up its involvement in this sector, it should learn the lessons taught by these experiences rather than repeat the same mistakes. Criticism has also been expressed from within the ranks of the "conflict managers" themselves, specifically with regard to

Critique and self-critique

■ a lack of contextualisation of the work, i.e. rigid adherence to a standard procedure with no regard to the need for an appropriate approach;

- an avoidance of issues of justice in order to achieve a swift peace accord;
- an undermining of the state monopoly on coercion caused by working exclusively with NGO partners;
- an outmanoeuvring of NGOs from the South by NGOs of the North (or NGOs from the East by NGOs from the West); a basic refusal to enter into a division of labour/coordination with other governmental and non-governmental and international actors, and in a number of cases also
- a lack of professionalism (inter alia Ropers 1999).

The British NGO International Alert has worked on a Code of Conduct for organisations active in conflict management and crisis prevention. This code can also be understood as defining good practice. Most of the principles for action can certainly be adopted by TC organisations. Human rights issues, and the issue of relations with the other actors in crisis regions, are given greater emphasis here than is usually the case in TC guidelines.

Basic attitudes and approaches

The basic approaches called for by International Alert include ensuring that the affected population are involved in the process of conflict resolution. They must be the driving force behind the transformation process, and normally they do have the capacity to make a contribution to the solution. Within this process, actors should give top priority to the humanitarian needs of those worst hit by the conflict. At the same time, it should be ensured that internationally-binding human rights are upheld, and cultural, religious and social diversity respected. The special contributions to the peace process made by women should be expressly acknowledged.

Impartiality

Impartiality is a working principle of key importance, but one which is particularly problematic for governmental development cooperation. In this context it means involving all stakeholders or parties to the conflict in the planning and implementation process. Yet it will be very difficult for development cooperation

to refrain from promoting particularly disadvantaged sections of the population. At the same time, development cooperation is required to remain independent of the parties to the conflict. Planning processes cannot be based solely on the information supplied by one party (even if that party is the government); that development cooperation must remain financially independent of the parties to the conflict goes without saying. Organisations should be held accountable to the target population and donors concerning their activities and strategies. The national legislation in force should also be respected.

Conflict management must often maintain familiar **Partnership** relations, and rely on individuals, organisations or governments that can make some contribution to the process. Here, partnership means providing long-term support doing justice to the real requirements of peace processes. An organisation working towards conflict transformation is also obliged to undergo organisational learning. In other words evaluations, and workshops providing space for an exchange of expertise and consultation with colleagues, are instruments which need to be systematically applied to strengthen the collective memory.

3. Instruments

Crisis prevention and conflict management in TC are only likely to be successful if their instruments are attuned to the tasks to be faced. This will involve prudent strategic management at all levels, as well as an appropriate form of analysis of the causes of conflicts, conflict-sensitive planning of sector management and projects, appropriate project steering, conflict impact assessment, and high standards of professionalism. In all these areas, certain agreed upon standards are currently emerging at the national and international levels.

Limited experience

New methods for approaching crisis prevention emerge not only on the ground during project implementation, but also at Head Offices, when these instruments are applied. Overall, experiences with new approaches remain limited, not least because only few organisations conduct intensive debriefing of staff upon their return from crisis-torn countries. Specific expertise and experiences are thus lost, and the best practices are not collated on a systematic basis.

3.1 Early Warning, Reporting and Analysis in Crisis Prevention

In many respects, knowledge management is a key concept in this field. For an organisation to be crisis-sensitive it must in the first instance be aware of the risks of conflict that are either dependent on, or independent of, its own intervention. To this end, the international debate has centred on the issue of early warning. Furthermore, if crisis prevention and conflict management are to be effective then general problems of information flow from partner countries need to be addressed, and the quality of background analyses has to be re-assessed and ensured. Here too, the Head Offices of TC organisations will require analytical capacities in order to manage inflowing information appropriately.

3.1.1 Early Warning

Bearing in mind the fact that development cooperation is increasingly being blamed for always acting too late, it is absolutely essential to address the issue of early warning. Early warning is one dimension of crisis prevention that has received a comparatively large amount of attention from the academic community, without any ready-made solutions tailored to the practical requirements of TC having been promised. In particular, early warning systems that are sensitive to specific regional circumstances would be appropriate. Yet this sensitivity is missing in systems claiming universal validity. Generally speaking, three qualities are expected of early warning systems:

- easy to use
- ready availability of information related to selected indicators
- capable of generating sound prognoses

It is undisputed that crisis indicators must be used to identify potential crises early on, if development cooperation is to be at all able to adjust its operations appropriately and at all levels, from strategy papers through to project steering. To date, a number of highly complex model indicators have been developed, some of them tailored to specific forms of conflict (genocide). They provide a clear picture of the scope, nature and probable trajectories of a potential conflict, but are difficult if not impossible for practitioners to use. By contrast, short checklists of indicators entail the risk of whole problem areas going unnoticed. Yet only these checklists are ever likely to be regularly applied by practitioners. A number of proposals have also come from the food security sector; countries of the Sahel and other dry zones can draw on experience with such early warning systems (such as the USAID "Famine Early Warning System" – FEWS).

The Clingendael Institute is currently developing a pragmatic, "good enough" solution (on behalf of the

Identifying potential crises

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands), i.e. one which does not claim to be absolutely complete or precise. There is growing recognition of the fact that a system of this kind immediately generates organisation-specific options for action, and is therefore best developed through close consultation and cooperation between academics and practitioners (Goor/Verstegen 2000).

BMZ also addressed this subject early on in a research project on crisis indicators in development co-operation. This included a condensed list of questions (Spelten 1999), and was tested in a trial run. It is being further developed on an ongoing basis; increasingly, it is evolving from an early warning mechanism into a policy instrument to identify partner countries where crisis prevention can be planned and discussed openly.

Multi-stage procedure

Checklists are often applied in conjunction with the rule that, once the indicators reveal rising tensions or an escalating conflict, a further qualitative analysis is then required to provide more precise information concerning the immediate risks and the actors involved. Multi-stage procedures of this kind at least enable practitioners to swiftly assess less critical cases. However, in the growing number of countries threatened by crisis, a considerable amount of work is to be anticipated in a second phase. It is therefore all the more important to focus on the top-priority problem areas, or those which are in a process of dynamic development (cf. Section 3.1.5).

Subjectivity

The subjective assessment of indicators by experts or technocrats is seen as a problem of qualitative analytic approaches; this can be counteracted at least by having questionnaires filled in several times by different individuals, and comparing them at a later date. The major weak point of purely quantitative methods is that of obtaining a reliable database, complete information in crisis-torn countries often being especially difficult to obtain.

A procedure combining the quantitative and qualitative dimensions (such as the BMZ list of

indicators) is certainly methodologically problematic. It can, however, focus attention on countries in crisis at the political or top administrative level. This last notion demonstrates that early warning can indeed serve a variety of ends, including political ones.

Some indicator systems that are already in general use in TC may also require only slight adaptation to make them appropriate for the purpose of crisis prevention. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (DEZA) for instance has developed a system called "monitoring of development indicators". This system provides Switzerland with a basis for its political, economic and development-oriented efforts, designed to facilitate coordinated changes in behaviour.

Continuous monitoring

For the development practitioner, the most appropriate early warning systems are those indicating which of the means at TC's disposal are likely to prevent or curtail an escalation in tensions. In other words there are strong arguments for providing an early warning system tailored to the needs of the end user (Goor/Verstegen 1999). At the same time, political interests come into play: A harmonisation of early warning systems currently being tested might for instance guarantee a standard response within a European framework, assuming there were agreements on certain checklists. Scandinavian countries believe that UN provision for early warning is already adequate, and see no reason to develop their own systems (NUPI 1998, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999, authors' interviews). Having said that, from a political angle it may also be helpful to have two or more systems operating in parallel. If the two systems generate the same results, this constitutes a compelling argument for (or against) intervention. If there is a discrepancy between the results generated by the two systems, then further qualitative analysis is required.

User-oriented systems

Early warning systems – some examples

Among others, the following organisations have developed or commissioned the development of internationally acknowledged early warning models:

■ Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER): Analytical Model for Early Warning and Response

■ The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) of Canada/Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA): Canadian Peace building Initiative Strategic Framework

■ The Swiss Peace Foundation, financed by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs: Early Recognition of Tension and Fact Finding (FAST being the German acronym)

■ United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs: Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS)

In addition to these, strictly academic models have been developed (well-known approaches are those of Gurr and Harff; cf. Hamm 1999 and Krummenacher et al. 1999), as have practice-oriented indicator models whose objectives extend beyond early warning (e.g. Spelten 1999). There are also numerous proposals for checklists which have yet to be tested, or are not being seriously considered.

Closing the gap

All the approaches designed more for practical application now need to be considered in the context of a polemicised debate: Critics like to keep reminding professionals that, in a number of recent cases of rapidly escalating conflicts, there has been no lack of early warning signals, but merely a lack of early preventive action. The pragmatic answer has been that the gap between early warning and early action should be closed. Yet the second step (early action) cannot be taken without the first (early warning). Early warning is a necessary prerequisite to targeted crisis prevention. This insight has led to almost all TC organisations continuing work on the first step. Checklists, which inevitably simplify, are also being used by practitioners as an orientation for reporting. Consequently, checklists

are an important tool for mainstreaming conflict awareness within institutions.

It can be argued that, in order to achieve the desired early action, it is crucial that early warning provide information as to the most appropriate level (local, national, regional) for intervention. It should also indicate which actors, institutions or structures that action should seek to influence. To date, no satisfactory mechanism for institutional integration of early warning systems has been identified which can convincingly bridge the gap between local knowledge, and options for action that are appropriate to organisations.

The correct level of approach

TC institutions can be both beneficiaries and providers of early warning systems. The second function can be performed for instance by staff of UNHCR who to a certain extent have access to information at source in refugee camps. This will not be the case across the board, but will differ from country to country depending on the selected channel and capacity available. The advantage of TC organisations is their relatively close contact with grass-roots target groups, giving them almost exclusive access to knowledge on conflict situations in certain regions.

Regional early warning mechanism for IGAD

Crisis prevention and conflict management are a key concern of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organisation in Africa. A project of cooperation between GTZ and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is designed to support IGAD in developing and maintaining an early warning system, and mechanisms to prevent violent conflicts. Following comprehensive conflict analyses in the region and a survey of existing early warning systems, a series of short- and long-term options are being jointly developed which will subsequently be incorporated into a concrete plan of implementation. FEWER (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response) has been commissioned to elaborate an appropriate model.

Source: GTZ in-house working paper

Utilising local networks

Finally, TC can help establish regional early warning systems.

In a number of partner countries, it is possible to rely on existing local structures or networks. One example is EAWARN, a country-wide network of universities in Russia, and a repository of corresponding information. One problem which arises here is that of "compatibility". How can such information, processed by third parties and managed according to a number of different principles, be accessed by the Head Offices of TC organisations? A second problem is the protection of such information against possible dangers: the possession and transfer of sensitive information to an early warning system might put local providers in particular at risk.

Amongst others, church-based organisations possess the advantage of being able to perform early warning via information channels that are regarded as reliable. The idea has already been aired for instance that information be managed through the hierarchically organised Catholic Bishops' network (authors' interviews). Efforts to develop early warning mechanisms that are application-ready are, however, still at an early stage.

3.1.2 Information Flow and Reporting

The fact that reporting from countries in crisis needs to be improved has been undisputed in Germany since publication of the cross-section evaluation (Klingebiel 1999) commissioned by BMZ in 1998. The report was based on country studies for Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali and Rwanda.

Restricted flow of information

Information from crisis-prone countries flows through a variety of channels. Alongside the standard reporting channels, informal routes of information transfer from the project to the Head Office level are common practice: Telephone conversations, and increasingly e-mail correspondence can supplement

and complete the picture conveyed via official channels. Information concerning conflicts can reach points within the development cooperation administration that are capable of acting on it, not only via the "official route" of the intra-organisational hierarchy, but also horizontally across departments, and through other channels of communication. Often these channels are cut off, or are never even utilised in the first place. What is ultimately crucial to messages being acted on, however, is often not the fact of information transfer itself, but the timeliness, the quality and the formal weight of the information. In this sense the argument that in the case of Rwanda, for instance, there was no lack of information but merely a lack of political will to intervene, is only partially correct (and only in relation to some of the actors).

Problems of information transfer:
Findings of the BMZ cross-section evaluation

"In the recording, forwarding and interpretation of information four problems can be identified:

1. The system features a wealth of information and, above all, inconsistent information; actors may tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting to certain mechanisms (e.g. selective perception) in their reporting ("cognitive dissonance").

2. The "local" structures (...) tend to be reluctant to refer to conflict situations.

3. Projects endeavour to shield themselves from the context of the conflict: staff do not want "their" project impaired by the unfavourable environment.

4. Development cooperation measures fail to forge a link between local conditions and the national or regional situation where a conflict is concerned."

Source: Stephan Klingebiel, Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations. Cross-section Report on Evaluations of German Development Cooperation in Six Countries, Berlin 1999, p.II

Structural deficits

In the real world of development cooperation, the flow of information is subject to numerous sources of interference or interruption. Information can already be incomplete when collected at the project level, for instance when unpleasant messages (as often arise in the event of a crisis) do not tally with the basic attitude of optimism of the individual collating the information ("cognitive dissonance"). In such cases the information is selectively perceived, subjectively processed and then passed on. Alternatively there may be a lack of appropriate sensitivity to the warning signals amongst the staff on the ground. In many organisations, the gathering of information is not considered a relevant task, and therefore one which staff often have to perform in their spare time. Some personnel adopt an openly rejective attitude ("We're not the secret service!"). Sometimes critical developments within the project setting go unreported, as their dissemination might put the further continuity of the project at risk, or in some cases could have material and social consequences for the author of the report, who might be worried about gaining a reputation for being "difficult". At a higher level country and regional offices, and indeed entire TC organisations, might face financial losses if the flow of funds is made dependent on the maintenance of a certain project scope.

Reporting duties and incentive systems

These structural problems can, however, be addressed. An improved flow of information presupposes vigilance against symptoms of crisis, and is unlikely to be achieved unless staff are sensitive in this regard. The attention of staff can be focused on problematic developments by applying specific reporting guidelines. Also proposed are incentive systems conducive to the furnishing of information, designed to ensure that alert reporting is more of a boost than an obstacle to career development. The relationship between TC implementing organisations and their commissioning bodies should be one of mutual trust that can be carefully fostered: on the one hand, faithful reporting on risks from the projects to the

financing body, and on the other hand arrangements ensuring alternative uses for funds better not spent in a conflict-prone project.

The demand for accurate information in the partner country and the project can stimulate the exchange of information. This can be organised in the form of internal conferences in country-specific working groups, and dialogue fora that also include external experts.

Country-specific working groups and dialogue fora

Finally, conflict-related information in the possession of the local population can be better harnessed and utilised. The War-torn Societies Project (WSP) was established in 1994, with the aim of providing the international community and national experts with instruments enabling them to act more rapidly and effectively in post-conflict societies. WSP has received support from 28 bilateral and multilateral organisations, and has been implemented by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). In the year 2000 it is planned to transform the project into an NGO with close links to the UN organisations. WSP clearly demonstrates that information procurement using the participatory action research method can lead to a better and deeper understanding of complex post-conflict situations. Not only is the information checked by the concerned actors themselves, but the contacts established can also serve as a basis for new forms of dialogue (cf. Section 4.2). A similar approach is the "action research" method applied by the international and ecumenical Life and Peace Institute (LPI). The Institute's experiences with the method have been gained primarily in the Horn of Africa (LPI 1999).

Participatory action research

The question remains of what happens to internal and external information once it has been acquired. Information management is a sensitive task, and one which could be supported through appropriate intra-organisational communication systems. Emergency aid organisations are particularly experienced in this domain. In the NORDEM project of the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in Kosovo (with UNHCR), it

Information management

proved possible to prevent the duplication of reporting work by applying the appropriate technology. Each staff member in the field had on-the-ground access to the PC-supported database being stored and used by the others. In less critical cases it might be assumed that such a system would meet with little approval, since it will take up working time. In larger, multilateral operations a system of this kind can also improve coordination between the agencies.

3.1.3 Country and Regional Studies

**Analysis –
a prerequisite
to action**

Country and regional analyses are considered by the EU for instance as prerequisite to comprehensive strategies. A strictly national focus should really be out of the question, since crises can be exacerbated by events in neighbouring countries. For instance, trans-border refugee inflows may cause local destabilisation, or invasions by rebel armies from neighbouring countries may occur. Such eventualities must be taken into account. In some cases, (diplomatic) solutions may be of a regional rather than a national nature. Having said that, one has to be aware that governmental and multilateral institutions almost always seek to deal with the government of a country.

Regional focus

Technical Cooperation is seldom planned on a transboundary basis, even though projects located close to a national border may for instance have specific impacts on the environment or labour market of the neighbouring country. It may be the time and effort involved in ministries from two or more states engaging in negotiations that makes the regional perspective unlikely from the outset. Yet at the analytical level at least, this perspective is absolutely essential.

Usually (but depending on the commissioning party), country and regional studies focus on the entire canon of possibilities for influencing emerging crises. This broad approach is also thoroughly informative for TC, and should not necessarily be replaced by studies with

a more narrow focus – i.e. involving exclusively the authors' own field of activity. To be efficient and effective, it is crucial that TC should know its place in the overall context of efforts for peace, and not overestimate itself. Nevertheless, country desk officers frequently point out that external experts often possess only inadequate knowledge of intra-organisational restrictions. This results in available funds being overestimated, and inadequate account being taken of the range of existing TC activities.

Recommendations from country studies often contain lists of prioritised areas of intervention, and under favourable circumstances also provide proposals for operationalisation. Corruption for instance can almost always be combated through a series of workshops (a standard recommendation); but only a profound understanding of the context can help correctly identify entry points for the effective tackling of the roots of the problem within an institution (e.g. court of audit, parliamentary budget committee etc.), or specify local focuses for an aid programme. An evaluation of studies commissioned by the EU Commission, and delegated by the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) to country experts, revealed (cf. Section 3.1.4) that many recommendations were of a very general nature, and focused strongly on policy frameworks: In pre-conflict phases, these recommendations focused on promoting regional cooperation, supporting civil society, building democratic institutions, protecting human rights and minorities, and supporting transparent and socially compatible economic reforms, utilising political dialogue and political conditionalities to promote the settlement of disputes. In situations of post-conflict peace-building, the recommendations aimed to achieve simultaneous reforms in the political and economic domains, with clear emphasis on the security sector and on addressing the international dimensions in order to build a lasting peace (Eide/Smith 1999).

Recommendations for action

Practicability

To date, there is barely any indication of how such recommendations are to be put into practice, or what actual effect they have in relation to conflicts. Country studies should display four strengths, although these are rarely likely to be achieved simultaneously:

- adequate overview of the situation on the ground (country expertise, where possible not just a desk study prepared without the author(s) having an opportunity to assess the field);
- knowledge of the potentials for intervention, constraints and budget lines of the commissioning party (this calls for close dialogue between authors and commissioning bodies);
- general overview of crisis prevention measures (recommendations not simply confined to a familiar segment of the spectrum);
- clear recommendations on how to set priorities within the entire spectrum of potential interventions.

Weaknesses of country analyses can be reduced by producing appropriate terms of reference, through consultation with commissioning bodies and through appropriate selection of personnel. The practicability of results will therefore be heavily dependent on the interest and will of the commissioning institution. Country studies will gain practical value when their recommendations set clear priorities, with cost analyses and risks assessment. This also includes identifying the risks associated with not taking action. Finally, country studies need to be incorporated appropriately into planning and evaluation processes, as well as into the professional debate within the organisation.

3.1.4 Analytical Capacities

In almost all TC organisations, including both governmental and non-governmental development institutions, conflict-related analytical capacities are underdeveloped. Numerous organisations (e.g. political foundations, church-based development services, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, LPI) draw attention to the expertise and grass-roots contacts of their local experts, and the representatives of their decentralised organisational structure: These organisations conduct their conflict-related analyses in the field. Other institutions conduct such analyses in regional or country departments (e.g. Novib, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Both models raise the issue of how to globally compare the used analytical criteria, and how to deal with the problem of restricted capability to learn from experiences in other countries – thus drawing attention to knowledge management deficits. A further problem is a poorly evolved sensitivity of their staff to crisis prevention. Orientation and training at the regional department and implementation level is still in the initial stage. A shortage of staff is specified as the basic reason for the analytical deficits at the central level. In some cases attempts are made to compensate this by calling for external expertise. This has the advantage that multi-country, long-term comparative analysis can at least take place. Having said that, it remains an open question whether the actors from within the commissioning organisations will support the results. Cooperation in a spirit of trust, appropriate forms of presentation and dialogue with practitioners are prerequisite to this.

Cooperation with external experts can take place either ad hoc, or within the scope of framework agreements with think tanks or regional institutions (inter alia Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands). In the Conflict Prevention Network (CPN, currently affiliated to the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* in Ebenhausen), the EU has continuous access to a network able to respond

Underdeveloped resources

Cooperation with the research community

to enquiries both from individual DGs of the Commission, and from the EU Parliament, and to provide expertise from an established pool of predominantly European specialists. In the past, it has been precisely those bodies concerned with TC and emergency (DG VIII and ECHO) which have availed themselves of this facility. The goals of the CPN are to deepen interdisciplinary dialogue, to support the EU in developing a joint foreign and security policy, to raise awareness of the complex nature of violent conflicts, and to further develop methodologies on an ongoing basis. The specific inputs offered by CPN include the preparation of background studies and briefing papers, and the holding of workshops and seminars to develop concrete options for action.

3.1.5 Analytical Instruments

Identifying priorities

To speed-up and improve analysis, a number of organisations (e.g. EU, DFAIT, BMZ) are testing analytical instruments designed to help identify as precisely as possible actors and patterns of escalation, as well as to establish a priority list of causal factors. To a certain extent these instruments are linked to well-known methods in development cooperation (objectives-oriented project planning, participatory rapid appraisal), but also go beyond them in seeking to identify, speak out about and standardise critical problem areas.

One method is described in the draft guidelines of the EU Commission entitled "Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries. A Practical Guide" (see also Section 3.3.1). In a first step, they recommend that the applicants identify top-priority areas of activity. One stage below the "root causes", worded in highly abstract terms the "problem areas" are proposed and then briefly brought forward under the headings "characterisation", "potential consequences" and "patterns of escalation". The practitioner is thus

Root causes of violent conflict and related problem areas

ROOT-CAUSE 1

Imbalance of political, social, economic and cultural opportunities

1: Socio-economic inequalities
2: Exclusive government elite
3: Violation of political group rights
4: Destabilisation by refugees and internally displaced people
5: Demographic pressures

ROOT-CAUSE 2:

Illegitimate non-democratic and ineffective governance

6: Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions
7: Insufficient or declining public services
8: Criminality, social and political violence
9: Biased law application and enforcement by justice and security services

ROOT-CAUSE 3:

Absence of opportunities for the peaceful conciliation of group interests and for bridging dividing lines between different identity groups

10: Absence of effective dispute resolution-mechanisms
11: Absence of pluralism/diversified debate
12: Distrust among identity groups
13: Weak or harming external engagement

ROOT-CAUSE 4:

Absence of an active and organised civil society

14: Weak civil society organisations
15: Absence of professional and independent media
16: Lack of economic "peace interests"

Source: Michael Lund/Andreas Mehler (principal contributors), Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention in Developing Countries. A Practical Guide. CPN Guidebook (draft document) 1999

provided with a tool to help identify the key components of what is usually an overwhelmingly complex conflict situation. In a second step the analyst is required to define a range of overall goals, fields of intervention and concrete activities under the headings of the 16 categories proposed, so that a selection can be made. Finally, the activity preselected for implementation is characterised, and a brief description of its expected impact on the conflict presented, also outlining risks and existing experiences.

This procedure helps the practitioner not only to analyse, but also to take swift action. Prescribed analytical frameworks always involve the risk of constraining the practitioner's own creative thinking. Within a given organisation, a joint conceptual framework for analysis can be promoted by providing a generally accepted manual. The prime objective of this kind of instrument is to help select from the repertoire of activities available.

3.2 Planning

Planning in the event of a crisis

External interventions in conflicts taking place in affected countries require careful planning. In particular the issues of prioritisation, coordination and harmonisation with third-party initiatives, and the integration of TC into the wider strategy of the international community make planning a complex and time-consuming activity. At the same time, the best use should be made of the windows of opportunity, which is why rapid response is called for – a need that can be contradictory to the above statement. Nevertheless, most people we interviewed preferred the careful planning process to "rushing things", although some of them do make use of the analytical tools described above which help speed-up planning.

The use of "crisis matrices" in the planning of all new projects, analogous to the way the cross-cutting themes of environment and gender are addressed, is also being

debated. Within the scope of its environmental impact assessment, Austrian development cooperation has a list of questions on "socio-ecological conflicts" which might serve as a take-off point for such crisis-sensitive planning. Some interviewees had the impression that the willingness of practitioners to accept further assessment procedures in addition to their existing workload was rather low.

3.2.1 Country Programmes

A number of ministries – such as BMZ or the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs – have made moves to design their technical and humanitarian assistance in selected conflict-prone countries or countries in crisis on a more sensitive basis than in "normal cases". Governmental organisations such as SIDA and DFID intend to make all their planning activities crisis-sensitive, even in countries where there are no visible signs of escalating conflict.

"In all its country strategies and similar documents SIDA shall analyse the risk of conflicts and ongoing armed conflicts and give priority to projects and working methods which reduce conflicts in society and prevent armed conflicts."

Source: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Strategy for Conflict management and Peace-Building. A summary, Stockholm 1999

The British Department for International Development (DFID) has also begun incorporating wider objectives of conflict reduction into all its country, regional and global strategies. The country papers are based on an analysis of the potentials for conflict. This analysis provides information on affected

Country strategies

sections of the population, underlying and immediate causes of potential conflicts, their intensity, trends, and possible measures for significant conflict reduction.

BMZ terms

BMZ Country Concept
The BMZ's country concept is a key planning, management and steering instrument for its country-specific work. Alongside BMZ's framework planning, the country concept forms the basis for country-specific implementation of BMZ's development-policy objectives.

Country Talks
The country concepts are prepared in country talks, which provide not only other German Federal Ministries, but also the implementing organisations, non-governmental organisations (especially the church-based organisations and political foundations) with an opportunity to contribute their experiences and to voice their opinions.

Key Cooperation Sector Strategies
The key cooperation sector strategies are designed to supplement the country concept, providing concrete details on the conceptual and technical aspects of the respective sectoral or thematic focus (going into greater depth than is possible in the country concept). The key cooperation sector strategies aim to concretise the country concept, and are attached to it as annexes.

Sector Concepts
The sector concepts – e.g. sector concepts on health, education, emergency and refugee aid etc. – are directives for the design of country programmes and project work. The concepts are prepared (and revised and updated as appropriate) when development cooperation in a given sector is of a particularly large order of magnitude, or if particularly difficult problems arise in that sector, or if the experiences gained call for significant amendments or addenda.

Source: GTZ, "Country-specific and other cross-project papers – their function and links", work document dated 27 January 2000

Many development cooperation institutions, especially most of the German political foundations, have also made the incorporation of conflict-related

issues mandatory in their country strategies, leaving broad scope as to the form which that might take. This too brings forward the issue of potential crisis to a new and prominent status, incorporating it into long-term planning. One should not underestimate the role of country and sector strategies in raising staff awareness. BMZ plans to introduce key cooperation sector strategies for crisis prevention (Kloke-Lesch 1999). However, these efforts are still at the initial stage. Although conflict analysis is often performed on a highly systematic basis, country papers usually remain silent with regard to the concrete activities that might contribute to conflict management.

Since the coordination of governmental and international TC organisations' country strategies is usually subject to intensive discussion with the governments in the partner countries, the raising of conflict-related issues may create ill feelings among the counterparts. Consequently, it is essential that this process be supported by political dialogue, so that conflict-related objectives and measures contained in a country concept are appropriate and mutually accepted.

If tensions are rising in a country, one means of preparing for political dialogue is to convene a country conference involving the concerned organisations and external experts. This conference should focus more closely than usual on the causes of the conflict and the factors exacerbating the crisis. BMZ is planning such a mechanism, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs already holds such talks.

Country conferences

Many organisations are still debating whether crisis prevention should be allocated a similar function in project appraisal to other cross-sectoral issues such as gender and environment. On the one hand, a "crisis matrix" would also focus the attention of non-specialists on the subject. On the other hand it would be difficult to prevent such a mechanism being perceived as just another onerous duty, leading to superficial treatment.

Project appraisal

3.2.2 Financial Planning/Budgeting

Flexibility is a must

Observers are unanimous in the view that the standard financing models and budget lines of TC place strong constraints on the requirement for rapid response to situations of crisis. Rigid financial planning is an obstacle to swift adjustment to changing needs (although such developments might in part be anticipated through appropriate planning). It is of key importance that donors keep promises made in the context of peace accords. It would be fatal if TC back-up measures (for instance involving the reintegration of ex-combatants) could not be implemented due to financial and administrative constraints.

Administrative procedures are rarely flexible. Several consequences can be drawn from this: Some organisations have introduced special procedures with fewer accounting steps, to make funds available on a more flexible basis. Others are creating budget reserves that also enable them to make funds available more quickly. At the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, the EU resolved to institute

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Rationale of the Danish "Peace and Stability Fund"

"A further factor to be taken into account when organising transitional assistance over a limited period of time is the question of when and how the work should be completed. In addition, there is a need for the transitional provision of flexible financing channels for assistance to countries when this is called for by the consequences of a critical situation. In developing countries the Environment, Peace and Stability Fund will be a supplement to contributions financed via the regular development budget. At the same time it will still be possible to initiate multi-annual reconstruction programmes financed exclusively via the Peace and Stability Fund. These contributions should, however, be coordinated with the general Danish assistance programme, which should continue to constitute the backbone of Denmark's development activities."

Source: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prevention and Resolution of Violent Conflicts in Developing Countries, Summary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy paper (draft))

a Rapid Reaction Fund. A few states have introduced budget lines explicitly designated for crisis prevention. One example is Denmark. To date (1999), 27 million Danish Krone have been made available in the "Peace and Stability Fund". It is planned to increase this figure to 100 million (2000), and further (focusing on Southeast Europe). The Canadian Peace Building Fund is also worthy of mention in this context.

Decentralised cooperation offices or embassies in-country sometimes have a certain financial leeway, and are able to deliver support to promising small-scale activities unbureaucratically. A number of interviewees expressed the hope that priorities could be better identified and responded to more rapidly locally, in cases where a certain financial liberty was permitted to this level. Unfortunately it has so far been possible only in rare cases to scale-up such activities to relevant large-scale and long-term projects, for the very reasons that there were no global strategies to which the projects could be related, or that conflict management has not yet been institutionalised.

Scope at the local level

Experience shows that sound financial management can make the delivery of funds more flexible. Through tight financial controlling, DEZA's Division for Humanitarian Cooperation is able to obtain an up-to-date overview of its financial status at any time. This has considerably enhanced its capability to plan the use of funds.

Flexible financial planning is also required after the window of opportunity has closed, however. It must also be possible to complete a project, to freeze funds, or possibly even to wind down the overall scale of commitment to ensure that funds are not wasted or used to finance a war. One example of this is the so-called watching brief phase adopted by the World Bank. This phase is used to focus on social and institutional assessments, so that World Bank is then well prepared to swiftly step-up its activities once the opportunities arise again.

Exit strategy

3.3 Impact Assessment

3.3.1 Conflict Impact Assessment

What impacts TC activities have on an existing conflict – positive or negative, slowing-down or speeding-up the conflict – is a question which arises constantly, i.e. not just on completion of a project phase. Alongside early warning, conflict impact assessment (CIAS) is a tool in which many organisations have shown keen interest, but with which virtually no practical experience has yet been acquired.

TC and Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS)

CIAS attempts to identify all the – intended and unintended – impacts of TC measures on the dynamics of a conflict and the peace-building process. This instrument plays an important role throughout the project cycle, i.e. before, during and after the implementation of measures.

A distinction should be drawn between impacts at the macro level (i.e. the combined effects of all TC measures on the conflict in the wider setting), and impacts at the micro level (i.e. the effects of individual measures on the conflict within the project setting). Identifying impacts presents methodological difficulties. For instance, the effects of interventions cannot always be clearly ascribed to a particular actor or measure.

Source: GTZ, DEA Glossary (English), 2nd edition (work in progress)

CIAS

A study commissioned by the OECD-DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Uvin 1999) states unequivocally that development cooperation always creates both incentives and constraints to both violent and peaceful settlement of conflicts. Consequently, the aim must be to isolate and reduce the negative effects, whilst strengthening and networking the positive impacts. Conflict impact assessment is designed to help serve this purpose.

Should crisis prevention be understood in a very narrow sense, this task would be virtually insoluble. Can the causes of the non-occurrence of a (feared) event be measured? Is it possible to determine if and when precisely a violent conflict was "prevented"?

Methodological problems

"In order to know that a preventive measure, P, prevented an event, E, we have to know that

1. E would have occurred in the absence of P

2. E did not occcur following the presence of P; and moreover

3. The presence of P is the agent, the explanation, for the non-occurence of E."

Source: Hugh Miall, Preventing Potential Conflicts, Assessing the Impact of Light and Deep Conflict Prevention in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, CPN Yearbook 1999/2000 (work in progress)

This appears to be the question addressed by "preventive diplomacy", i.e. what is termed "light conflict prevention". With regard to TC and crisis prevention, the focus is likely to be less on a single event, and more on the reduction of wider potentials for conflict – what is termed "deep conflict prevention". Here, links can be established with the existing checklists used in early warning (cf. Section 3.1.1). In methodological terms, application-oriented research for CIAS has only just begun. It is currently still being debated which effects are to be measured, in order to assess the efficiency of measures designed to prevent conflict. Here are some examples of the kind of questions which would be addressed:

Did implementation of the measure
- prevent the outbreak of specific, possibly imminent acts of violence (i.e. the question which is "impossible" to verify)?
- protect vulnerable groups against attack?
- reduce mutual fear between groups?
- re-establish broken lines of communication between political actors?

For TC measures, however, such event-related questions will be less relevant. More relevant will be questions relating to potentials, for example:

Did the measure
- help reduce structural disparities between groups in dispute, especially with respect to a more just distribution of key goods and services?
- contribute to the formation of autonomous spheres of social power outside the existing official and oppositional organisations (civil society)?
- help improve the capabilities of actors who themselves are significant players in the crisis prevention and reconciliation process? (after Lund 1999)

Plausibility as opposed to certainty

As with impact assessment in development cooperation in general, CIAS also faces the basic problem that it is very difficult to ascribe individual outcomes and developments to specific causes with any precision, given the large number of actors, projects and other factors involved. At the CPN Annual Conference in 1999, a review was conducted of the present status of efforts. It was found that impact assessment as yet plays barely any role in practice. One proposal made was the sequential analysis (comparison of dates when conflict-related events first occur, and dates of targeted intervention), and/or the interviewing of the parties to the conflict. It is regularly proposed that participatory impact assessment be made an integral component of CIAS. Yet at the same time in this highly-sensitive situation it is less clear than in traditional TC whether the publicly expressed view of the interviewee is more likely to be simply their personal conviction, or whether it represents "the truth". To date there are few methods with any potential to generate certainties that go beyond plausible assumptions, particularly since CIAS still has to be applied in practice.

CIAS is designed to identify the effects of development activities on conflicts on an ex ante and in-process basis, rather than retrospectively as in traditional evaluations. Some organisations have already taken a firm position on this.

In-process assessment

"All projects in SIDA's international development cooperation shall be strictly examined during the planning and implementation stages in order to identify undesirable and harmful effects. An analysis of the effects of the project on the conflict shall be built into the regular project assessment work."

Source: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Strategy for Conflict management and Peace-Building. A summary, Stockholm 1999, p.5

To better localise impacts, lists of questions are usually proposed for thematic areas, for example: 1. institutional capacity for conflict management and peace-building; 2. military and physical security; 3. political structures and processes; 4. economic structures and processes; 5. social reconstruction and empowerment (Bush 1998). Also appropriate are the 16 problem areas contained in the EU Guide (Lund/Mehler 1999, cf. Section 3.1.5). It is less important what the categories are called, and more important that identification of the key impacts is guaranteed.

With CIAS, a distinction can be drawn between the micro level of the project, and the macro level of TC involvement as a whole. A distinction should be drawn between the conflict-related impacts of a project to reintegrate ex-combatants in a village community, and the impacts of a national demobilisation programme, or indeed the combined impacts of all TC activities in a partner country. Furthermore, these questions can be addressed prospectively (ex ante) or retrospectively (ex post), as well as on an in-process basis.

Micro and macro levels

On behalf of the Conflict Prevention Network, the organisations Saferworld, International Alert and FEWER have prepared a complex list of question, based on the 16 problem areas specified in the aforementioned Guide (see Table on next page showing "Problem Area 5: Demographic Pressures"). Prospective lists of this kind can be seen as planning instruments for crisis-related needs analysis; if applied repeatedly at relatively short intervals, however, they should be seen in the context of impact assessment.

In crisis and pre-crisis situations, a tendency has been observed among the personnel of organisations to fill in such lists in the office, far away from events on the ground. Under pressure of time and other organisational constraints, the standard local needs assessment normally performed in TC is easily avoided. Many support measures that were specifically designed to prevent crises, for instance in Bosnia, have been based exclusively on external needs analyses in which the affected groups were unable to participate.

Multi-ethnic cooperation and local conflict impact assessment, North-East India

The Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid (EZE) has for some years been providing support to marginalised sections of the population in the Indian state of Manipur, where violent clashes between members of various mountain peoples continue to escalate. This has now motivated over 20 NGOs to join forces in a United NGO called Mission to Manipur (UNMM), with the purpose of implementing multi-ethnic programmes. Based on an analysis of its own needs UNMM, i.e. the local partner association, intends to scale-up its activities to assess the impacts of development projects on conflict situations in the region.

Source: Association of Church Development Services (AGKED) 1999

Problem Area 5: Demographic pressures

Definition: In a context of scarcity and unfavourable environmental conditions, demographic pressures on available physical and social resources such as those caused by migration, high fertility rates and large numbers of youth, may increase the potential for violent conflict. When land is scarce, each additional mouth is difficult to feed. Migration to urban areas or neighbouring provinces or countries is not a viable solution if these destinations ar not prepared to receive people and provide economic opportunities. Lack of jobs and educational opportunities opposes the younger generation's expectations for social advancement.

Column A Components of problem areas	Column B Possible manifestations of the problem which indicate significance of the problem area	Column C Scoring 1 2 3 4 Low High	Column D Problem is: (+) intensi-fying or (-) decreasing social ten-sions&conflict	Column E Significant problem area Yes or No
To what degree do scarcity and unfavourable environmental conditions place pressures on the basic requirements for sustainable livelihoods?	▪ Scarcity may lead to social disintegration, for instance, when men are able to take up labour and income opportunities in other locations (leading for example, to impoverishment of female-headed households and/or low degree of support for children and youth) ▪ Governments or local administration may be unable or unwilling to provide adequate and accessible alternatives to scarce resources ▪ Inequitable social opportunities between men and women at family level may be translated into increased levels of domestic violence and marginalisation of women ▪ Fragile livelihoods are increasingly threatened by competition for scarce resources		+	-
To what extent does the gov-ernment have the capacity to respond to an increasing de-mand for goods and services?	▪ The lack of a stable macro-economic framework may prevent provision of vital services ▪ The education system may not meet the needs of a rapidly changing economy ▪ The government/authorities use increasingly repressive means to confront expressions of discontent ▪ Government or authorities increasingly "blame" particular identity groups for inequitable access		+	-
To what extent do political leaders exploit fears of demographic change for political gain?	▪ A lack of independent media and active civil society capable of counter-balancing extreme political propaganda allows tensions to rise ▪ Increasingly unchecked levels of inter-communal distrust and tension ▪ Economic shocks or reforms increasingly lead to groups feeling insecure about the future ▪ Increased manipulation of political and economic identity by leaders		+	-
To what extent is scarcity perceived to be the out-come of inappropriate or deliberate policies by neighbouring communities or government?	▪ Lack of means by which government addresses the causes of scarcity e.g. by improving environmental monitoring or through land reform ▪ Government/local authorities do not undertake measures to mediate inter-communal relations and facilitate resource sharing to prevent violent competition from damaging livelihoods ▪ Governments or alternative authorities enourage over-exploitation of available resources leading to environmental damage and shortages ▪ The government or authority uses scarcity as a lever for control e.g. by controlling food and development aid		+	-
Statement/conclusions	Illustrative linkages: Demographic pressures may be the consequence of socio-economic inequalities (problem area 1) and of declining services (problem area 7) and may lead to destabilisation (problem area 4) and distrust among identity groups (problem area 12).			

A problem area with a total score of 12 or more should be treated as significant. A component of a problem area with a score of 3+ should be treated as significant.

3.3.2 Evaluations

Inevitably, the focus on crisis prevention and conflict management will have consequences for traditional evaluation work. Major organisations are currently engaged in designing modified criteria and terms of reference for their consultants, incorporating conflict-related issues. Even in the 1990s, most evaluations of TC in crisis-affected countries did not explicitly address the impacts of a violent conflict on TC or, vice versa, of TC on the conflict (Leonhardt 1999). There are, however, some notable exceptions.

One notable evaluation is the aforementioned OECD study (Uvin 1999), the conclusions of which have far-reaching consequences, and which is based on four country studies: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka. The World Bank's post-conflict unit has also published an evaluation of experiences in post-conflict reconstruction in nine states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Uganda). The World Bank study makes only very abstract reference to its own omissions. Nevertheless, its conclusions have been very positively received. BMZ has published (Klingebiel 1999) a cross-section report on evaluations of German development cooperation in six countries (El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Sri Lanka), not including the country studies themselves. This study generated key stimulus for the debate within Germany. A desk study synthesising the lessons of experience gained from Norwegian assistance to countries in conflict (Burundi, Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan) has also been published (Sørbø et al. 1999), again based on detailed evaluations. Although these studies reach a number of similar conclusions concerning the impacts of the respective activities evaluated, the measures had not been designed explicitly to prevent conflict. Consequently there is still little information available as to the value of explicitly preventive action in TC. Clear

information is available on conflict management (e.g. Duffield in Sørbø et al. 1997).

The new approaches to CIAS are – as indicated above – conceptually broader than evaluations conducted ex post. This is closely linked to the insight that crisis prevention work cannot follow a linear trajectory in pursuit of strictly defined ultimate objectives, but must always focus its attention on the process itself. Conflicts and crises are dynamic phenomena. TC should therefore provide correspondingly dynamic, flexible measures in response.

Evaluations should not just be ex post

It is especially important to bear in mind unintended impacts of TC that may possibly exacerbate a conflict. Published guides have already discussed specific – positive and problematic – conflict-related experiences with certain activities (Creative Associates International 1997, Lund/Mehler 1999). In principle, this kind of evaluation is appropriate not only for the project level, but also for the sector level and for overall involvement at the national level. It could also be argued that the cross-sectoral perspective is also of key significance for the evaluation of individual projects. This because when assessing the impacts of a project on a conflict – for instance a water management project with a multi-ethnic steering committee – knowing whether the measures are working at the project level and having the desired impacts on multi-ethnic cooperation is not the only relevant issue. If a pilot project of this kind is used as an alibi, whilst wider measures of reconciliation between hostile groups are absent, its impacts at the national level might even become dysfunctional.

All impacts should be considered

A wary approach should also be taken towards the wish for premature disengagement. The sudden exit from an unsuccessful project might also exacerbate a conflict: Jobs would be lost, a sense of hopelessness might be created, and in certain situation of rising tension rebels might interpret this as a signal that regime is now also considered by donors to be a "soft target". If necessary, the exit should be prepared by

designing– where possible at the planning stage – a prudent, phase-by-phase exit strategy.

3.4 Institutionalisation and Capacity Building

Conflict unit

In almost all development cooperation organisations the additional work being invested in crisis prevention,

Advantages and disadvantages of the institutionalisation of crisis prevention and conflict management

Institutional solution	Advantages	Disadvantages
Department or unit	sufficient human resources, capacities for product and organisation development as well as "helpline", possible division of labour, special expertise immediately evident to observers outside the organisation, potential for coordination of multi-sectoral projects	resistance from regional or sectoral departments, considerable financing requirement
Conflict advisor	lightweight structure, usually a high degree of acceptance among regional and sectoral departments, permanent contact person	mainstreaming, product development and "helpline" duties likely to overtax a single individual
Task force – staff from regional and sectoral departments	lightweight structure, able to influence various activity areas within the organisation, suitable for addressing problems arising on a one-off basis	avoidance of responsibility, additional work without special remuneration despite existing constraints on working time
None	appeals to staff members' sense of personal responsibility	no contact person, no strategic organisation development, expertise not evident to observers outside the organisation

coupled with the interest in institutionalising the theme, had led to a debate on the establishment of specialised units or divisions. The World Bank's post-conflict unit, which hopes at some point to make itself superfluous, is an example often mentioned. So, is there a need for a "crisis prevention unit"? The advantages and disadvantages need to be carefully considered.

To date, only very few organisations have had their own crisis prevention unit (DFAIT, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DFID). At the ministerial level, the subject has usually been dealt with by units with a broader mandate – although corresponding designations have been gaining prominence in establishment plans. TC organisations have either attached a conflict advisor to an existing unit (SIDA, Finland), allowed themselves the luxury of a separate desk, or operate with task forces or theme teams (NRC, GTZ). All these solutions have advantages and disadvantages, as is becoming increasingly evident, and must be adapted to the requirements and not least to the financial constraints of organisations. Hybrid forms are also conceivable (permanent conflict advisor, and in case of acute need ad hoc working groups).

Beyond these concrete forms, the conceptual foundations of crisis prevention should also be reflected at the institutional level. A recent study that also provides an overview of forms of institutiona-lisation (Leonhardt 1999) identifies a number of relevant points as criteria for successful involvement in crisis prevention and conflict management. These findings can be considered in the light of the following questions of institutional logic:

Findings (cf. Leonhardt 1999/2000)	**Institutional problems within development/TC organisations**
It is necessary for the (TC) organisation to make the theme of "conflict" explicit, and to address it. In many cases the theme still goes unmentioned in project documents, evaluations, debriefing guidelines, country programmes etc..	*Which individual or unit should be responsible for this mainstreaming?*
The actions of the organisation must be integrated into a strategic framework guided by ground rules, and embracing policymaking, TC, foreign trade and the army.	*What status does the TC representative need in order to credibly act as contact person vis-à-vis sectoral ministries?*
The organisation must be aware of the fact that peace processes take longer than normal TC processes. This must also be reflected in management procedures. Flexibility and a long-term perspective are required.	*Which institutional solution is conducive to flexibility and a long-term approach?*
A self-assessment as to where constructive action for crisis prevention and conflict management can be taken by an organisation is a matter of interest to any donor. This is the only means to ensure that funds are employed efficiently, and strategic comparative advantages utilised appropriately.	*At which level – within the hierarchy – must decisions be taken concerning strategic priorities?*
Adequate instruments and tools should be made available, as well as intensive back-up support for those who work in conflict situations and their wider setting.	*Which position within the institution ensures an appropriate deployment of human and financial resources?*

Findings (cf. Leonhardt 1999/2000)	**Institutional problems within development/TC organisations**
Risk assessment and the acceptance of risks are critical characteristics for an organisation that intends to achieve positive results in the conflict sector.	*Which institutional links and networking are required so that such risks can be taken?*
The organisation must closely coordinate and bring its activities into line with those of other actors. This applies both to international and to local actors.	*What institutional solutions will ensure presence and reputable status on international committees as well as in conflict areas?*

In the light of the above, a "narrow gauge" solution is clearly inappropriate. Organisations dealing with the issue only peripherally and within the scope of their normal activities are highly unlikely to possess the expertise needed to deploy the required instruments on a timely and target-group-oriented basis. Where country desks or divisions are the lead decision-makers, it will be appropriate to position crisis prevention and conflict management at least in such a way that very close cooperation between these country desks, country desks for affected neighbouring states, and staff units, is possible. For organisations with experience of institutionalising cross-sectoral subjects (e.g. in the form of sectoral divisions), the creation of a more or less independent unit seems an obvious option. If the sector has a separate budget line, even a small one, this will also be an appropriate option. This will enhance the status of the unit within the organisation, and give it broader scope for action. At the same time, a small budget will strengthen the need to cooperate with other departments when tested pilot measures are to be upscaled. Systematic mainstreaming of the issue

Solutions adapted to the organisation, but appropriate to the problem

throughout the entire organisation will then become inevitable.

Capacity building

Capacity building and institutional learning are prerequisite to reputable work and a credible "market offering" in the crisis prevention sector. This issue can be tackled through staff training, and the recruitment of new staff. Some interviewees considered it necessary that 10-20 percent of the staff of an organisation receive corresponding training. Another approach would be to outsource this expertise. SIDA recently commenced implementation of a framework agreement with a variety of university faculties: Faculty staff make available a fixed amount of working time per term, during which they can prepare country studies, or serve as a help desk if the officers responsible for the project require consultancy services. Other models are conceivable. There is broad consensus on the fact that the external expertise required goes far beyond what is available within the existing pool of generalist TC consultants.

Key capacity building inputs could be made through intelligent knowledge management methods. Frequent rotation in some organisations leads to a loss of experience. Accessing information and documents (often unreliably collected) from files in archives is laborious. These operations can be better performed using computer-based systems. It goes without saying that all approaches identified in the business world under the heading "organisational learning/learning organisation" can be useful (Kline/Saunders 1998, Argyris 1999).

4. Areas of Activity

4.1 Reducing the Structural Causes of Conflicts and Building Conflict Management Mechanisms

What might be the specific input of TC in situations of crisis? Critics have cautioned against an over-estimation of TC's capacity in this regard (Musto 2000). At the same time, it is considered certain that TC is far from harnessing all its potentials. In the numerous TC projects around the world, scope for furthering constructive conflict management undoubtedly exists. Some people even believe that the development worker can be turned into a "peace field diplomat". In principle, any TC project can generate impacts that help prevent crises. Yet this will only be convincing if traditional measures are carefully assessed, possibly supplemented by new components and implemented with the explicit aim of helping prevent crises. Having said that, the present set of TC measures will have to be complemented by innovative activities in areas that were previously neglected. This addition will need to be supported by appropriate training of TC personnel. Knowing that any development project can, under certain circumstances, also exacerbate tensions, innovative measures must gain more prominence. TC as a whole will have to become politically more sensitive and conscious, in order to meet the above challenges.

Specific inputs of TC

Structural stability is a comprehensive goal of development cooperation, and at the same time requires numerous internal and external inputs. Exerting a positive influence on structural causes of conflicts, and strengthening mechanisms for peaceful conflict management, are the twin pillars of development cooperation activities geared to this objective. Preventive impacts can occur, when structural activities are designed to

Structural stability

- reduce economic underdevelopment and regional disparities
- create balanced political and social opportunities
- combat deterioration in the natural resource base which affects people's lives
- alleviate population pressure
- reduce educational deficits.

Traditionally, TC has had a strong footing in areas which make it eminently suited to supporting this view of structural stability. These include: Protection and conservation of natural resources, food security, family planning, and the strategic goal of poverty alleviation. In practice, such projects can only be effective in reducing the potential for violent conflicts if they are designed with an explicit focus on addressing the causes of crises. Furthermore they must be implemented with the strategic aim of helping achieve structural stability.

Traditional TC activities are frequently linked to potential conflict situations. The better known include water management, NRM and rural development projects (De Soysa/Gleditsch 1999).

Conflict management in a rural development project: Rio Peixe, North-Eastern Brazil

Rio Peixe is an alternative development project with and for small farmers, amidst large-scale agro-industrial projects producing soybean for export. The project aims to help achieve comprehensive agrarian reform to benefit farmers, in the face of land speculators seeking to increase their returns, and corruption among decision-makers. Land conflicts are being peacefully addressed through dialogue with powerful individuals from the public and private sectors. The dialogue is based on cartographic analyses of land titles and the illegal sale of land. The lobbying and campaign work is seen as a key factor in the success of the dialogue.

Source: Gröss 1999 (Association for Development Aid and the Catholic Rural People's Movement)

The gradual exacerbation of conflicts in many partner countries is causing a change in the project setting, and is creating a need for highly specific

interventions in existing "traditional" projects. The first and least adjustment to such a situation will involve ensuring that the projects do not exacerbate conflicts – the do no harm principle. Secondly, components aimed at reducing crises can be added-on to existing projects. Finally, carefully-designed new projects in less traditional areas of activity may be of particular value in peace-building.

Operating with an additional conflict management component can contribute to peacefully resolving conflicts emerging in the project setting at the local level. One conceivable option would be to establish dialogue forums between rival target groups. This is already an innovative approach. In the case of a project delivering advisory services to a government, the TORs of the seconded experts can be broadened to include aspects of peaceful conflict management (given the appropriate expertise, and subject to agreement by the partner side).

Additional components

A few years ago, TC discovered the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants as one of its activities. The results of these projects are obviously preventive. Yet the argument can be turned around: Demobilisation and reintegration projects are highly conflict-sensitive – and the success of a project can be reversible in the event of a renewed escalation of violence. Similar arguments apply to demilitarisation proper, although here too it may be possible to achieve sustainable results, by combining traditional TC activities with new components.

Established conflict-related activities

There are also a number of activities designed primarily, and not just secondarily or incidentally, to help prevent crises. Most organisations have yet to draw-up a list of best practices for crisis prevention. The following areas of activity seem particularly important:

Innovative core areas of crisis prevention in TC

- participatory information gathering and conflict analysis
- community-based peace-building
- promotion of local and regional conflict management initiatives

- support to the media for peace
- education and training for peace
- security-sector reform
- legal assistance
- promotion of democracy
- empowerment
- conflict management and crisis prevention in the post-conflict reconstruction process
- trauma healing and reconciliation
- gender aspects in crisis prevention and conflict management

Strategic objective: promoting peace constituencies

The strategic objective of many project proposals for crisis prevention is to promote peace constituencies. In addition to the aforementioned war constituencies, i.e. the winners of armed conflicts, militia leaders, the hardliners of a regime and those who profit from general lack of security, there are presumably always groups with an interest in peace (cf. Section 2.2 and Section 2.5).

Peace constituency networks

A peace constituency is designed to systematically counteract, on a broad basis, those profiting from war. Peace constituencies can be local or regional networks of individuals, and governmental and non-governmental institutions within the field of conflict. They are persons who have a long-term interest in preventing violence and pursuing peaceful conflict management. In addition, they possess the influence and capability to also realise this interest (Ropers 2000).

According to this definition it is clear that an intervention in support of such objectives must be formulated in highly context-specific terms. Certain groups (e.g. women merchants, trade unions, traditional and religious leaders) may in particular cases be legitimate and organised groups with a political, economic, social or cultural interest in peace, but in other cases similar groups may even be party to the conflict. A broad diversity of projects may also be appropriate for promoting this strategic objective.

Tajik-Kyrgyz community-based crisis prevention project

Along the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – for instance in the Ferghana valley – violent inter-ethnic clashes occur repeatedly, usually over the use of water resources. DEZA is supporting a Tajik and a Kyrgyz NGO (Itifaak and the Foundation for Harmony and Tolerance), which are jointly implementing the "conflict prevention" project. The project aims to explore and utilise local methods of consensus-building, with a view to resolving inter-ethnic conflicts at the local level. To this end local opinion-makers, i.e. teachers, village chiefs, religious authorities etc. are being trained in conflict analysis methods, conflict resolution techniques and mutually satisfactory consensus-building procedures. Role play and conflict analysis can be applied to concrete situations of local conflict. To disseminate constructive ideas on conflict resolution, the two NGOs are jointly exhibiting examples of successful joint water management in 20 situations of conflict over resources from around the world. The project is also thinking of establishing a "Central Asian network of ambassadors of good will", bringing together influential and respected personalities from the region and providing them with ongoing training in peaceful conflict management methods, analogous to the "International Negotiation Network" developed by the Carter Centre.

Source: Slim 1999

Similar approaches also exist in other regions: Supported by the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) has conducted workshops on "preventive diplomacy and peace-building" in three regions of Africa. In addition to joint conflict analysis, these workshops aimed at regional networking. For the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, the foundations have been laid for establishment of an NGO platform for conflict prevention (ASPR 1999).

As with all TC projects, the issue of critical mass ultimately cannot be avoided: How can isolated, small-scale activities actually generate significant impacts that prevent or delay the outbreak of violent conflicts? What is required here is not only a strategic vision with clear objectives, but also an awareness of the fact that

Being a part of the whole

an activity is laying at most one foundation stone in the "architecture of peace". And to continue the image: It is then just as important to know which other stones are already being or will be laid by other actors, so that the structure can be properly cemented.

Do complex conflicts require equally complex project approaches?

Violent conflicts have a tendency to become self-perpetuating and to gain complexity. Consequently there is also a tendency to address the complex relationships through complex, integrated projects involving a variety of partners and objectives. The benefits of addressing the causes of conflicts simultaneously should be weighed against the increased need for steering inputs, given that little experience has so far been gained on the basis of which the likelihood of success could be assessed.

"Paths to Peace" in the Urabá region

The number of flagrant human rights violations in Colombia is continuing to increase. The Urabá region in the North-West of the country is considered the most violent zone of Colombia. During the 1990s, it had the highest rate of homicide in the world. The population is socio-culturally highly heterogeneous, with a very high proportion of families living in absolute poverty. Increasingly, the civilian population is being caught in the crossfire; combatants on both sides each suspect civilians of supporting the other side, and at the same time coerce civilians into providing such support.

The goal of the GTZ project is to strengthen the interventions of the non-governmental human rights organisation CINEP (the Jesuit adult education organisation) and "Viva la Ciudadania" (an association of eight NGOs seeking to help build a democratic culture), which in turn are supporting democratic processes to help resolve the problems of the region. The project has strengthened municipal organisations in developing democratic and efficient administrations, and has improved the situation of displaced persons by creating "peace villages". Further components of the project include a nutrition and a health programme.

Source: GTZ in-house working paper

The conflict cycle

For analytical reasons, the phases of a conflict are often identified within the framework of a "conflict cycle". Only in a pre-conflict phase can conflict

prevention be performed in the strict sense. Having said that, preventive action can also be taken in a post-conflict phase, to prevent a second escalation. When assessing the capability of TC organisations to act, it is important to understand the dynamic trends at work. It is generally accepted that opportunities for intervention decrease sharply, the further a conflict escalates.

From the local cooperative to the Security Council of the United Nations, all types of organisation have begun to define their role in conflict management. This trend is more than just a fashion. At the same time, the claim is exaggerated that while budgets for other items have been reduced, appropriations have been increased only for conflict management, thus creating lucrative opportunities. The trend is rather a response to the changed perception of the changing setting of development cooperation (Carl 1996). This certainly means an upward swing for conflict management, which is also bringing in new actors.

Promoting conflict management mechanisms: old ground, new actors

On the other hand, it should be emphasised that conflict management is not a new field. Amnesty International, the Red Cross, Quaker Peace Service (to name but a few) have long been engaged in finding ways to redefine the roles and relationships between people and organisations across national borders. A number of NGOs specialised in conflict management have already become established internationally. All major NGOs in development cooperation, as well as the governmental agencies involved in emergency aid and Technical Cooperation, are now making significant efforts, or have become new actors in this field. There may also be traditions and institutions at the local level which are allocated this task.

Tradition of conflict management

Conflicts are managed in all societies of the world, but in diverse ways. To cite one example, the Asia Foundation has financed a series of workshops on existing mechanisms of conflict management. In this connection, a large number of indigenous conflict management initiatives located on all continents were

Strengthening existing conflict management mechanisms

identified. Of these institutions only a few have received any external support at all. Some of these initiatives are suitable either as primary partners for new small-scale projects, or as additional partners for new components within existing programmes.

The methods applied in the field of conflict management range from community-level mediation, to local reconciliation techniques, to informal arbitration tribunals, and to religious forms of mediation and reconciliation. Even training in techniques of negotiation with multinational companies, seeking to conserve and protect natural resources, falls within this domain. All these approaches have two things in common: they are non-violent, and inclusive (Jandt/Pedersen 1996).

Strategic advantages of TC

A strategic advantage of TC lies in the identification of existing conflict management mechanisms. TC has the necessary contacts on the ground, and often enjoys confidence and trust even among the poorer sections of the population. As with other tasks in which they are involved, however, TC organisations also run the risk in this field of being perceived purely in their function as donors. Today, increasing numbers of NGOs are emerging motivated predominantly by lucrative self-interest, and without any substantial experience in conflict management.

"External" conflict management

Indigenous conflict management methods contrast with the methods from which international actors make their selection. Internationally active organisations often start from the assumption that there are universally applicable models of conflict management. Sometimes, these choices based on the principle of universality are dominated by excessive optimism concerning the potentials of social engineering.

Structural change versus psychosocial conflict management

Current conflict management practice often pays inadequate attention to the structural causes of conflict – such as socio-economic disadvantage or poor governance. Conflict management strategies are for the most part designed on the hypothesis that social

behaviour and existing mentalities are basically susceptible to change. Sometimes over-enthusiastically optimistic assumptions concerning the time required to bring about change make such designs extremely unrealistic. Instability is interpreted in terms of social psychology. Conflict is then the result of a dissonance between views, or a break in communication between individuals and groups. According to this view, armed conflicts (of a cyclical nature) are dysfunctional events. And corresponding conflict management is seen as a means to create order. At the very least, this is a problematic view.

Conferences or workshops bringing together people from different ethnic backgrounds or countries are often based on the assumption that tensions can be reduced by applying psychosocial techniques to correct false mutual perceptions. Conflict is then seen as an "error", for which both parties to the conflict, or both "perpetrator" and "victim", are equally responsible. Here, a word of caution is necessary. It goes without saying that conflicts also have psychosocial causes. Equally, measures to help alleviate inappropriate perceptions undoubtedly make a positive contribution. But at the same time the underlying structural and political causes of armed conflicts should not be lost sight of.

Even when agreeing to social engineering, a naive approach is out of the question. Any attempt of furthering peace in a situation of escalating conflict is faced with the challenge of either accepting the physical separation of the parties by keeping them apart, in order to reduce the risk of violent confrontation, or seeking to bring about communication between the parties through encounter, dialogue and cooperation. This challenge arises in particular when dealing with refugees and displaced persons, especially in the planning of reintegration programmes. In the long term, however, only such attempts that try to re-unite the parties are likely to foster sustainable peace-building, although

Physical separation versus encounter

**Strategic objectives
and social
engineering**

physical separation may be appropriate in the short and medium term (after Ropers 2000).

Seeking to bring about structural change through social engineering always borders on the presumptive, and side-effects are easily lost sight of. The frame of reference of such an approach should be retained, however: One key strategic objective for development cooperation to pursue in crisis prevention is to nurture a variety of overlapping social alliances which are expected then to form a counter-force to the risk of political mobilisation along ethnic, religious or other identity-defining lines. In other words, the strategic goal is to influence the social process so that social relationships extend out of the purely one-dimensional towards a multi-dimensional perspective.

The intention of bringing about structural change always bears the danger of over-estimating one's capabilities to exert influence.

4.2 Participatory Rapid Appraisal and Conflict Analysis

**Information and
analysis**

Beyond being the basis for appropriate planning, participatory rapid appraisal and above all participatory conflict analysis can generate positive impacts on existing conflicts. Participatory conflict analysis is per se a political activity, which is why incompatibilities can arise with the dominant philosophies (or mandates) of the many TC organisations which see themselves as "apolitical".

It is often conceded that there is a lack of accurate and useful information on armed conflicts. Yet at the same time, existing participatory information gathering methods developed in non-violent situations are not applied to any significant extent in conflict situations, allegedly due to the shortage of time and acute nature of the problem. Where people are dying or starving, suffering from disease or being displaced, there seems to be little time for participatory workshops or a

comparison of TC organisations' own views with local perspectives and capabilities.

Nevertheless, the process by which one attempts to understand the conflict is often the first clear response to it – in other words it is a first intervention. Depending on how this diagnosis is conducted, it can strengthen or weaken local (war or peace) constituencies. It is therefore highly appropriate to put emphasis on participatory procedures in violent conflicts.

Do no harm by conducting appropriate analyses

In crisis situations, TC and above all emergency aid is often delivered on the basis of deliberate misinformation, which leads to massive errors in assessment. One example is the unquestioned preferential treatment given to leaders of the Rwandan *ancien régime* in the Goma (ex-Zaire) refugee camps. The fact that these leaders were used in the distribution of food automatically led to a strengthening of their position. Thus precisely those groups responsible for the genocide were supported.

By contrast, participatory conflict analysis in theory at least offers opportunities to help the local population develop a collective understanding of the situation, which is prerequisite to a functioning society. Utilising participatory methods for conflict analysis is not new. What is new is the insight that this kind of analysis or planning can itself be an instrument of conflict management. Participatory analysis and planning for conflict management can be applied at two levels:

Participatory conflict analysis

- at the political level – to create a climate in which different groups can begin to jointly discuss future-related issues; and
- at the technical level – to develop methods for improved participation by hitherto "silent" groups.

Conflict analysis in one form or another is key to the transformation of violence.

The first step comprises the critical evaluation of information. Opportunities for a peaceful or non-peaceful future are often constrained by rumours, or tales of unrepresentative individual experiences. Rarely is information available that might be analysed and

Sound information rather than rumours

verified in dialogue with others. Seldom are there opportunities to compare and discuss conflicting experiences. Misinformation is even an instrument deliberately chosen by parties to mobilise support, confuse opponents, create chaos and trigger panic, which in many cases leads to "the enemy" no longer being perceived as human beings. In such contexts, sound information can be a powerful instrument for pushing ahead efforts for peace, reconciliation and an end to war.

Joint analysis rather than prejudice

A second step is a joint analysis of the available information and interpretations. Here, TC's methods can be used to best effect: A joint analysis which ideally ends in a consensus concerning the causes and trajectories of conflicts, and the process leading to such an analysis, can be key steps in overcoming social barriers, coming to see former enemies as human beings once again, and identifying alternative options to armed conflict. The NGO Conciliation Resources for instance supports corresponding workshops, seminars, international exchange etc. with local civil society groups. A further step can be the joint publication of the results of the analysis.

Improved understanding of the dynamics of a conflict thanks to joint publication

The publication "Accord. An International Review of Peace Initiatives" initiated by Conciliation Resources aims to disseminate information on conflicts which has been jointly gathered and collated by the various parties to the conflicts. To date, seven issues have appeared. They are designed to help groups involved in a conflict identify more clearly their position, and serve as a means of comparison for people in other violent conflicts. Thus each issue is more than just a publication; it is rather more of a peace-building measure.

Source: Author's interview

Based on experiences in four countries, the UN War-torn Societies Project (WSP, cf. Section 3.1.2) reached three conclusions relevant to participatory planning:

The selection of issues on which data are collected in conflict situations should be made exclusively by the target population themselves. There will then be greater opportunities to discuss the issues truly relevant to the management of the conflict. WSP sees its role in the project planning process exclusively as one of facilitation, neither promising nor delivering any inputs at all, but merely creating scope for the appropriate processes.

Self-determination in the selection of issues

Persons taking part in participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) should always be drawn from different social and ethnic backgrounds. The form of data gathering to which TC is accustomed usually occurs within a narrow, directly affected target group. Such an appraisal rarely leads to an analysis of project impacts cutting across all the social strata.

Comprehensive participation

PRA processes can also become a kind of mediation. Where generally accepted authorities integrate groups in a consensus-building process, mediation is taking place. PRA facilitators trained in communication techniques and mediation skills might better utilise the opportunities to facilitate constructive conflict management in each individual PRA process. It is therefore appropriate in zones of conflict to supplement training in PRA methods with corresponding training in conflict management (Tschirgi 1999).

PRA as mediation

4.3 Community-based Peace-building

The belief in the necessity of participation is also the basis for the heavily propagated community-based peace-building approach. The concept of this approach has embraced a wide range of empowerment and capacity building measures for various social groups. It starts from the plausible assumption that peace

processes only have a chance when they are promoted by local actors. Prerequisite to an approach of this kind are close contacts with local grass-roots groups, and an intimate understanding of the local conflict situation. One outstanding example is the support of traditional leaders at the local level and district councils formed on a "bottom-up" basis in Somalia following the withdrawal of the UNOSOM Mission (Heinrich 1997).

Community-based peace-building in the Horn of Africa

The Somalia Programme of the Life and Peace Institute began in 1992, and developed into a civic education programme for local officials on district councils, teachers, police officers, journalists and women's groups. Peace initiatives at grass-roots levels are promoted in order to support local communities and strengthen traditional conflict management methods. A similar programme was launched in 1998 for Southern Sudan.

Source: Life and Peace Institute 1999

Collapse of the state and crisis prevention

Somalia is considered a "collapsed state"; consequently, there was no real alternative to an approach of this kind. Yet the advocates of "community-based peace-building" are making a virtue of necessity: They argue that the state which existed prior to its collapse was nothing but a repressive mechanism, and that ultimately the new approach amounts to a form of community-based state-building. This assumption has far-reaching implications which have not been sufficiently discussed to date:

1. A narrow or exclusive focus on governmental partners in development cooperation is called into question – local, traditional and informally organised societies should be considered the better partners.

2. The collapse of states in crisis need not be prevented, since a "better state" cannot emerge until that collapse has taken place.

Although Somalia has not yet risen from the ashes (although a non-recognised state has – "Somaliland" –in the former British territory), it is also not clear whether new states will be formed from the regions and districts. Nevertheless, a number of zones of the country can be considered to be at relative peace, and economically functional. It remains very unclear whether the more modern "quasi-governmental" and civil society organisations (district councils, police forces, human rights and women's organisations) will be able to co-exist with the traditional structures (council of village elders, Sharia courts) in the long term. The potentials for military defence of the peaceful zones in a highly conflict-prone region of the world are certainly limited. Critics therefore ask how stable and crisis-resistant the new arrangement is. One particular feature of community based peace-building is that it can already be launched during wartime. Clearly, non-governmental actors are the obvious choice for the implementation of this approach.

Somalia – a role model?

4.4. Promoting Local and Regional Conflict Management Initiatives

When conflicts have escalated to the degree that they reach international attention, responses almost exclusively are addressed to the needs of the conflict's victims, and the deeds of those inciting the conflict. This means that barely any time or funding are left to support the role of unarmed civilians in transforming the conflict. Civilian initiatives often require international support, because of their extreme vulnerability within their own social setting, since they are calling into question the existence and actions of armed groups.

Sierra Leone – mediation work

The London-based NGO Conciliation Resources seconded a coordinator to Sierra Leone who possessed close links to the country and a network of contacts. This created scope for a multifaceted programme to strengthen local organisations.

The programme included the following components:

- strengthening the national programme of the Catholic Church for reconciliation and trauma healing

- conflict analysis: workshop with national and international NGOs

- mediation and negotiation skills: workshop for religious leaders, trade union representatives, representatives of women's organisations and individual peace activists

- reporting on the elections: training for members of the national journalists' association

- team-building workshop for the national women's peace movement

- peace-building workshop at the community level

Source: Author's interview

Civil society approaches

One key to "civilising" conflicts is to strengthen those groups at the grass roots of society which profit directly from peace. These include civil society organisations which are engaged in conflict management. However, here too interventions should be planned with great caution, not forgetting that governmental institutions should also be trained in dealing with the growing complexity of civil society and its increasing claims on participation. In many countries, TC also faces the problem of competition between various NGOs and other civil society organisations for influence and external support. This competition can also bear the potential of conflict.

Limits to indigenous approaches

Local and indigenous potentials for paving the way to sustainable peace should not be overestimated,

Bangladesh: Cooperation between competing NGOs

The Swiss Red Cross (SRC) was involved in conflict management in Bangladesh while implementing a health programme with local NGOs. Proceeding on the assumption that local NGOs were to a certain extent competing with one another, and understanding that a collective action to improve the poorly functioning public health service was not possible, the SRC developed a procedure in 1989-1995 which brought the organisations together under a common objective. The following moderation and conflict management tools were used:

- workshops to create a climate of mutual respect between the NGOs

- elaboration of joint visions

- exchange of personnel

- mutual professional consultation

- networking of staff at the second and third management levels, with a view to in turn influencing the top management level where rivalries were particularly pronounced

The personal relationships and joint visions proved to be the strongest binding elements.

Source: Ribaux/Barua: 1995 and 1999

however, especially in a post-conflict phase. Although they are a necessary precondition, they are not sufficient for "managing" a conflict, since the traditional management methods have already failed, at the point where escalation into armed conflict should have been prevented. Many of the traditional approaches to managing conflicts and social differences reinforce undemocratic patron-client relationships, and have perhaps contributed to the emergence and spread of the conflict. Very recent studies (Hamid 1996, Blanchet 1996, Roy 1996, Burling 1997) have shown that some traditional rural courts are dominated by men, and almost always reach decisions that are against the interests of women. In view of this the fashionable embrace of traditional approaches should always be

critically questioned, though by no means generally avoided.

Potentials for support emerge above all in the form of funds, training measures, consultancy and exchange. The specialisation of a number of NGOs in multi-ethnic community-based conflict management projects creates interesting partners. Key to the success of projects here is the process-orientation, i.e. the ability to respond flexibly to changing constellations in the conflict (Ropers 2000).

Cooperation between civil society and the state

Very limited is the scope for influencing regional and international factors, such as political and military interventions or the arms trade, from the local level. Traditional and indigenous conflict management methods are therefore not always compatible with the demands of today's conflicts. Warranted though the interest in strengthening local institutions and capacities may be, the wider context must not be lost sight of. Governmental institutions too perform a key

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Fiji: Constitutional reform against racism

The history of Fiji is characterised by racial division, which has a strong influence on the country's social and political institutions. On the initiative of the Citizens' Constitutional Forums*,* a progressive civil society group seeking democratic change and forms of government, Conciliation Resources has provided support to create space for dialogue on constitutional reform. According to the revised constitution, specific social groups should no longer be excluded from the life of society. This initiative alone has led to dialogue between various social groups on power-sharing, civil rights, minority rights, land reform, electoral reform and institutional reforms which would not otherwise have been possible. When the project was launched the conflict was evident, but had not escalated into violence. The language of "conflict" has been avoided wherever possible, focusing instead on discourses of inter-cultural understanding and the promotion of human rights. External support has been provided for strategic planning, international fund-raising, identification and exchange of international resource people, communications advice, research, dissemination of information on the constitutional and political process.

Source: Author's interview, Conciliation Resources website

function in managing local conflicts. Supporting local peace initiatives can also include promoting democratic election procedures, reforms of the legal system, the establishment of integrated education systems, appropriate language policies and human rights legislation.

4.5 Media Support for Peace

Independent media are considered prerequisite to the open discussion of conflicts. When the media are censored or controlled, then dissident opinions can only be expressed through an element of force. Media reports can often significantly change public opinion on conflicts – positively or negatively. Pluralistically constituted supervisory committees which could constructively influence these processes are seldom found in countries in crisis. Material assistance for representatives of the government press, which is always welcome, should only be provided either where democratic standards are observed, or in conjunction with corresponding promotional measures.

The avoidance of stereotypical and polarising representations in the media is one goal of TC in this domain. Another is compliance with standards of professionalism in the reporting of sensitive issues. Wherever possible, efforts should be made to help

Strengthening professional standards

Sensitisation in election coverage

In the run-up to the 1997 elections in Mali the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), funded by the EU, held a series of workshops on election-related problems which focused on the difference between (often unintentional) irregularities and the deliberate manipulation of elections. The media in fact then went on to avoid expressing any irresponsible criticism when, in the heated post-election atmosphere, a number of opposition parties made serious allegations.

Source: Mehler 1998

establish a code of conduct for journalists and, in the journalists' own interests, to press for compliance with the code. Personnel development workshops for furthering the promotion of professional journalists' associations and sensitisation measures can be applied to raise professional standards and promote a professional ethos.

Radio for peace

Experiences with "hate media", for instance in the Great Lakes region or in the Balkans, have nurtured the idea that the targeted deployment of an independent news channel which avoids the dramatisation of events can create a balanced picture. Measures to this effect have often been implemented in conjunction with UN peacekeeping missions, namely in Namibia, Haiti, former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, El Salvador, Central African Republic – in some cases with tangible success. For instance, Radio MINURCA became the most listened-to radio channel in the Central African Republic on account of its acknowledged independent reporting. Thus independence was also utilised to sensitise the electorate. The creation of a mixed editorial team composed of members from hostile groups has been a standard approach in this field inspired by the model

Star Radio, Liberia

On the initiative of the NGO Fondation Hirondelle (Switzerland), and financed by USAID, Star Radio went on the air in 1997. Following reports on acts of violence by the government, the station was repeatedly threatened with being closed down. Donor pressure enabled it to resume work on several occasions (although it was suspended again in March 2000). The station not only provided reliable information of national importance, but also produced a version of Gogol's play "The Government Inspector" adapted for radio, in Liberian Pidgin. Radio Star has received several international and national awards.

Source: Jörg Becker, Promoting an active contribution by the media towards the formation of a peace constituency, GTZ working paper, March 2000 draft

"Radio Ijambo" project of the NGO Search for Common Ground in Burundi. The success of the project is difficult to demonstrate in this instance, however, in light of the ongoing civil war. It is obviously still easier to incite conflict through the media than it is to nurture peace.

Audio-visual media are considered effective materials for education. The goals of education for peace can for instance be conveyed through soap operas. It is important here to take into account the respective cultural tradition. The use of local languages, local theatre groups and universally popular actors are likely to produce positive results.

Production of programmes providing education for peace

4.6 Education and Training for Peace

Although media work in the context of education for peace should be considered a separate field, it is not always entirely distinct from education projects proper. Education and training are among the traditional activities of TC (Isaac 1999). A debate has been ongoing for some time concerning the role of education and training in the peace process and in conflict resolution. Can education for peace be provided externally? How can peace be incorporated into curricula?

According to the present understanding, education for peace comprises all activities which improve attitudes, knowledge and capabilities for conflict management. People of all ages should be shown how to alter their conflict-related behaviour, how to counteract the escalation of violence and how to promote conflict resolution. Thus peace education is a measure which creates the social preconditions for peaceful co-existence.

Education for peace

Overall, little knowledge and very few evaluations are available on the impacts of education for peace. How does it influence the political, social and economic factors that have contributed or may in the future contribute to war? There are, however, sufficient

examples of projects of education for peace, and projects integrating conflict handling into the formal education system. Even in industrialised countries school mediation is gaining a higher profile in the context of "violence in schools" and how to deal with it.

Youth and education for peace

Young people are the future of any society, and it is in most of the "young" societies in developing countries where the under-16s make up a majority of the population. It is crucial to the future of peace that this group recognise the societal value of peaceful co-existence, and receive an education conducive to the realisation of their material and social desires. This is of course especially relevant to former child soldiers who are to be socially re-integrated. In the strict sense, education for peace means learning how to co-exist and cooperate with members of other social groups. What are the lessons learned from experiences to date by TC?

Projects for children in conflict zones – "Good practice" in the formal education sector

1. Basic education must be inclusive: Primary school education should be made available for all children, i.e. regardless of social class, religion and region, and where possible in the languages of the main population groups.
2. Teachers should be trained especially in developmental psychology and general education theory.
3. New curricula should incorporate conflict-specific themes such as communication, cooperation, reconciliation and problem-solving (including the methods needed for their introduction: role play, music, stories etc.).
4. New textbooks should draw attention to the underlying causes of poverty, illiteracy, racism, patriarchy etc., and prompt processes of refection on them. They should create an understanding of the socio-cultural underpinnings of rival identity groups.

Source: Annette Isaac, Education and Peace Building – A Preliminary Operational Framework. CIDA, Quebec 1998

A number of principles for TC education projects with children in conflict situations can be formulated:

Apart from the formal school system, non-formal education is also important. This, too can be promoted by TC through appropriate project activities:

Non-formal education and training

- Youth camps, youth groups, sport and recreation programmes: Such activities help motivate young people from diverse backgrounds to engage in joint activities. This breaks down old cultural barriers. At the same time, recreational activities are designed to replace the "culture of violence" which can be highly attractive to young people in the absence of alternative options.
- Education programmes for adults and youth: Long-term advice and support for parents and children who never had an opportunity to obtain a full school education.
- Training for community leaders on all aspects of education for peace and crisis prevention. This training is important especially for leaders who are highly respected by young people.
- Development of courses and teaching materials which explicitly address the problems of children and young people. This aims to prevent the emergence of youth gangs willing to use violence.

Young people per se do not constitute a "security risk", although the systematic neglect of their interests does.

4.7 Security-sector Reform

Security-sector reform can be considered an innovative field combining both technical and political involvement. It involves the reform of key institutions of the state: security forces (police force, but also the army and paramilitary forces where they are involved in internal security), and the justice and penal systems.

The focus of TC activities in this regard are likely to vary from country to country.

Whilst it is undisputed that poor functioning within the above three institutions can contribute significantly to the escalation of conflicts, it remains a largely open question whether the great number of conceivable but to date rarely seriously tested interventions actually achieve their objective.

"A well-functioning security sector instils in the population a sufficient sense of security and trust in existing structures to keep them from choosing alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, a well-functioning security sector is more likely to be perceived as a legitimate part of a generally accepted social order. In that way, security sector reform also concerns the creation of a new political culture in which differences are settled through discussion, accomodation, and sound civil institutions."

Source: NUPI Working Group on Security Sector reform, Security Sector Reform As a Development Issue, Room Document n° 7, OECD/DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris 2-3 June 1999

Comprehensive security concept

This new field of activities is also a reflection of the status of the international debate on the notion of security. Based on the concepts of human security and structural stability, a comprehensive security concept is the foundation of security-sector reform. Since the end of the Cold War, international bodies have been less and less concerned with the external and territorial security of nation states. Not external aggression, but the physical, material and social security of citizens has been at the heart of the new debate. Also, external threats are becoming less significant than internal risks. Therefore, activities of reform focus on security-sector institutions which fail to properly discharge their mandates, or even increase rather than decrease security risks.

Development cooperation, and TC in particular, has long shied away from the subject of security. At most, TC was willing to become involved in the reform of legal systems. Involvement in the security sector was considered "too political", and this view was also shared in some quarters well outside of TC, in political diplomacy. If we agree that any form of involvement in crisis prevention does have political impacts, then the decision in favour of involvement in security-sector reform is no longer so spectacular. Concern for physical security is a core element of crisis prevention.

Wrong to shy away from political themes

Projects in this sector are indeed highly sensitive; they are perhaps the most "political" of all conceivable interventions, with potentially the most far-reaching results. The proposed measures include the establishment of parliamentary control over defence forces, the professional training of police forces, the establishment of neutral recruitment to the security services, human rights courses for prison staff, separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive, and many more. It is only too obvious that some go far beyond the scope of TC.

The proposed levels for TC involvement in the security sector are:

Levels of involvement

- The political level: strengthening of parliament and civilian institutions of government in their capacity as monitoring, decision-making and control bodies with a key role in planning and budgetary control. Support and professionalisation of NGOs and the press engaged in this area.
- The economic level: disarmament and conversion, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, utilisation of resources formerly used for military purposes (e.g. real estate).
- The social level: strengthening of public security, assessment of citizens' security needs, control of arms transfers, especially small arms and light weapons (after Wulf 2000).

The professionalisation of the security forces is considered a more specialised task which is not within the competences of the traditional actors of TC, and which is often to be seen in conjunction with other objectives (establishment of regional crisis-response forces).

Lessons learned

Research reports have identified the following lessons learned:

- It is not possible to reform individual components of the whole complex (the triad of the security forces, and the judicial and penal systems), but only all three simultaneously. At the same time, a key objective of reform is to separate these three domains.
- Equally important is recognition of the fact that reform activities of this kind require political will coupled with scope for action on the part of a legitimate partner government, as well as the feeling of ownership – conditions which unfortunately are often not in place in countries with the greatest need for reform.
- Security-sector reform is likely to be most easily implemented in post-conflict situations, since radical steps are then likely to encounter less resistance on all sides (NUPI 1999).

Supervisory bodies a priority

One of the top priorities in the security field is the strengthening of civil bodies in their monitoring and control of the security forces. This is a possible area of activity for TC.

Different understandings of the nature and role of the state

Little attention has been paid to the fact that a Western understanding of the nature and role of the state has dominated the design of measures for the security sector. Adaptation to other socio-economic and cultural models might achieve positive results. For instance, it is not to be predicted that the dualism of "modern" and "traditional" law will simply disappear following a reform of the legal system. This would mean that either a clear division of competences or, conversely, a broad integration of the two spheres of law should then be aspired to. Other Western ideas also need to be reviewed: The unbroken continuity in the

" … it requires significant institutional reform and upgrading the skills of civilians tasked to manage and monitor the security forces within the government of partner countries (for example, in the ministries of finance, defence, internal or home affairs, and justice; offices of the bugdet, auditor general, and the national security adviser; parliamentary committees for foreign affairs, defence, public accounts/appropriations, and auditing; the court system; and human rights ombudsmen; and strong support to capacity building among members of civil society and civil society organisations)."

Source: Nicole Ball, Spreading good practices in security sector reform: Policy options for the British government (Saferworld Report), London, p. III

use of prisons for punishment and as a pool of forced labour since the colonial period – as opposed to use for re-education and rehabilitation purposes – (Bernault 2000) – means that reforms in this sub-sector have to date met with very little sensitivity in many partner countries. Local resistance is often considerable.

British development cooperation has led the way in facing the challenge of security-sector reform in partner countries. Former Secretary of State Clare Short described security-sector reform as part of the good governance agenda, and at the same time as a key component of poverty alleviation. For the poor, physical security and the security of property are prerequisite to leaving poverty behind (Short 2000). This link was underlined by a study on Bangladesh. It demonstrates that, even in apparently "peaceful times", in 30 percent of cases the lack of social security was the reason why poor households could not improve their economic position (Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies 1991).

A very recent discussion going beyond security-sector reform is the debate on the linkages between international military interventions and development activities (after Hendrickson 1999). There is now a global consensus that coordination between military actors and development organisations – at least in post-conflict situations (the NATO CIMIC Programme in the

Civil-military cooperation

Balkans leaps to mind) – needs to be strengthened. This applies all the more to cooperation between civil and military actors within partner countries.

Civil-military cooperation in South Africa

In the "Training for Peace in Southern Africa" project involving Norway's NUPI and the South African partners ACCORD and IDP, the key aim to is build stand-by peace-keeping capacities in Southern Africa. NGOs and civilian personnel are also involved, however. A further aim is to build constructive working relations by establishing contacts between the military forces of the Republic of South Africa, long isolated by the decades of apartheid, and the military of neighbouring states.

Source: NUPI 1995/97

4.8 Legal Assistance

The problem of access to the legal system

Conflict management should certainly first take place in the institutions created for the purpose, including the justice system. In countries in crisis, however, access to the legal system is often a major problem for purely geographical, financial, political and socio-cultural reasons. In the long term, this undermines the legitimacy of the state, since conflicting interests cannot be resolved by the state justice system. Thus it is no longer able to ensure law and justice. Judges and lawyers are inadequately trained, or are corrupted and intimidated. Crisis prevention can then comprise support for judicial reforms to counteract these deficits.

With regard to conflict management, existing legal systems often make no provision for the peaceful settlement and resolution of conflicts. In projects of legal assistance (e.g. legal aid fund for vulnerable

groups), TC can help provide professional legal counselling in critical cases; this strengthens the formal legal system. One option is to train para-legals who can help clarify legal issues and thus promote empowerment, without undermining the formal system.

Legal aid in Kivu

In Kivu in the East of the Congo, prior to the disaster in neighbouring Rwanda a legal aid association entitled "Héritiers de la Justice" (heirs of justice) had been founded under the auspices of the regional secretariat of the "Eglise du Christ au Zaire". Its aim was to promote the local population's understanding of legal issues. With funds provided by EZE (the German Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid), a "mediation committee" composed of prominent local citizens to act as arbitrators for dispute settlement was set up. They also organised so-called *bazars juridiques*, regular fora on legal issues for the local population. The methodology usually applied by the mediation committees was to begin with principles of African wisdom such as proverbs, before proceeding to explain Western concepts of modern law. Members of the committees held regular consultation hours for those seeking advice (*pharmacies de droit*/"legal dispensaries").

Source: EZE, work report 1998/99, Bonn 1999, p.12

Where the traditional legal and conflict management system has survived being taken over by colonial or modern systems, and where it enjoys popular consensus, it would also be appropriate to explore potentials for support in this domain. Here too political sensitivity is required, since traditional legal systems may support or undermine structures of domination, and may disadvantage certain sections of the population (e.g. women) (cf. Section 4.1).

4.9 Promoting Democratic Transition

Governance

The political causes of crises and conflicts – legitimacy and efficiency deficits of a government, deliberate exclusion of sections of the population, systematic human rights violations, corruption etc. – are attracting increasing attention. One obvious option is therefore to take preventive action in the sphere of governance, even though resistance by partner governments may in some cases be strong. In its strongest form this may even be the explicit demand for measures to improve governance. Even multilateral organisations such as UNDP, which has in the past shown marked restraint in adopting a higher profile, might do so at least if the views of reformers within the organisation gain support.

> "UNDP should make governance work in post conflict situations its central activity in CPC (crisis/post conflict). This focus would build on UNDP's talents and fills a major need in CPC work. It would include pre-governance work, including consensus-building, and programmes to create space for civil society and government to meet and rebuild trust and local capacity for development. Other key governance areas should be rule-of-law and reform of the security sector (...)."
>
> Source: UNDP in Crisis, post conflict and prevention. Recommendations for change. Report of the Transition Team to the Administrator of UNDP, November 1, 1999

In Germany, the political foundations are actively engaged in innovative projects to promote good governance, with relatively low funding. Having always promoted democracy, the foundations claim to have been involved in crisis prevention for some time.

Two dimensions

The pushing of democratic transition has to take account of two distinct dimensions. The governmental dimension involves institutional reform and the promotion of good governance, whereas the non-

governmental dimension involves the support of civil society organisations and democratic political parties.

The positive links between democratisation and crisis prevention are a result of a) the effects of political reforms on good governance, b) the promotion of disadvantaged sections of the population (reduction of structural disparities, combined with empowerment), and c) the effects of strengthening civil society associations on a culture of dialogue, which is key in conflict situations. Factors a) and b) have a bearing on the structural causes of conflicts, whilst factors a) and c) affect procedural preconditions for conflict management (Mehler 1998). Democratisation measures are thus often located at the interface between crisis prevention and conflict management.

There will without a doubt always be debates about which kind of democracy people mean when they advocate democratisation. The existence of a multi-party system alone is certainly an insufficient criterion for democracy, even though no single- or no-party system to date has been able to achieve or sustain democratic standards in the long run. On the one hand, the aim cannot be to simply transfer a comprehensive institutional package ("democracy for export") distilled from the experiences of the home country of the TC organisation. On the other hand, there are a number of universal standards which can be transferred locally and institutionalised: free political competition and participation by the people, as well as a guarantee for all basic civil rights and liberties. The structural stability argument is that democracy can help build a society's capacity to manage social change peacefully. To this end, measures are implemented embracing the improvement of political education, electoral awareness-raising and support for local election monitoring, networking, advocacy work for disadvantaged sections of the population, and the facilitation of communication between political actors. Needs will, however, vary according to the phase of

Which democracy is to be promoted?

democratic transition: liberalisation, democratisation, consolidation (Erdmann 1999).

In the absence of genuine demand and social capacities, it makes little sense to foster democratic transition. This restriction, however, applies to all forms of involvement by development cooperation.

Political education

To promote democratic transition, the political foundations primarily support measures of political education, hold seminars with middle- and senior-level leaders from political parties and the administration, and run media campaigns. One key problem with promoting democratic transition is the possibility that a crisis may be exacerbated in the short term, though it may be reduced in the medium to long term. It is conceivable, and even intentional, that political education and empowerment will help hitherto disadvantaged groups to become more capable of handling conflicts. This, in turn, can trigger repressive measures by an authoritarian regime. Support measures should be skilfully timed to avoid escalating violence.

Support for the creation of a national election monitoring network in Benin

The support provided by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in the "birth" of the "Network of NGOs for peaceful and transparent elections" in Benin was of national significance. The "network" was an association of NGOs which monitored the parliamentary elections of 28 March 1995. In doing this it was supported by KAS. Without the initiative of KAS, and its role as mediator between NGOs competing due to different party-political backgrounds, the involvement of civil society to this degree would not have been possible. As a result, although KAS was not the main partner financially, it was the main provider of conceptual inputs (to the strategic debate) and technical inputs (to the training workshops). Finally, in the eyes of politicians from across the party-political spectrum, the network had a direct influence on the proper conduct of the parliamentary elections.

Source: Mehler 1998

In the longer term, however, this "upgrading" of pro-democratic groups and disadvantaged sections of the population is a prerequisite for dialogue between equal partners, and thus for constructive conflict management.

4.10 Empowerment

Many conflicts are asymmetrically structured in terms of the distribution of power and resources between the parties. This can be one of the causes of the conflict, for instance if particular groups are subject to massive economic, cultural or political discrimination. Where conflicts are heavily asymmetrical, it is especially important that the weaker side be supported first in formulating their own objectives, as there will otherwise be no "basis for negotiation" from which to address the conflict. But the stronger party also requires empowerment. In this case, however, the aim must be to raise awareness of the fact that integration of the disadvantaged groups is also in the objective interests of the stronger party.

Balancing asymmetries in initial bargaining positions

The term empowerment refers to support measures which enable individuals or groups to gain control over their own lives and their social relationships. This concept is based on the insight that well-being depends essentially on the existence and accessibility of social resources (networks, support systems). In development cooperation, empowerment occurs in the context of strengthening disadvantaged, weak or powerless groups. What is often lost sight of are the impacts of empowering individual groups on the system as a whole. It should be remembered that an increase in the power of the formerly disadvantaged generates "interference" in the existing social system, thus creating fresh conflicts that may even lead to violence. For conflict management, one implication is a somewhat different use of the term. Empowerment in this context denotes a process through which the

Empowerment in conflict management

parties to the conflict and their representatives reach a clearer awareness of their own goals and needs.

4.11 Conflict Management and Crisis Prevention in the Reconstruction Process

In the ideal-type conflict cycle, major attention would be focused on rehabilitation during a post-conflict phase. In this situation, TC organisations consider themselves competent and are more willing to become involved than in a pre-conflict phase. The new beginning is also an opportunity to avoid replication of old mistakes. When building institutions and physical infrastructure, preventive effects can be generated by considering from the outset what the possible impacts on a conflict situation might be. For instance, what is the significance of a passable road between locations A and B: market integration that is conducive to peace, or a deployment route for combatants? What form must the control committee for the new national radio station take, in order to ensure that broadcasts can no longer be so easily used to incite war? These and similar questions should be addressed.

Post-conflict conflict management

Not every context is suitable for any form of conflict management. In immediate post-conflict situations, the rifts in society can be so great that for instance a naively planned dialogue forum between members of mutually hostile groups can have counterproductive effects, and trigger inter-group dynamics that are difficult to control. Joint action may be prerequisite to a joint coming to terms with the past.

Peace conditionality

The reconciliation-oriented reconstruction activities of Caritas Switzerland in Bosnia have gained a high profile. The so-called "roof over our heads" project has provided municipalities with materials in situations where the majority were jointly involved with the minority in reconstruction activities. This is a form of conditionality designed to promote peace, which also

The Atlas Reconstruction for Peace Project in Bosnia

During the reconstruction process in Bosnia, UNOPS assisted municipalities in Bosnia in drawing up an atlas documenting their painful recent history, the ongoing development efforts and various projects. The issue at stake was "reconstructing society": decentralised cooperation for human development. As information was being gathered for the atlas, people from diverse backgrounds came together to document their reconstruction activities. First of all, within the municipalities themselves this created a need for coordination and helped build relationships from the bottom-up. Secondly, it generated networking between the municipalities.

The atlas project demonstrates how diverse groups in a former war zone can profit from international assistance, whilst in the process of rebuilding and reconstructing their social networks – in a spirit of peaceful co-existence and with a desire for development and democracy.

Source: Atlas of Decentralised Cooperation for Human Development. UNOPS Sarajevo 1998

reflects the do no harm principle as applied to the effects of an organisation's actions on a conflict.

A reconstruction for peace approach of this kind is being promoted for instance by the World Bank. The integration of conflict management elements into the reconstruction process is even being considered as a criterion for lending. Measures must, however, be

Joint production as a framework for inter-religious dialogue in Tajikistan

In Tajikistan, Caritas is bringing together mutually hostile groups in a production shop for roof tiles. Measures are dependent on the local context, and therefore vary. The general aim is to mobilise parties to the conflict in joint activities, and promote inter-religious dialogue. Hence this dialogue is not an exclusively problem-oriented approach, but is also of wider significance in itself.

Source: Authors' interviews

adapted to local circumstances. Personnel seconded to reconstruction projects for instance require advice of further training, in order to be able to recognise the opportunities and risks of conflict management. Mediation itself can only be performed by TC in exceptional cases. Ultimately, TC organisations often lack political leverage, and at the present point in time also professional expertise in mediation at the very local level focussed on by project implementation. TC has to become aware of its opportunities to prepare the ground for negotiations.

The particular contribution made by political foundations to peace processes

In both South Africa and Chile, German political foundations of various political backgrounds have, in the course of seminars and intensive discussions, stimulated debates in the parties ideologically closest to them, and suggested the idea of compensation. Helpful in this context was the parallel approach pursued by the different organisations, in order from the outset not to undermine the trust between the parties to the conflict and their external partners. This highly specific input is seen in both cases as a key contribution to the success of the respective peace processes.

Source: Authors' interviews

Middle and grass-roots party level managers as target groups

Typically, the political foundations deal with the middle and grass-roots management levels within parties. These are also the levels of leadership at which conflict management is focused. The middle level is often comprised of influential individuals in particular sectors or regions. These may also include religious or traditional leaders, or important officials in the administration, in the media, in the education system or in the arts. All experiences with complex conflicts to date indicate that inclusion of the middle and lower levels of party leadership in conflict management is prerequisite to sustainable conflict resolution (see chart).

Conflict management methods in relation to phases and levels (after Ropers)

Phases

Levels ↓ / Phases →	Latent conflict to political crisis	Confrontational conflict	Violent conflict	End of war	Post-conflict-management
All Levels	Development of protection for minorities, strengthening of multi-ethnic structures, sustainable and just socio-economic development — Human rights monitoring and democratic media culture				
Senior leadership level (capital, urban elite)	Facilitation Good services	Sanctions to change conflict approach	Crisis management		Support of power-sharing, Political reconstruction; Peace-keeping
Middle leadership level (provincial cities, middle-level elite)	Creation of conflict management institutions; Promoting a democratic conflict culture, Training in political organisation development; Empowerment of disadvantaged groups	Mediation and pre-mediation; Consultation projects; Training in conflict management, Peace commissions and round tables	Mediation by means of power; Support of non- and semi-partisan local actors, Public awareness-raising and protests to end violence		Demobilisation and civilisation of militarised political structure; Social reconstruction, Reconciliation workshops
Grass-roots level	Education for peace, Community Building		Humanitarian intervention		Rehabilitation and trauma healing, Education for peace, Community building

Levels

4.12 Trauma Healing and Reconciliation

In post-war societies, conflict management means on the one hand healing the wounds of the past, and on the other hand searching for a viable common future. Traumatised individuals must receive therapy. At the same time, justice requires that those who have committed crimes during war be brought to account and convicted in a court of law, so that civilised co-existence is once again made possible. In other words, a careful balance must be sought between possible reconciliation, and justice. In many cases it is even necessary to punish crimes against humanity so that trauma healing can take place. Work with severely traumatised refugees who have fled from violence demonstrates in particular that information on each unpunished crime reawakens a victim's memories of their own pain, and can lead to flashbacks and re-traumatisation. Seen in this light, the call for justice takes on a new dimension.

Dealing with past injustice

Dealing with past injustice in peace processes is a difficult topic. To achieve dialogue between parties to a conflict and a peace accord, it is often first necessary to grant at least temporary impunity to the negotiating partners, and to release prisoners of war or political prisoners from captivity.

However, if past injustice remains entirely unaddressed, then natural justice and violence may quickly flare up again. As long as militias and security forces are able to feel safe in the knowledge that their crimes will go unpunished, it will be impossible to break the culture of violence and counter-violence. Impunity undermines the confidence and trust of citizens in the (new) government's ability to ensure law and order, and exercise control over their own security forces.

Source: Gunnar Theissen/Georg Grossmann, Reconciliation work following violent conflicts, GTZ working paper, draft of 03.03.2000

Processes of psychosocial traumatisation always have a concrete social, political and cultural background. If the respective background is not taken into account, then the trauma cannot be healed, because not only the traumatic experiences themselves, but also the different forms of dealing with them are culture-specific. Irrespective of that, the following measures can be envisaged by TC:

- sensitisation in the care of sections of the population traumatised by physical threat;
- training in the care of specific traumatised groups (for instance women, children and especially former child soldiers);
- network development and advocacy work;
- support in the establishment of specialist associations.

Originally, reconciliation as an instrument of conflict management and crisis prevention was defined and shaped by creed-based or religiously-motivated NGOs. The concept varied, according to the religious persuasion. Thus there are considerable differences between the definitions put forward by Islamic-, Hindu-, Confucian-, Buddhist- or Christian-influenced NGOs. The definitions produced by all the religiously-based NGOs do have one thing in common, however: Their perspective is to a certain extent driven by a logic that runs counter to the more technocratic, social-science-oriented perception presently favoured by bilateral and multilateral TC organisations.

Reconciliation as an instrument of TC

In the Roman Catholic (Christian) milieu, for example, the concept of reconciliation is captured for instance in the apothegm "make peace in time of war", which comes from the New Testament. In contrast to many other attempts made for instance by bilateral and multilateral organisations to induce perpetrators to acknowledge the error of their ways, Christian teaching assumes that reconciliation must begin with the victim. In the view of the Catholic NGOs, this notion corresponds to the idea that God hears and responds to the voice of the oppressed and poor first. Within this

A Christian view

world view, God gives back to the victims their life, their dignity and their humanity which the perpetrators attempted to take away. Through their wicked deeds the perpetrators have injured the dignity not only of the victims, but also of their own lives. From a Catholic viewpoint, this requires the creation of new life, since the normal human measures of forgiveness and punishment cannot be sufficient to rectify the injustice committed. The resurrection of Christ is the symbol of reconciliation: God achieves it not through the negation or rejection of evil, but by defeating it from within. Closely related to this concept are notions such as grace, forgiveness, repentance, justice and truth.

For the current form of conflict management in TC, this notion of forgiveness plays a threefold role for NGOs of a Christian persuasion:

- By focusing on the victims, it helps bring support to those who need it most.
- Thanks to its spiritual dimension, it sheds some light on the atrocity and scale of past events, whilst at the same time creating room for hope.
- By focussing on the recreation of humanity, it looks towards the future without forgetting the past which, due to the orientation towards the victims, is always present.

Other religiously-founded perspectives, especially local variations on the subject of atonement and purgation, cannot be ignored either. Against the background of such perspectives, the view held by a number of professional organisations, namely that reconciliation is universally "feasible", should be seen as problematic. Caution at least is appropriate.

Activity areas for dealing with the past

Essentially, three activity areas can be identified for reconciliation work and dealing with past injustice:

- advisory services for legislation and administrative practice when dealing with past injustice;
- support for truth and reconciliation commissions;
- support for the criminal prosecution of perpetrators of past injustice.

Joint encounter of rape victims of opposing groups in Georgia

Following an armed conflict in Georgia, the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) brought together Abkhasian and Georgian women. A neutral location in Armenia was chosen for the encounter, where the women – in two separate groups – were provided with quarters. There was, however, a door between the two sections of the building. After a certain period, the women came to better understand the suffering of the other group, and the door was kept open. Person-to-person encounters took place across the bridge of group affiliation.

Source: Caritas Internationalis, Working for Reconciliation. A Caritas Handbook, Vatican City 1999

It is conceivable, however, that without a comprehensive strategy and judicious action, only some actors will actually be able to deal with their past.

Caution is also the method of choice for another reason: The concept of "reconciliation" is sometimes used as a pretext to reject the legitimate claims of concerned individuals and groups. Whether TC measures in this field actually promote reconciliation (for instance in the support of truth and reconciliation commissions) is very often dependent on the context. Perpetrators often see a risk in their crimes being exposed, whilst other target groups see precisely this exposure, coupled with acknowledgement of the injustice they have suffered, as preconditions for reconciliation. No exposure of the crime and therefore no acknowledgement of regret, means no reconciliation! The role of TC here can only be to facilitate conducive frameworks, and stimulate endogenous processes.

Risks associated with the reconciliation approach

4.13 Gender Aspects in Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

The issue of gender requires specific attention not only in TC in general, but also in the particular context of armed conflicts (Reimann 1999). Additional components for existing activities are worth considering. Gender aspects are strongly linked to specific events in various phases of a conflict. These aspects are therefore dealt with in detail below, by phase.

Support before the outbreak of war

In early stages of violent conflicts, the mobilisation of soldiers can mean increased commercial sex trade, including child prostitution. In this phase TC organisations can extend support to advocacy organisations specialised in this field. Health measures can also be adjusted to the specific needs of women, for instance in the form of AIDS information and education. As tensions rise, political propaganda usually reinforces existing gender stereotypes, and pressure is often placed on women to produce more offspring. It is also not automatically ensured that human rights are understood to include women's rights. Nevertheless, in this phase it is often possible for women's groups or committed mothers to raise their voice against armed activity, even when other political activities are being repressed. TC has an important role to play here. Thanks to their years of presence on the ground, TC organisations are familiar with these groups, have built relationships of trust with them, and can therefore provide subtle support (Spearman 1999, Woroniuk 1999).

During the war

During wartime, although the majority of soldiers are men, women are also conscripted for armed service. Women and girls now often become the victims of sexual violence, for instance rape, sexual humiliation, forced prostitution, physical torture or mutilation. In war, the old social networks no longer operate, sometimes not even within families. The traditional division of labour also comes under pressure. Women

are suddenly responsible for significantly more dependants. As the societal capacities to care for others become scarcer, girls are burdened with additional workloads. During peace negotiations, women are often excluded. During this stage, TC can play an advocacy role for women's rights (Spearman 1999, Woroniuk 1999).

Once armed conflicts have come to an end, women are often only marginally involved in political decision-making concerning reconstruction. Reconstruction programmes sometimes ignore the specific interests of women – for instance health needs. Women also often lack access to the media. It is also just as difficult to establish contacts among external representatives of aid organisations or peace-keeping missions, because the latter are not trained in gender-specific approaches.

During the rehabilitation phase

From this analysis, the following list of key gender issues for TC organisations in armed conflict can be proposed. Addressing these issues should be declared good practice for TC.

Good practice

Other vulnerable groups that are not described here certainly also experience highly specific threats in situations of crisis. Personnel should at least be sensitised to the possible negative side-effects of TC projects on vulnerable groups.

Good practice when addressing gender issues in situations of crisis

Gender issues should be systemically incorporated into the monitoring and planning process at a wide variety of levels, by women who are well prepared for this task.

Institutional capacities for conflict management and peace-building:
Is there support for the role of women in peace-building? Are women involved in early warning mechanisms? Do women receive training in mediation and alternative conflict resolution to the same degree as men? Are there analyses of obstacles which prevent women from participating in peace initiatives?
Are local and international organisations able to address gender-specific issues, and appropriately manage the gathered data? Do ex post investigations of war crimes for instance take a precise look at crimes committed specifically against women? Do the organisations working with refugees possess the expertise to implement the UNHCR recommendations?

Security: Is the individual physical security of women and girls guaranteed? Has the fact that women and girls are at greater risk than men been taken note of? Does a female definition of security appear anywhere in the planning of security precautions? Can women contact public security personnel in case of need?

Political structures and processes: Does the project support the participation of women and their decision-making capability within the political structures? What about women's participation in aid organisations? Do women's organisations have opportunities to articulate new political objectives?

Human rights: Do all human rights initiatives include support for the promotion of women's rights?

Legal system: Does the legal system comply with international norms? Do women have access to the formal legal system?

State structures: Do women have the same rights and the same access to state appointments?

Economic structures and processes in economic reconstruction: Are programmes designed such that women can participate on an equal footing? Is the productive role of women strengthened by these programmes?

Social reconstruction and empowerment: This is where TC must provide support to help maintain the benefits which women have worked towards and gained during the crisis: In certain conflict situations, women take up occupations that they were formerly unable to pursue. TC can play a role here by maintaining this new scope so that positive developments are not reversed. To this end, women's organisations can be supported in their work to create legal and social acceptance of the new occupations. The question to be asked here is: Is there support for the empowerment of women?

After Spearman 1999, Woroniuk 1999

5. Training for Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management

5.1 Training of Personnel

Work in conflict, crisis or post-war situations places high demands on personnel. It requires a broad spectrum of technical, social and personal expertise. This includes for instance an ability to analyse conflicts and accurately assess the risk, an ability to engage in intercultural communication, and stress management skills. In recent years, organisations and institutions seconding civilian personnel on peace missions have increasingly acknowledged the need to improve the briefing and preparation of those personnel (development workers, peace experts etc.) before assigning them to zones of conflict or crisis. By contrast, TC organisations as a whole still have work to do in this respect. This is leading to a situation in which the expertise required for specific programmes and projects of crisis prevention, and especially conflict management, is more frequently to be found outside the existing staffs of TC organisations than within them.

Demands on personnel

In response to these new needs, governmental and non-governmental training activities in numerous countries have been improved, broadened or newly created (Benkler 1999). A study presented at the 5th Meeting of the Conflict Prevention and Post Conflict Reconstruction Network (Nov. 1999), which surveyed the training activities offered by both national and international organisations, came to the conclusion "... that there is a growing number of conflict-related training activities under way ..." (UNDP/USAID 1999).

Preparation and briefing

This tendency is still too minor in TC organisations. To increase the skills of their staff in the implementation of programmes and projects of crisis prevention and conflict management, and to prepare them for personal encounter with conflicts and crises, some organisations have incorporated corresponding modules or courses into their standard training programme for field staff

(e.g. DEZA 2000 training programme, course programmes of INTRAC). Yet the interface between "standard" preparation for a TC assignment, and training with a specific conflict- or crisis-orientation remains relatively unclear. Where specialised, conflict-oriented training activities do exist, participation in these training modules is in some cases compulsory, but is usually optional. Only few TC organisations today tend to train all staff in basic conflict- and crisis-related skills on a standardised basis before they send them out to conflict or crisis conditions.

However, the training requirement is not confined to field staff. Head Office staff too must be trained in conflict analysis, and be familiar with the instruments of conflict management. Despite this need, conflict-related issues remain the exception in the training programmes of TC organisations. Responsible project officers, desk officers and task managers in particular have a significant need for action-oriented expertise on the "do no harm" approach, on CIAS, on gender-specific prevention and conflict management, as well as on constructive conflict management instruments in general. Opinions diverge as to what constitutes the optimum training of staff not located directly on the ground: DFID for instance trains its staff in their respective teams (country sections, regional sections), to guarantee maximum relevance to project implementation, whereas others (e.g. DEZA) offer standardised courses in which staff from a broad diversity of backgrounds can participate.

Good briefing for an assignment also includes overlapping for the incoming individual with his or her predecessor. This ensures that the institutional expertise is retained. The process of reflection when predecessor and successor overlap is also considered by many as a first step in the debriefing of the returning staff member, and of the analysis of his/her assignment.

Coaching and supervision

The support of field staff on assignment in regions of crisis or conflict remains an enormous challenge to the major TC organisations. Although many apply the model

of "cooperative" or "participatory" management, the instruments of coaching and supervision for instance are not yet broadly disseminated. In addition, their application also requires an understanding of roles and a division of functions between desk officer and field staff member which are not necessarily compatible with the administrative procedures and hierarchical regulations of many organisations (e.g. the need to separate the function of superior from the confidentiality involved in a coaching relationship). Specific training courses in coaching or psychologically oriented supervision need to be designed to supplement the existing consultancy expertise within TC organisations. What is required is on the one hand the transfer of coaching skills, and on the other hand structural and organisational measures designed to ensure that the relationships between all concerned are defined based on transparent rules.

The experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and many other organisations in Bosnia demonstrates that there is a strong demand for the assignment of individuals with psychological training and a sensitivity for conflicts. However, only few TC organisations have either trained personnel on the ground, or psychologists whom they could second from their Head Offices to local situations of need (exceptions are for instance GTZ and ICRC).

Since the personnel requirement for TC missions in post-war societies is considerable, there is a risk that in future many inexperienced individuals may be assigned, especially in emergency-oriented development aid, without having had the opportunity for proper preparation. Mechanisms for on-the-job training, for instance mentoring or coaching as used by the NGO International Alert for its own personnel in London, should be put into application more frequently. For special supplementary training, cooperation should be sought with other actors in war-torn societies, for instance with UNDP and ICRC, in order to be able to profit from their respective local expertise.

Debriefing

Debriefing that follows assignments to zones of conflict and crisis is considered by the TC institutions sending personnel to be highly important. The staff member is to be given an opportunity to reflect upon his or her assignment on a personal and professional level. Secondly, debriefing sessions can fulfil the function of supporting the expert in reintegrating into his or her previous life and professional setting. A final aim is that the experiences gained be fed back into the intra-organisational pool of expertise, and thus are not dissipated or lost.

These expectations often contrast starkly with actual practice, where time or financial constraints often leave no scope for debriefing or in-depth analysis of experiences. Only rarely are psychologists available for debriefing. Unfortunately, almost all TC organisations omit systematic debriefing of returning staff.

Selection of personnel

Changed project types or conditions in the countries of crisis or pre-crisis create new requirement profiles. So far, the competences required for work in conflict or crisis situations appear only in the questionnaires used at the time of recruitment, and they are identical with the standard recruitment criteria. The organisations interviewed specified the following categories, each weighting the criteria differently:

- strong commitment to the goals of the project and the organisation ("no 8-hour day");
- ability to identify, address and manage risks;
- capacity for analytical and systemic thinking;
- political maturity and acumen, as well as sensitivity;
- creativity in dealing with constantly changing situations and conditions;
- intercultural communication skills;
- ability to work in a team, and a will to be actively involved in team development;
- ability to communicate;
- capacity to learn.

Most of these requirements could also be demanded of average TC staff. It is important to remember,

however, that under conditions of conflict, the risks of politically inept behaviour or culturally insensitive behaviour are accentuated. In other words: Several of the areas of expertise and capabilities normally required of TC staff must be especially pronounced in staff recruited for work in crisis and conflict situations. These staff must be specialists in the requirements listed above. Increasingly, a further requirement is that staff also possess additional skills in applying the methods of crisis prevention and conflict management.

Strategic goals of personnel planning

Following a workshop conducted by the UNRISD War-torn Societies Project in Bossey on the theme "Practical recommendations for managers of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies" (June 1998), representatives of multilateral and bilateral organisations (for instance UNDP, USAID, UNICEF, GTZ) issued a statement setting new goals for personnel planning: "We need to review personnel procedures and practices with a view to recruiting, training and promoting exceptional and excellent staff for post-conflict work, while rewarding achievements and sanctioning incompetence. We recognise that necessary skills include maturity, political acumen, analytical ability and good judgement, commitment, creativity, and the ability to fit into a team."

Source: WSP, Bossey Statement 1998

Pool-building

For the UN organisations it is proposed that a UN-wide system be created to serve as a pool for the recruitment of personnel to work in crisis zones or post-conflict societies. The Norwegian Refugee Council currently has a pool of approximately 700 individuals who are deployed primarily in missions of UNHCR, as well as those of other UN organisations (the Human Resources Stand-by Force), whilst the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights has approximately 120 individuals specifically for human rights ombudsman

duties. It should be mentioned in this context that the German Federal Foreign Office has also begun coordinating training activities for a pool of experts within the scope of a training programme entitled "civilian personnel on peace assignments" (Kühne/Benkler 1999). At the same time the "Civil Peace Service" is drawing on the services of "doubly qualified" experts (TC and conflict management) using BMZ funds (cf. Section 2.4). The TC organisations we contacted did not, however, see any explicit need to establish further pools.

Furthermore, the Bossey Statement (see box above) calls for the creation of administrative scope within the UN system for the recruitment of exceptionally qualified external staff, who should be rewarded for achievement. In the countries of assignment a team structure is planned with clear procedures for the training of juniors. The provision of sufficiently stable team situations for the inexperienced is prerequisite to successful work in complex emergencies. A change in organisational culture is designed to ensure that achievement, especially in crisis situations, is demonstrably rewarded. Not least the ability to fit into a team and address conflicts must be valued especially highly and made conducive to further career development.

5.2 Experiences and Practice

Types of training measures

On the basis of the interviews conducted, training measures can be divided into three main categories:
a) on-the-job coaching and training;
b) conventional training courses taking place within a fixed time frame;
c) institutional learning.

On-the-job coaching and training

Very little experience is available as yet concerning on-the-job training in crisis prevention and conflict management. Some organisations in the English-speaking countries train their personnel on the job in

so-called reflection workshops. They, for instance, hold closed conferences at six-monthly intervals, business lunches or similarly structured events to facilitate an exchange of experiences. These are designed to give participants an opportunity to reflect on their work in a rather different, unfamiliar setting. TC organisations basically agree that considerable efforts still need to be made with regard to staff training. The view also prevails that on-the-job training combined with professional mentoring or coaching is often more appropriate than time-consuming training courses, which as a rule remain theoretical.

Whilst practicable models for on-the-job training remain rare, sufficient expertise is available on how conventionally designed training measures should be structured. Usually, basic expertise is transferred in a first phase, after which practical exposure is followed by more in-depth training or specialisation. Beyond that, specially adapted preparatory briefing measures should also be planned for country assignments. Diringer for instance seeks to identify four types of training programme (cf. p. 144) as state-of-the-art (Diringer 2000).

Conventional training courses

As regards institutional learning, recent management thinking on the subject of the learning organisation does not yet seem to have gained a foothold in TC. The comments made by the individuals interviewed suggest that, in the context of crisis prevention and conflict management in particular, the issue of defensive routine needs to be closely addressed. It must be assumed that in many TC organisations, defensive routine is a key factor constraining organisational learning (cf. Section 3.1.2). Defensive routine denotes behaviours which protect the agent against "uncomfortable" situations: Unpleasant information is not passed on, divergent opinions or views are not expressed (Argyris 1998). Defensive behaviour is not appropriate in situations where partnership and cooperation are key criteria for positive results. For organisations engaged in crisis prevention and constructive conflict management, the

Institutional learning

Basic training/induction courses

In basic training/induction courses, basic knowledge and methodological expertise is transferred. Trainees also gain experience in reaching a correct, situation-specific and balanced selection from the available instruments and methods of conflict management. Not least, application of analytical skills and the practice of thinking in complex systems needs to be provided. Furthermore the development of personal and social skills is a key prerequisite for an individual's capability to intervene when the opportunity for conflict management arises.

Specialised, subject-specific or supplementary courses

In courses of this kind, which supplement basic training, specific technical or methodological aspects of conflict management are covered in greater detail.

Country- or project-specific induction courses

These courses prepare staff members for work on specific assignments, in specific regions, in concrete project settings, and in the situations of social conflict which prevail there.

Training of trainers programmes

One special case are the training of trainers programmes, in which participants are introduced to and trained in the role, function and specific methodological expertise of the trainer. The aim of such programmes is to enable participants to run and implement training courses responsibly and professionally. Since the use of external trainers can only be the first step in establishing a training programme for conflict management in conflict and crisis regions, these training of trainers programmes are also implemented in conflict regions at the local level and/or often in cooperation with local organisations. The aim of such measures is to train and/or upgrade a pool of national trainers who will gradually assume full responsibility for training measures within their region.

Source: Diringer 2000

identification and conscious eradication of such routines is a question of credibility and effectivity. This means that during training, coaching, and the establishment of computer-based knowledge management systems, staff should reflect upon whether and to what extent authentically perceived information is being fed into the system.

Training via the Internet

The Internet too now offers a diverse range of training opportunities. USAID for instance offers a course in conflict management. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Bradford is currently establishing a distance learning course on the "Introduction to Conflict Resolution". The pilot course comprises six units:

1. What is conflict resolution?

2. History of conflict resolution;

3. New developments in conflict resolution;

4. Analysing contemporary conflicts;

5. Conflict resolution in war zones;

6. Post-settlement peace-building and reconciliation.

Source: UNDP, USAID 1999 and CCR,
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/dislearn.html

Today, actual training in mediation or the transfer of basic skills for constructive conflict management, for instance active listening, reframing etc., for the most part need to be bought-in by TC organisations on the open market. Consequently, these measures are usually tailored to the needs of Western societies. There are individual institutions which also offer training in these areas in conflict regions (for instance the Asian Institute for Responding to Conflict and Development, India).

Specialised training measures

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The spectrum of course content

In many cases, church-based institutions offer training for peace work, which are strongly influenced by the Christian notion of reconciliation (for instance the Caritas Internationalis Handbook 1999, cf. also Section 4.12).

The provisional UNDP and USAID report on training documents a range of content and forms of training. The quintessence of the report is that workshops, seminars and short training courses are held in the following areas:

Training course content

Conflict prevention, conflict policy, early warning/early action, emergency aid and mitigation, children and conflict, children's rights, work in unstable environments, emergency aid management training, micro-finance in post-conflict situations, environmental management, transition from war to peace, project cycle management and conflict resolution, early warning and preventive measures: capacity building in UN organisations; regional workshops on human rights and country-specific workshops in Africa on the themes of conflict management and peace-building; gender awareness for military and civilian personnel on peace-keeping missions

Source: UNDP & USAID 1999

Although the structure of training measures varies widely in terms of course content, it is possible to identify a core of six components common to the various curricula and schedules. These core components can be assembled as modules, to suit the given time frame and target group (after Ropers 2000):

- personal skills,
- basic social skills;
- general ability to communicate and interact;
- skills in working with groups, within a team and with organisations;
- conflict analysis and contextualisation skills;
- conflict management skills.

SRC capacity building

In 1997, the Swiss Red Cross (SRC) decided to implement an intensive, challenging capacity building programme to train personnel in conflict management and crisis prevention. Characteristic elements of this programme were:

- *Practical orientation*: major importance was given to practical experience of conflict management projects. The criterion for award of the training certificate was the proven ability to design a project of constructive conflict management.

- *Institutionalisation within everyday organisational procedures*: participants were obliged to implement pilot projects; supervised in doing so by in-house supervisors, quality circle.

- *Integration into organisational feedback culture*: culture of intensive and professional feedback and consultation (intervision, coaching).

- *Organisational learning*: mix of home-country social workers and field-oriented TC staff.

- *Cost recovery*: some course participants from outside the organisation (7 out of a total of 29) on the basis of financial contributions.

- *Expert network for intercultural mediation and conflict management*: The aim was to create a network of individuals (multipliers) trained in intercultural mediation and conflict management. They were supposed to be able to identify potential applications or interventions in their working area on their own initiative, as well as to plan and initiate such ideas in the form of projects.

Source: Ribaux 3/1999

What can TC learn from this example for future training measures? The lessons learned involve the composition of course groups, and the integrated practice-orientation.

Mixture of home-country social workers and field-oriented TC staff

The mixture of staff working in TC, and staff employed as social workers in Switzerland, proved unfavourable. The training needs of social workers relate to their face-to-face dealings with individuals in conflict, whereas TC staff approach conflict management and crisis prevention from a greater distance, and from a highly systematic and group-oriented perspective.

Project managers require expertise on specific measures and conceptual approaches that can be incorporated into their projects, whereas social workers want training most of all in intercultural mediation between individuals. This distinction should also be borne in mind with respect to the training of field staff and local employees of partner organisations in TC project countries. Desk officers and representatives of donor organisations require different training than their field staff. Whilst face-to-face communication, mediation, and practice with instruments such as "organising a round table" need to be on the training schedule for field staff, desk officers need to focus on reflecting on their own handling of conflicts, and on the integration of conflict management methods into TC projects.

Mixture of external and internal course participants

Overall, the mixture of internal and external participants proved highly productive. Through joint brainstorming, the externals were able to benefit from the broad range of potential applications. The internals were able to gain an external perspective on their own approach. The detailed discussion of organisational problems within the institution sometimes proved problematic.

DFID takes an entirely different view concerning the composition of training course participants. There, training and capacity building on conflict-related issues is conducted separately for specific departments. This creates an opportunity for joint work on projects. Joint consultation and quality circle functions can thus be performed by the team in part at relatively low cost.

The decision to require the participants to apply the skills acquired during the training course by designing a pilot project proved correct, but difficult to implement. There was a discrepancy between the need for training, and the reality of the organisation. There was a major resource problem: During the training cycle, no funding was provided for any of the proposed international projects. Consequently, the graduation requirement that course participants launch a pilot project had to be reduced.

Practical orientation of the training

Hence: Training which aims to produce concrete practical results for TC can only be successfully implemented if financial resources and time budgets are made available in support of that aim.

Concerning training and teaching materials the joint study by UNDO and USAID came to the conclusion that a wealth of materials are available which are almost impossible to survey. According to the study, many publications are very similar or cover the same subjects. Rarely are materials jointly developed. Teaching methods are highly diverse: They range from brief presentations designed to stimulate group discussion, to role play or case analyses (UNDP/USAID 1999).

Teaching materials/ methodological principles

No doubt there are also numerous materials available in TC on resource-oriented training or participatory situation analyses (e.g. Subedi 1997, Srinivasan 1993, Pretty et al. 1995). Simulation games in which participants learn to deal with complexity (such as "Sim City") can also be utilised for training in constructive conflict management. Having said that, there is a lack of simulated scenarios geared specifically to conflict management in TC. Such simulated cases could help participants learn to manage complexity, stress and the real conflict situation. (Author's interview with Ropers).

As is customary in adult education, most training programmes for conflict management are geared to an interactive, participatory approach and a holistic learning model. The selection of methods is also

determined by the objective of creating maximum opportunity for experiential learning. The range of methods comprises individual work, various graduated modes of work in small groups, as well as plenary presentations, discussions, simulation exercises and role play. The area of conflict management is developed while reflecting on concrete examples from practice. Thus a balanced mix is offered of theory and practice, and action and reflection.

5.3 Training Local Actors

Ropers points out that a distinction needs to be drawn between training measures for individuals who are remote from the conflict (external TC experts), and training measures for internal (partisan) actors. Whilst the types of training should not differ in principle, certain items might be inappropriate for experts or representatives of administrations and NGOs, or for various other groups in a region of conflict or crisis (Ropers 2000).

For participants from zones of conflict, the primary modes of training provided so far are a) Problem-solving workshops with training elements and b) Planning and capacity-building workshops with training elements.

Problem-solving workshops

Problem-solving workshops bring representatives of parties in conflict together for an integrated joint learning and working process. Such a process is designed to increase the likelihood of raising their interest in understanding peaceful conflict resolution. Workshops of this kind can also include training elements, for instance role play enabling participants to switch perceptual perspectives.

Capacity-building workshops

Planning and capacity-building workshops aim at strengthening the action and negotiation capabilities of individual partners. The incorporation of training elements for conflict management can assume a wide variety of forms.

According to Lederach (1995), the analytical distinction between "implicit" and "explicit" knowledge has become relevant in the planning of activities to promote internal actors' conflict management expertise and capabilities. Implicit knowledge is understood as the body of everyday, culturally-influenced experiences in dealing with conflicts. It is usually accepted as self-evident. By contrast, explicit knowledge is the product of a conscious effort to gain insight on the basis of practical experiences and theoretical reflection (Diringer 2000).

This leads to a further distinction in training and upgrading types. Prescriptive training programmes seek to transfer explicit knowledge and develop skills by making available professional trainers with appropriate qualifications in the given field. It deals therefore with expertise that can be transferred. Elicitive training programmes view training as an emerging creative process, and seek to elicit the implicit knowledge from the participants. These training programmes create a space into which the participants can bring forward their experiences and expertise in conflict management. They can relate to their knowledge interactively, and jointly reflect on experiences. In doing so the course itself becomes a real locus of intercultural conflict management (Diringer 2000). Elicitive training methods pursue an approach similar to the participatory planning and appraisal methods practised by TC in recent years. Their key characteristic is the attempt made to motivate the actors of the development process to identify and utilise their own resources.

Prescriptive versus elicitive training

When planning local training measures, it is fundamentally important to bear in mind the composition of the participant group, mainly in relation to their belonging to a specific conflict party. If, during the training sessions, case studies that relate to the actual conflict are used to train or demonstrate, there is a real risk that traumatic experiences may re-surface, and negatively affect further learning during the course,

Risks

even when the seminar takes place in a protected space. In regions of generalised violence, the potential risk of re-activating traumatic experiences among participants requires especially responsible handling of this problem.

In summary, the aim is to develop the capacities and strengthen the conflict management skills of both outsiders, i. e. individuals not involved in the conflict, and of persons involved in the conflict. There is, as always, a need to suit the issue of capacity building to specific needs and preferences of the target group.

6. Outlook and Open Questions

6.1 The Future

The concluding chapter of a report is not supposed to simply repeat all the problems and opportunities discussed in the study. The points to be discussed here are cross-sectoral issues and general contradictions that emerged from the interviews conducted and literature studied. Also we consider it appropriate to reflect on the present state of the art from an imagined point in the future.

Based on the opinions expressed by the persons we interviewed, we will now take the liberty of engaging in a bold speculation. Let's imagine a time two decades from now. Seen from there, the present debate on crisis prevention and conflict management in TC will be considered one of the most significant debates in development cooperation. This is because what is at stake is the fundamental issue of credibility, and this in a business that claims the moral high ground. In the future, TC organisations will be measured against their compliance with a conflict-specific code of conduct or other ethical rules, against their analytical expertise, their demonstrated capacities in developing and applying methods of conflict impact assessment, and their field delivery related to conflict management and crisis prevention. For many donors, this will have become a crucial issue in the award of contracts.

A look back from the future

Also significant will be the challenge to show cost-efficiency: Will TC have made a demonstrable contribution to preventing the escalation of violent conflicts, thus averting considerably more costly military measures or warfare? Will it also have prevented the need for the costly process of reconstruction? This remains to be seen.

At this point in time it is difficult to forecast further developments. The interviews revealed a wide range of answers as to the question of the ideal phase and point

Preference for specific conflict phases

in time at which intervention or action should be launched (pre-conflict, open conflict, post-conflict or refinements of this model). The usefulness of this idealised model of the crisis cycle was questioned. For good reasons, some respondents disputed its explanatory force. But in many more cases it was conceded that involvement in the post-conflict phase was much simpler and more promising for TC. This because: a) Everything needs to be reconstructed anew and there is no resistance to starting everything afresh, and b) The relevance of involvement in crisis prevention in a country that is demonstrably in the midst of a crisis is no longer a matter of any dispute. Other interviewees pointed out that opportunities to intervene during one of the windows of opportunity might arise during any phase of a conflict, and therefore they advocated that TC at least "keep its foot behind the door" until the conflict escalates. Others saw the advantage of pre-conflict involvement in the better opportunities to achieve peaceful resolution before the conflict escalates.

Coordination

In the future the issue of coordination between the various actors will remain a key challenge. At a very general level, far from the realities of specific countries in crisis, there is already a strong willingness to pursue cooperation and exchange. Examples of this will include:

- The Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network, driven primarily by World Bank, USAID and CIDA, and in which all major multi- and bilateral organisations are involved;
- The OECD-DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation.

Respect for specialised NGOs

Further non-regular coordination occurs bilaterally between specific units of the participating institutions, for instance between EU and World Bank. Left out of this process are the numerous NGOs with particular experience in local conflict management. The present study has so far not discussed the fact that, until very recently, human rights issues and advocacy work were

dealt with almost exclusively in the domain of specialised NGOs. It is therefore understandable when representatives of civil society respond to governmental development organisations' entry into the arena of crisis- and conflict-related issues with scepticism. Undoubtedly it is at this point that the seriousness of TC organisations' involvement in conflict-related issues in (civil) war zones will be measured. The way they manage to deal with coordination within their own society will be the most important indicator in this regard. A definition of their own activities in terms of complementarity, modesty related to the whole conflict system, and respect when dealing with other specialised groups will most likely become the model for actors in the conflict zones themselves. The arrangements for strategic and practical coordination, and strategic coherence currently in place within war-torn countries vary widely. They range between a) donor countries with close coordination being practiced between the political and development-oriented actors in the implementation of individual projects only, and b) donor countries where the governmental development organisation has assumed a credible lead role, and is accepted in that capacity by the majority of NGOs because of a clearly stated strategy and the lead organisation's ensuring of complementarity to other groups. The credibility of governmental TC organisations is particularly enhanced by an active discourse conducted with new actors on the scene – security forces, weapons manufacturers and industrial associations – as occurs in the UK for instance.

Even further from a solution is the problem of coordination between the various donor structures in the crisis-torn countries. Some of the responsibility for this deficit rests with the slow decision-making processes within the TC organisations themselves. Even more important, however, is the broad range of (legitimate) organisational differences in the assessment of a particular crisis, i.e. of the ability of partner

Is a concerted donor strategy possible?

governments to manage such crises, or of the actual causes of the conflict. The objectives of the various policies can also vary widely. This led the authors of an OECD-DAC synthesis study to conclude that a concerted donor strategy to create incentives and disincentives for peace is barely feasible (Uvin 1999). As a result, coordination at this level is currently confined to harmonising abstract principles, and to exchanging information and analytical tools. However, there is barely any doubt that the need for coordination is much greater.

No simple answers

Impact assessment of country strategies, of programmes and of projects planned to prevent crises is still at a rudimentary stage. The methodology of conflict impact assessment as a whole is in its infancy, and is based on assumptions of plausibility. In practice this means that it is not yet possible to draft any "iron laws" of Technical Cooperation in crisis situations.

6.2 Open Questions

The following problems in particular are not likely to yield any simple answers.

1. Inevitable Partisanship versus the Need for Neutrality

TC often cannot avoid taking sides: Whether support goes to inefficient or even war-mongering elites of a government, or whether poverty alleviation and emergency aid are supporting disadvantaged victims or adversaries, the adoption of a partisan position is problematic in either case. This even more so in view of the fact that TC organisations are seeking at the same time to act as neutral conflict mediators. A number of organisations have therefore decided to pursue in a given country X either one option (traditional TC and emergency aid) or the other (conflict management). Others see traditional TC rather as a prerequisite to

conflict management, but then often rule out mediation in the strict sense.

2. Reconciliation versus Justice

The key aim of conflict management is to achieve a reconciliation of interests between the parties to a conflict. Once violence has been used, this becomes extremely difficult: Victims have a legitimate interest in justice, and indeed sustainable peace may only begin once a "culture of impunity" has been brought to an end. Yet how this can be best achieved remains debatable. Considering the fact that some peace negotiations can only take place subject to some degree of amnesty, this becomes even more questionable.

3. Humanitarian Duty versus Feeding the War and "Fungibility"

Moving far beyond the domain of emergency aid, and deep into the domain of TC, development cooperation also feels committed to humanitarian goals ("poverty alleviation"). The unintentional exacerbation of conflicts resulting from an (again unintentional) feeding of conflict-generating structures (or even parties to the conflict), hitherto accepted as a lesser evil in the context of activities actually oriented towards the common good, is increasingly being perceived as a problem by an interested public. There is also a risk that TC might relieve a government of its actual tasks in the social sector, to such an extent that it can use the resources made available for repression and warfare.

4. "Sustainability" versus "Buying Time"

Profound planning and analysis, including participatory needs analysis, is also considered a key condition for sustainable results in the context of crisis prevention activities. Yet when tensions escalate, time runs out. There is barely any clear indication as to when time can (still) be taken for intensive planning. One way out of this dilemma might be a division of labour between TC organisations: whilst one organisation

takes care of short-term stabilisation measures, another plans sustainable peace-building by addressing structural causes of the conflict. There are virtually no examples of close strategic coordination, which ideally would require a joint analysis of the causes of the conflict. The second option is the coordinated sequencing of chronologically overlapping measures by one and the same or various organisations, an idea which is already built into the concept of development-oriented emergency aid.

5. Loyalty to Principles and Credibility versus Flexibility and Scope for Action

Conflict management – especially mediation – requires trust, and a clear commitment to ethical standards and transparent principles. There again, the imperative of preventive action often requires deviation from rigid and accepted rules. These two imperatives sometimes clash, because they may not always be compatible.

6. Need to Avoid and Criticise Defective State Structures versus Damaging and Undermining of State Authority

The increasingly problematic cooperation with moribund state structures in development cooperation as a whole has to be seen in a new aggravated dimension in the context of crisis prevention and conflict management. On the one hand the state (i.e. the justice and security apparatus) has in such cases almost invariable already failed to resolve the conflict, whilst on the other hand development cooperation can further contribute to its weakening if it relies exclusively on traditionally existing mechanisms or civil society.

7. "Culture of Prevention" versus Preference for Involvement in the Post-Conflict-Phase

Largely for reasons of self-legitimation, but also due to a number of comparative advantages on the part of

larger (governmental) TC organisations, a clear tendency towards post-conflict situations is evident in the ways TC selects countries for cooperation. Yet this occurs despite the fact that crisis prevention involves, as the term implies, the prevention of suffering, and the protection of achievements of development cooperation, which in turn saves tax monies.

8. **"Structural Optimism" of Development Cooperation versus Ruthless Assessment of TC's own Potentials to Positively Influence Developments**
   The warning against TC over-estimating its own capability to influence events cannot be repeated often enough. On the other hand, TC needs its "structural optimism" if it is to do anything at all.

Obviously there are no simple answers to these questions. But dilemmas of this kind demonstrate three things:

1. There is a need for transparent decision-making rationales for Technical Cooperation in situations of crisis, and for ongoing impact assessment. Unavoidable negative side-effects (and the prevention of avoidable effects) should be taken account of from the outset in strategic planning.
2. Any assessment of activities must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, and can lead to very different results. Blueprints are often entirely inappropriate.
3. A targeted division of roles between different actors can often help TC meet conflicting requirements.

Finally, the present study has not yet drawn attention to the potentials for influencing violent conflicts in partner countries through activities in the donor countries themselves: Advocacy and campaign work on the one hand, and the staging of dialogue fora on the other, may be two activities barely ever looked at by Technical Cooperation. But they are significant from the global perspective, and for one-off cooperation.

Advocacy work and dialogue fora in donor countries

7 Annex

7.1 Literature

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Germany
http://www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/index.htm

Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Deutschland
http://www.bicc.de

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidapo-e.htm

Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre
http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/

Caritas Switzerland
http://www.caritas.ch/

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
http://www.ccpdc.org/

Carter Center, USA
http://www.cartercenter.org/

Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), University of Bradford, UK
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/dislearn.html

Center for Development Research, Denmark
http://www.cdr.dk/

Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies, Belgium
http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/facdep/social/pol/cvo/cvo.htm

Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway
http://www.cmi.no

Conciliation Resources, UK
http://www.c-r.org

Conflictnet, USA
http://www.igc.org/igc/gateway/prindex.html

Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR)
Network (currently accessible via World Bank website)
http://www.worldbank.org/peace building

Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), Germany
http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~cpn

Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael-Institut, Netherlands
http://www.clingendael.nl/cru/index.htm

Creative Associates International/Conflict Prevention Net, USA
http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai

Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI)
http://www.dupi.dk

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, development cooperation page
http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/udviklingspolitik/

Department for International Development (DFID), UK
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH
http://www.gtz.de

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) OECD
http://www.oecd.org/dac/index.htm

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, development cooperation page
http://www.bz.minbuza.nl/English/f_sumdevelopment14.html

European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/en/index.html

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
http://www.euconflict.org

EU Commission Directorate-General Development
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/index_en.htm

EU Commission Directorate-General Relex
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/external_relations/index_en.htm

Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Germany
http://www.fes.de/subjects_gr.html

German Development Service (DED)
http://www.ded.de

German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ),
http://www.government.de/bmz

German Overseas Institute (DÜI)
http://www.rrz.uni-hamburg.de/duei

Global Peace building Network (GPN); Website Work Programme
of the CPR Network
http://www.worldbank.org/peace building

GTZ see Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

Guide to the law of war and peace, USA
http://www.hg.org/war.html

Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS), Germany
http://www.hanns-seidel-stiftung.de/default.de

Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research
http://www.conflict.com/hiik

Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS), Germany
http://www.boell.de

Human Rights Watch, USA
http://www.hrw.org/home.html

Institute for Development Research Centre (IDRC) Canada
http://www.idrc.ca/index_e.html

International Alert, UK
http://www.international-alert.org/

International Crisis Group, USA
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
http://www.ifrc.org/news/dftf/

International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), Canada
http://www.ifex.org

International Peace Academy (IPA), USA
http://www.ipacademy.org/

Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS), Germany
http://www.kas.de

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Germany
http://www.kfw.de

Life and Peace Institute (LPI), Sweden
http://www.life-peace.org

Minorities at Risk Project, USA
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar

Norwegian Institute of Human Rights der Universität Oslo
http://www.humanrights/uio./no/indexeng.htm

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
http://www.nupi.no/default-e.htm

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
http://www.npaid.org/

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
http://www.nrc.no/engindex.htm

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Germany
http://www.hsfk.de

(International) Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
http://www.prio.no

ReliefWeb Home Page
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf

Reuter Foundation AlertNet
http://www.alertnet.org/alertnet.nsf/?OpenDatabase

Saferworld, UK
http://www.gn.apc.org/SWORLD/index.html

Search for Common Ground, USA, Belgium
http://www.sfcg.org/

Development and Peace Foundation (SEF), Germany
http://www.sef-bonn.org/

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
http://www.sipri.se

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
http://www.sida se

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (DEZA)
http://194.230.65.134/dezaweb2/home.asp

Swiss Peace Foundation
http://www.swisspeace.ch

Swiss Red Cross
http://www.redcross.ch

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
http://www.undp.org/erd/

UNESCO, Culture of Peace Project
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
http://www.unhchr.ch

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
http://www.unhcr.ch/

UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
http://www.unops.org

UN Security Council Documents
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm

UN Volunteers
http://www.unv.org

United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
Office of Transition Initiatives
http://www.info.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/

War-torn Societies Project, UN
http://www.unrisd.org/wsp/wsp.htm

World Bank, Economies of Conflict, Crime and Violence Research
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/index.htm

World Bank, Post Conflict Unit
http://www.worldbank.org/postconflict

7.3. List of Interviewees

Country	Abbr.	Organisation	Interviewee(s)	Date
Germany	BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	Adolf Kloke-Lesch	18.10.99
	GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit	Bernd Hoffmann	several occasions
	KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation	Monika Baumhauer, Michael Plesch	26.10.99
	FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation	Jörg Bergstermann	18.10.99
	HBS	Heinrich-Böll-Foundation	Annekathrin Linck	04.12.99
	AGKED	Association of Church Development Services	Wolfgang Heinrich	18.11.99
	SEF	Development and Peace Foundation	Tobias Debiel	26.10.99
	DED	German Development Service	Volker Kasch	20.10.99
	Berghof Center	Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management	Norbert Ropers	20.10.99
	EZE	Protestant Central Agency for Development Aid	Jürgen Reichel	26.10.99
Austria	AA	Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Doris Danler Sigrid Boyer	tel. 16.12.99
	ASPR	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution	Arno Truger	tel. 20.12.99
Switzerland	EDA	Department of Foreign Affairs	Peter Reinhardt	27.10.99
	SRK	Swiss Red Cross	Anne Gloor (ex-staff member)	08.11.99
	DEZA	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Gerhard Pfister Daniel Maselli	28.10.99
	Caritas	Caritas	Thomas Gass Geert van Dok	09.11.99
	HEKS	Hilfswerk Evangelischer Kirchen Schweiz	Arne Engele	27.10.99
	OeME	Office for Ecumenical Affairs	Beat Dietschy	27.10.99
UK	DFID	Department for International Development	Sarah Beeching	2.11.99
		Saferworld	Paul Eavis	4.11.99
	SRC	Swiss Red Cross	Arnold Boulter	4.11.99
	IA	International Alert	Martin Honeywell Manuela Leonhardt Tony Jackson Eugenia Piza-Lopes	3.11.99
	CR	Conciliation Resources	Andy Carl Guus Meijer	3.11.99
Netherlands	Novib	Nederlands Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking	Mario Weima	15.11.99
	Clingendael	Netherlands Institute of International Relations	Georg E. Frerks Luc van de Goor S.Verstegen	15.11.99
	AA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Caroline Poldermans	15.11.99

Country	Abbr.	Organisation	Interviewee(s)	Date
Belgium	CPRS	Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies	Luc Reychler	25.10.99
Sweden	SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	David Wiking	25.11.99
	LPI	Life and Peace Institute	Mark Salter	
			Mats Lundström	25.11.99
Norway	AA	Foreign Ministry	Rolf Christian Ree	26.11.99
	NORDEM	Norwegian Institute of Human Rights	Kristin Hogdahl	26.11.99
	NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	Stein Stoa	26.11.99
	NUPI	Norwegian Institute of Internatinal Affairs	Torunn L.Tryggestad Espen Barth Eide	26.11.99
	NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	Kai Jacobsen	26.11.99
	PRIO	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo	Dan Smith, Wenche Haugge	26.11.99
Denmark	DANIDA/	Foreign Ministry	Signe Röpke, Gert Meinecke	24.11.99
	CDR	Center for Development Research	Gorm Rye Olsen	24.11.99
	DUPI	Danish Institute of International Affairs	Bertel Hiurlin	24.11.99
USA	CDA	Collaborative for Development Action	Mary Andersson	19.11.99
UN	UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees	M. Pirolet	9.11.99
	UNDP	UN Development Programme	correspondence with Le Moyne	
	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services	Bernhard Schlachter	29.10.99
	UNRISD	War-torn Societies Project	Agneta Johansson Catherine Boullé-Weber	29.10.99
EU	ECHO	EU Commission Humanitarian Office	Peter Billing	16.11.99
	EU	EU Commission, Ex-DG VIII/2	Martin Landgraf	25.10.99
	SRC	Service Commun – Evaluation Unit	Helena Laakso	25.10.99
	Relex	External Relations Directorate-General of the European Commission	Peter Meyer	09.11.99
	CPN	Conflict Prevention Network, SWP	Reinhardt Rummel	09.11.99
	FEWER	Forum for Early Warning and Early Response	Eugenia Piza-Lopez	03.11.99